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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great Crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic crisis were watershed events 
in modern American history.1  The economic crisis forced American citizens to re-think the 
concepts of economic independence and interdependence that had long characterized their 
political culture.2  It set in motion a series of political and economic debates in the United 
States.  As citizens faced unemployment and failing wages, they came increasingly to 
believe that federal, state and local authorities should intervene in the national economy.   
Further, for many, the events confirmed, the idea that social inequality would be difficult to 
address and eradicate.  If the problems that stemmed from social inequality and economic 
crisis were to be solved, then efforts had to be made to redistribute wealth more equitably, 
and regulate the market so that some measure of fair competition and uniform standard 
pervaded.   During the presidencies of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
these ideas were tested and expanded.  Even though their administrations created new 
government agencies to deal with specific aspects of the continuing economic depression, 
debates over the adequacy and appropriateness of government intervention in the private 
economy dominated public life and discourse.   
The subject of this dissertation is to explore the National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933, its origins, and its significance as it paved the way for dynamic economic and 
                                                           
1 Christina D. Romer, “The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
105, no. 3 (August 1990):  597-598, 614, 616, 618; William L. Anderson, “Risk and the National Industrial Recovery 
Act:  An Empirical Evaluation,” Public Choice 103, no. ½ (April 2000):  139; Hugh Jebson, “The Great Crash of 1929,” 
Hindsight, January 2005, 22. 
2 Lionel D. Edie, “The Banks and the Stock Market Crisis of 1929,”  Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 
3, no. 1 (January 1930):  21; Elliot A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt and the Brains Trust:  From Depression to the New 
Deal (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1977), 5; Amity Shlaes, “How Presidential Administrations Cheat at 
Monopoly,” USA Today Magazine, January 2011, 12. http://www.usatodaymagazine.net. (accessed March 14, 
2015); Joseph Nolan, “Boom and Bust in the 1920s,” Vital Speeches of the Day,” December 1, 1995. 
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industrial change in the United States.  The National Industrial Recovery Act was designed 
to target high unemployment rates in the private sector and improve wages through the 
use of industry codes.3  It, also, reduced child labor, which enabled American corporations 
to hire more able-bodied and older Americans.  Tentatively, it established collective 
bargaining rights that allowed some workers to negotiate for better labor conditions and 
benefits.  These policies aided citizens participating in the labor market, where they could 
make more money and earn a higher standard of living.  In its design, the NRA differed 
from the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the early years of the depression that reduced the 
prices of consumer goods and commodities, due to excessive competition in industrial 
sectors and stagnant wages.4  Even as the national economy became more consumer-
oriented, the Roosevelt administration did not want to leave working and middle class 
citizens on the wrong side of the financial road.   
President Roosevelt believed in an expanded role for the federal government, while 
his predecessor, Herbert Hoover relied chiefly on the private sector to take control of 
recovery efforts, with the limited federal government assistance.5  The Roosevelt 
administration acted on the belief that a laissez-faire national economy had not and could 
                                                           
3 Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics:  Economic Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 107-109. 
4 Frederic F. Clairmont, “The Grand Malediction:  Bretton Woods in Retrospect,” Economic and Political Weekly 29, 
no. 42 (October 15, 1994):  2728, 2730; Ellis Hawley et al., Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism 
(Cambridge, Mass.:  Schnenkman Publishing Company, 1973), viii.  Welfare capitalism that characterized American 
life before WWI consisted of the belief that business executives were enlightened corporate leaders who provided 
public services.  Business leaders worked on American prosperity and benefited their workers through a host of 
programs designed to improve their day-to-day lives. 
5 Thomas E. Cronin and William R. Hochman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Presidency,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly (Spring 1985):  278; Telegrams to Governors Urging Stimulation of Public Works to Aid the 
Economy, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Volume 1:  Herbert Hoover, November 23, 
1929, Herbert Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West Branch, Iowa; William F. Jasper, 
“The Rise of the Administrative State,” The New American, January 21, 2013.  http://www.thenewamerican.com. 
(accessed March 12, 2015). 
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not address the growing financial needs of ordinary Americans nor could it resolve the 
public’s concerns.  Given the scale of the economic crisis, the federal government had to 
step in.  This dissertation seeks to clarify the role of the Roosevelt administration in 
pursuing that line in comparison to its predecessor, Herbert Hoover.6  The National 
Recovery Administration was a central political agency in this process and enabled 
Roosevelt to approve dynamic changes to the national economy and manufacturing sector.  
Without the NRA, industrial codes, and other economic and industrial reforms would have 
been non-existent.   Thus, both policymakers played important roles as president in trying 
to spur economic recovery.  Some scholars argue that Hoover only wanted to support 
private sector efforts.  He declined to support an expansion of public works and federal 
relief as solutions to economic deprivation among American families.7  The majority of 
historians argue, however, that the belief in limited government had to change if the United 
States was to move forward and revitalize the national economy.8           
Scholarly and Historical Context 
                                                           
6 Ellis Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism, ix.  Most Republican policymakers following 
the Harding administration argued for public works, but only during times of economic depression.  In 1928, 
Hoover campaigned on the premise that, during times of plenty, revenues should be set aside for periods of 
economic stress, which led to the promotion of public works projects that stimulated high employment levels. 
7 Statement Announcing a Series of Conferences with Representatives of Business, Industry, Agriculture and Labor, 
The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Volume 1:  Herbert Hoover, November 15, 1929, Herbert 
Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West Branch, Iowa. 
8 Please see the following sources that are used throughout the dissertation:   John Kenneth Galbraith and Liaguat 
Ahamed are two scholars who focus on the roles of the stock market, central bankers and other economic actors 
to discover the causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1929.  Herbert Hoover in his memoirs and pamphlets discussed 
how American Individualism shaped American thought about conservative fiscal and financial values that 
dominated American core values.  William E. Leuchtenburg and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., chronicled the events 
leading to the emergence of the Great Depression; and how the Roosevelt administration responded and resolved 
this economic crisis.  Charles Dearing, Clair Wilcox and Frederick Roos documented the organizational structure of 
the NRA and the many other executive branch agencies used to address the economic emergency of the 1930s. 
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After World War I, the United States became a creditor nation.9  American 
businesses and banks lent Western European countries capital to rebuild and revitalize 
their national economies.10  Advocates of expanded foreign loans believed that they 
benefited the global economic system.  Most state and national banks were members of the 
Federal Reserve System, and they did not believe that they had over-extended themselves 
in terms of the extent of the domestic loans or those to Great Britain and other European 
countries.11  Overextension of credit, and the expansion of government guarantees for 
loans meant that the federal government was at risk of defaulting on its own debt, 
especially if gold reserves were minimal or limited.  Problems with the gold standard, 
foreign debt, and the issue of monetary contraction domestically, thus, were among the 
central reasons for the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.12 
Scholars such as H. Parker Willis and Liaguat Ahamed have argued that the Federal 
Reserve was mistaken that intergovernmental loans in the 1920s would permanently 
enhance and promote economic growth in the United States.  In the short term, economic 
prosperity did occur and Americans did experience dynamic change.  In the long term, the 
loans were detrimental to the economic health of the United States especially as European 
nations defaulted on their public credit accounts.  The Great Crash of 1929, this school of 
thought argued, was caused by the snowball effect of defaults on domestic and 
                                                           
9 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II:  The Coming of the New Deal (Boston:  Houghton 
Mifflin, 1959), 64; Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (New York:  Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 32-35. 
10 H. Parker Willis, “Who Caused the Panic of 1929,” The North American Review 229, no. 2 (February 1930): 177. 
11 Liaguat Ahamed, Lords of Finance:  The Bankers that Broke the World (New York:  Penguin Press, 2009), 292-293, 
289, 309. 
12 Michael Bordo et al., The Defining Moment:  The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth 
Century (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 8-9; William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal 
(New York:  Harper & Row, 1963), 31; David McGill, “The Great Depression and the New Deal,” Hindsight, April 
2008, 26. 
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international loans that crippled the American economy.13  The steep decline in U.S. exports 
that followed foreign defaults also weakened the national economy. In contrast, Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., in The Age of Roosevelt, asserted that the Federal Reserve contributed to the 
crisis by increasingly restricting such loans.  George Harrison, president of the New York 
Branch of the Federal Reserve System after 1928, pressured the Federal Reserve Board of 
Washington, D.C., to tighten the money supply.  He warned American banks to discontinue 
the practice of establishing cheap money policy and easy credit that had underwritten 
widespread speculation in the Stock Market by the late 1920s.14 
As economic distress increased in the late 1920s, the Hoover administration argued 
for intergovernmental reforms for the purposes of promoting free trade and other 
agreements, such as establishing the economic moratorium that provided some financial 
relief to post-war Germany.  Hoover believed in global growth and argued that the 
developing economic crisis was an international issue as well as domestic.  He also believed 
that trade policy might be used to stimulate growth.15  Moreover, Hoover contended that 
the economic crisis had not originated in the United States; but he looked abroad for the 
financial roots of the crisis.16  Neither the Great Crash of 1929 nor the Banking crisis of the 
1930s, which sparked the emergence of the Great Depression, changed Hoover’s mind. 
                                                           
13 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover:  The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York:  Macmillan 
Company, 1952), 8; Maury Klein, “The Stock Market Crash of 1929:  A Review Article,” The Business History Review 
75, no. 2 (Summer 2001):  326-327;“The Age of Monty and Ben,” The Economist, December 22, 1990; “Blind Spots:  
Central Bankers in History,” The Economist, January 10, 2009. 
14 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II:  The Coming of the New Deal, 156-157; Milton 
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States:  1867-1960 (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1963), 255-256, 267-268; Janine Richardson, “Letting in the Light,” 13, Cobblestone, March 2008. 
15 The President’s News Conference, The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Volume 1:  Herbert 
Hoover, November 5, 1929, Herbert Hoover Papers; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library website, West Branch, 
Iowa. 
16 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover:  The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York:  Macmillan 
Company, 1952), 1-2. 
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In response to the deepening economic crisis, Hoover turned to private charitable 
organizations to aid destitute American workers, and pushed for a balanced federal budget.  
He sought to sustain the gold standard to stabilize prices for consumer goods and exchange 
rates.17  His policies were, in some respects, contradictory.  He opposed expanding the 
federal government as an economic foundation of individual welfare.  He, also, believed in 
decreased spending, an enlarged tax base, and self-help for all Americans.  He emphasized 
globalization, despite the domestic crisis, and asserted that the United States could not 
remain isolated from the rest of the world.18  In doing so, he distinguished federal 
intervention in the global economy and corporate support from individual welfare.  But one 
question that remains unresolved was whether Hoover or Roosevelt attempted to use 
Woodrow Wilson’s perspective on the rising phenomenon of globalization to target 
reforms to the national economy following the Great Crash of 1929?    
The issues of globalization and expanding the money supply were among the main 
arguments behind the Reconstruction Finance Corporation credited under Hoover during 
the banking crisis of the early 1930s.19  With the RFC, Hoover argued that American 
businesses could obtain loans to improve upon the production of manufactured goods, 
                                                           
17 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover:  The Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York:  Macmillan 
Company, 1952), vi, 1-2, 7-8; Winifred Wandersee, Women’s Work and Family Values, 1920-1940 (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1981), 32.  Wandersee argues that after the Great Crash of 1929, the cost of living in the 
United States decreased and consumer goods became less expensive. 
18 Dexter Perkins, “Woodrow Wilson:  An Interpretation,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series 
29 (1947):  128-129. 
19 J. Franklin Ebersole, “One Year of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 47, 
no. 3 (May 1933):  474; Joseph Lash, Dealers and Dreamers:  A Look at the New Deal (New York:  Doubleday, 1988), 
72-98; Jordan Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair:  Hoover, Congress and the Depression (Urbana:  University of 
Illinois Press, 1970), 51, 91-93; James L. Butkiewicz, “The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Gold Standard 
and the Banking Panic of 1933,” Southern Economic Journal 66, no. 2 (October 1999):  275; Gerald D. Nash, 
“Herbert Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 46, no. 3 (December 1959):  462; Beryl Wayne Sprinkel, “Economic Consequences of the Operations of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” Journal of the University of Chicago 25, no. 4 (October 1952):  211, 213. 
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invest wisely in the domestic economy, and compete internationally with their foreign 
counterparts.  By 1932, many political figures believed that Hoover’s public policies, 
especially the RFC, were efforts to increase government spending while avoiding 
expenditures to provide public relief.  As historian Gerald D. Nash has argued, during the 
negotiation process for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Hoover continued to 
assert that voluntary efforts in the private sector were sufficient to spur economic growth 
and deal with unemployment.  He hoped the RFC would, indirectly, add new jobs in the 
American labor market.  While Hoover supported limited government intervention to 
stimulate investment, he was not a proponent of public sector growth and relief, with the 
exception of limited expenditures for public works. 20 
For the economic observer, the problem in trying to expand available credit in the 
early 1930s was compounded by the fact that the Hoover administration supported a 
renewed metallic standard in the United States and globally.21  This economic stance was 
problematic, because gold and silver coinage promoted deflation and further depressed 
prices.  Further, the Hoover administration’s monetary policy in the late 1920s led directly 
to a contraction of credit in the private sector, as corporate banks and corporations 
reduced the money supply.22  Despite arguments to the contrary, Hoover stubbornly 
                                                           
20 Gerald D Nash, “Herbert Hoover and the Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 46, no. 3 (December 1959):  455. 
21 William Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal (New York:  Harper & Row, 1963), 31; Elliot A. Rosen, Roosevelt, 
The Great Depression and the Economies of Recovery (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 2005); 15. 
22 Michael D. Bordo et al., The Defining Moment:  The Great Depression and the American Economy in the 
Twentieth Century (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 8-9. 
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reaffirmed his belief in the value of gold to global exchange rates and the importance of 
stable prices for consumer goods.23 
The economic crisis had, however, altered the context for monetary policy.  Hoover’s 
efforts to balance the federal budget and the emphasis placed upon financial and material 
assistance from private charities failed to address the needs of ordinary American citizens 
who suffered from a crippled national economy.24  During his presidency, Hoover 
wondered about the gold standard as a mechanism for depressed exchange rates.  He did 
not want to leave a metallic standard but he retracted the money stock, because he was 
concerned with gold flight.25   Hoover’s policies may have contributed to the emergence of 
the Great Depression as a global event, because many nations were affected by his 
restrictive American monetary policy.  Moreover, all nations, especially Western countries, 
maintained interconnected monetary policies that tied nations together for the sake of 
economic survival and prosperity.  
By the end of Hoover’s presidency, many economists, political leaders, and ordinary 
citizens believed that the economic crisis required the intervention of the federal 
government and a new monetary standard.26  Policymakers and ordinary American citizens 
both sought the means to address unemployment and to ameliorate the poverty and 
displacement that resulted.  Consequently, the Roosevelt administration made moves to 
use public sector goods to bolster the private economy.  The Roosevelt administration 
became involved in regulating the manufacturing sector through policies that would, 
                                                           
23 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II:  The Coming of the New Deal (Boston:  Houghton 
Mufflin, 1959), 233; “Herbert Hoover’s Tragic Presidency,” http://www.austincc.edu/lpatrick/his2341/tragic/html. 
(accessed February 17, 2013). 
24 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II:  The Coming of the New Deal, 233-235. 
25 Robert A. Garson and Stuart A. Kidd, ed., The Roosevelt Years:  New Perspectives on American History, 1933-1945 
(Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 141. 
26 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II:  The Coming of the New Deal, 82-83. 
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through planning, reduce cut-throat competition, increase purchasing power, and improve 
upon the working conditions of Americans.27  
With Roosevelt’s election success, in 1932, the political climate shifted again.  
Vowing broad experimentation in policy, the Roosevelt administration pushed through a 
full slate of sweeping legislation, including the National Industrial Recovery Act.28  Through 
a newly created National Recovery Administration, the government sought to increase 
economic growth through improved wages in the private and public sectors.  In theory, the 
agency should have increased the purchasing power of American citizens and bolstered 
employment levels in the United States.  With more money in the hands of ordinary 
citizens, they could participate in the market place and acquire goods that sustained or 
improved upon their standard of living.  Furthermore, the cutthroat competition that had 
driven overproduction and simultaneously lowered prices would be addressed through 
cooperation in industry.  Government, industry, and--to a limited extent--labor negotiated 
codes and thus participated in recovery.29 
The economic well-being of American workers became one of the focal points of 
government policy under the newly-elected president Franklin D. Roosevelt.  In his book, 
The Great Depression, Robert McElvaine argues that economic individualism had influenced 
                                                           
27 Franklin Roosevelt’s Statement on the National Industrial Recovery Act (June 16, 1933), Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt Library & Museum website, http://www.docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odnirast.html, author:  Staff of the 
Roosevelt Library, version date 2015, (accessed January 23, 2015); The Social Welfare History Project, “The 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 Signed into Law on June 16, 1933,” 
http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/eras/national-industrial-recovery-act-of-1933/ (accessed January 23, 2015). 
28 Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Milleu, The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (Amherst:  University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2002), 41. 
29 “Teaching with Documents:  FDR’s Fireside Chat on the Purposes and Foundations of the Recovery Program,” 
National Archives and Records Administration website at College Park, Maryland, 
http://archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-fireside/ (accessed January 23, 2015); Lowell B. Mason, “Darrow vs. 
Johnson,” The North American Review 238, no. 6 (December 1934):  524, 526-527; Donald Richberg, “Progress 
under the National Industrial Recovery Act,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 15, no. 4 (January 
1934):  395. 
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Depression-era politics, but Roosevelt represented a break from that tradition.30  Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt was not an overt deficit-spending advocate.  Indeed, he did not embrace 
Keynesian economic theory, but he believed that financial and material relief programs 
were important factors in preventing the destitution of the American workers.31  As 
historians have long claimed, Roosevelt received pragmatic approval in addressing these 
problems. 
After the presidential election in November of 1932, Roosevelt sought to address the 
crisis in different ways from the prior administration and thus changed the American 
political landscape.  During his first one hundred days, FDR used his political mandate to 
pass a series of economic reforms and stimulus programs, such as the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Emergency Banking Act.  The 
National Industrial Recovery Act was the culmination of Roosevelt’s efforts to stem the 
economic crisis and put Americans back to work.  Further, Roosevelt, as a product of the 
progressive drive to reform the national economy and promote better social conditions for 
all Americans, saw his national economic policies as a means of addressing not just the 
economic crisis, but also lasting inequality.  Viewed by some conservatives as “traitor to his 
                                                           
30 Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression:  America, 1929-1941 (New York:  Three Rivers Press, 1993), 58-59; 
“The United States Turns Inward:  the 1920s and 1930s,” Scholastic, 
http://www.scholastic.com/browse/subarticle.jsp?id=1674. (accessed April 5, 2013); Ellis Hawley et al., Herbert 
Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism, 5.  In the United States, there were two economic visions that 
pervaded until the Great Depression.  A laissez-faire system with independent businessmen was on one hand, 
while Christian Capitalism and its emphasis on morality and ethical tenets existed with compassionate men leading 
the charge against social and economic decay.  Hoover believed in both Americas, and sought to use both premises 
to design social and economic reforms. 
31 Special Report, “Text of Roosevelt’s Message to Congress, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 5, 1935.  In this State of 
the Union speech, Roosevelt confirmed that American workers should have some rudimentary socioeconomic 
rights such as housing, and a higher standard of living, and that Congress should enact laws that enabled these 
economic and social dreams occur.  Moreover, the federal government, during times of need, should provide 
Americans with relief even if this was not initially budgeted by the various branches of government. 
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class,” Roosevelt believed in the “common man” and sought to provide ordinary Americans 
with relief and emergency financial support.32 
The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, was an important effort that 
paved the way for dynamic change and attempted to resolve the national emergency in the 
United States.  It sought first to address those competitive practices that contributed to the 
emergence of economic deprivation and collapse.33  The law restructured the national 
economy and its industrial sectors to create a new environment characterized by high 
employment in the labor market that ideally benefited American workers and consumers.  
The New Deal also changed the ways in which the public sector viewed those who worked, 
and it provided working and middle class Americans with opportunities to petition their 
employers for better working conditions and benefits.   Roosevelt had a sense of action to 
address the people’s concerns and Americans had more confidence in his administration to 
mitigate the crippling effects of the Depression.34 
Under the leadership of the Roosevelt administration, Congress passed the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and modeled the new NRA on the War Industries Board (WIB) that 
had been established after the United States entered the First World War in 1917.  The WIB 
had been the first attempt of elected officials to link a centralized planning approach to 
economic policy in the United States’ government.35 The WIB was responsible for the 
                                                           
32 Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York:  The Viking Press, 1946), 71, 154, 166; Philip A. Grant Jr., “The 
Presidential Election of 1932 in Michigan,” Michigan Historical Review 12, no. 1 (Spring 1986), 89; Sidney M. Milkis 
and Jerome M. Milleu, The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (Amherst:  University of Massachusetts Press, 
2002), 27. 
33 Special, “Text of Richberg’s Business Report to Roosevelt,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1934; “National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,” The Social Welfare Project, http://www.socialwelfare.com/eras/national-
industrial-recovery-act-of-1933/. (accessed April 1, 2013). 
34 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II, 1-3. 
35 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt Volume II, 37, 65; Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years:  A 
History of the American Worker, 1933-1941 (Chicago:  Haymarket Books, 2010), 19. 
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logistics of consumer goods and commodities to American soldiers fighting in Europe.  
American policymakers strove to ensure that American soldiers were well cared for and 
had the necessary tools and equipment to fight the Central powers in Europe.36  Lastly, the 
WIB was concerned with the pricing of commodities and other materials used by military 
forces so that stock levels were maintained and managed efficiently.  The NRA used many 
of these innovations in seeking to address the imbalances within the market and the 
economy.  
More importantly, the NIRA was the first federal law enacted that promoted 
centralized planning of the national economy during peacetime.   Historian William 
Leuchtenburg has argued that the NIRA was an important law that enabled American 
policymakers in the Roosevelt administration to win the war against the Great 
Depression.37  This critical period in American history was described using war 
mobilizations metaphor.  The Great Depression was what Roosevelt described as the 
analogue of war, and it had to be eradicated through the creation of federal agencies 
including the National Recovery Administration.  This metaphor enabled Americans to rally 
behind New Deal programs, establish a common sense approach to ending the crisis, 
promote the national interest, and end all opposition to new policies.  It enabled a new crop 
                                                           
36 Leo Wolman, “The Statistical Work of the War Industries Board,” Publications of the American Statistical 
Association 16, no. 125 (March 1919):  249, 252-253.  The WIB also maintained statistics on commodities and 
supplies to determine domestic consumption levels; Robert D. Cuff, “A Dollar-a-Year Man in Government:  George 
N. Peek and the War Industries Board,” Business History Review 41, no. 4 (Winter 1967):  407.  This article 
illustrates that George Peek was concerned with the proper allocation of materials to American soldiers during the 
First World War.  Logistics is an important part of any military exercise, and this issue was one of his top concerns 
and served as the major goal of the WIB. 
37 William Leuchtenburg, The FDR Years:  On Roosevelt and His Legacy (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
2001), 36-38, 66.  One must also mention that American corporate executives and policymakers wanted to re-
establish the WIB to serve as an apparatus to combat the Great Depression.  The WIB and the 1917-1918 wartime 
mobilization were viewed as examples of cooperation and successful coordination to defeat the Central powers, 
and now these same types of institutions were to defeat poverty and destitution during the interwar period in the 
United States. 
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of American scholars in public sector agencies to mobilize and fight against unemployment 
and poverty during the Depression years.38   
The National Industrial Recovery Act’s principal strategy in confronting the crisis 
was to centralize industrial planning to address the negative effects of competition on the 
economy and to help stabilize the boom-and-bust cycle that had led to the crisis.  The NRA’s 
fair codes of competition further enabled policymakers and corporate executives to work 
together to regulate the various industries in the United States to stave off overproduction, 
the corrosive effect of competitive price wars, and the long-term effects of corporate 
monopoly on prices, wages, and working conditions.39  In addition, while highly contested, 
NIRA’s section 7(a) established the right to collective bargaining, and thus trade unionism 
in the United States.40  The role of the federal government, with the passage of the NIRA 
expanded dramatically; and working Americans benefited from some of the industrial 
rights under the National Labor Board and the NRA.  Section 7(a) was essential to the NIRA, 
because it was the first attempt by policymakers to manage and regulate workplace 
conditions and expand employee rights and benefits in effect, to create “industrial 
democracy.”   
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In 1932, Congress had passed an act limiting labor injunction, entitled the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, that opened the door for broader labor union action.41  Senator George 
William Norris of Nebraska and New York Representative Fiorello H. LaGuardia introduced 
this important bill, which had an enormous impact on worker relations in the private 
sector.  This law enabled workers to strike without interruption for better working 
conditions, wages and benefits.  It prohibited corporate executives from relying on labor 
injunctions to get their employees back to work in cases of labor disapproval.42  The law 
had a significant influence on future legislation, such as the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933 and the National Labor (Wagner) Relations Act of 1935.  Moreover, the new 
NIRA law differed from earlier federal policy, and especially from the Hoover 
administration’s reform strategies, which had stressed corporate subsidies and private 
relief.43  Section 7(a) had a regenerative effect on the labor movement, because it enabled 
American workers to collectively bargain to rectify worker grievances, factory conditions, 
and dissatisfaction with the labor market. 
Literature Review 
This dissertation differs from the works of prominent global historians that may 
have focused entirely on foreign policy, such as Martin Kitchen, and Charles Poor 
Kindleberger; labor and the history of American consumers, such as Lizabeth Cohen; the 
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Great Crash of 1929, such as John Kenneth Galbraith; the Great Depression and the 
interwar period, such as George McJimsey, and David M. Kennedy; the political and 
economic agendas of the New Deal, such as Alan Brinkley, Eric Rauchway, Ellis Hawley, 
William E. Leuchtenburg, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, such as Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr and Bernard Asbell.  It seeks to examine the business history of American 
corporations in the automobile and petroleum sectors, and how these businesses were 
affected by the presidency of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as both 
policymakers sought to rectify the private sector decline.  This historical account 
enumerates how geopolitics affected the United States as American corporations, for the 
first time, were regulated by an expanded federal government.  It illustrates how the 
federal government became proactive in its economic responses to mitigate the effects of 
the Great Depression.  It attempts to perform a comparative analysis between the Hoover 
and Roosevelt presidencies following the Great Crash of 1929 until 1935, and the effects 
that the federal government’s policies had on American workers as the NIRA and AAA took 
hold in the United States.   
Historical scholarship on the New Deal literature has focused mainly on the Second 
New Deal period that occurred from 1936 to 1945.  It was during Roosevelt’s second 
administration that many laws such as the Wagner Act, or National Labor Relations Act of 
1935 that validated trade unionism and the Social Security Act that created social 
insurance were passed.  The First New Deal agenda, in which laws, such as the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act were passed, was in many ways 
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equally important.44  As some historians have argued, it set the template and limitations for 
federal policy.  In this narrative, I will discuss the major components of the National 
Recovery Administration and how the various branches of this agency functioned by 
analyzing primary and secondary source materials.45 The National Archives contain 
significant amounts of literature on the Consumer Advisory and Industrial Advisory boards 
that served as important administrative organs within the NRA.  These documents enabled 
me to scrutinize in more detail the duties and responsibilities of both sub-agencies.  
Moreover, the National Archives contains the Donald Richberg Papers.  The Donald 
Richberg Papers were an essential part of this dissertation, because they enumerate and 
provide a first-hand account of his actions as general counsel for the NRA.  As readers may 
recall, Richberg was an influential and successful labor attorney, who played a prominent 
role in the NRA as general counsel.46  He worked closely with General Hugh Samuel 
Johnson, who served as the chief administer for the NRA.   
In order to paint a more vivid picture of the NRA and how its policies affected the 
average American worker, this dissertation uses primary source materials from the 
Reuther Research Archives at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan.47  The Reuther 
Archives contain New Deal labor newspaper articles, letters, and written essays that 
activists published in labor magazines and scholarly journals.  It also contains the private 
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papers of New Deal scholars and trade unionists Mary Van Kleeck, Mary Heaton Vorse, 
Harry O’Connor and Robert Dun, including their manuscripts and documents with 
descriptive citations and notes on them.  These New Deal scholars’ papers compose a 
critical portion of the dissertation.  The New Dealers provide enormous detail into the 
relationship that they had with the federal government, corporations in the private sector 
and their colleagues throughout organized labor.  Their works allowed me to paint a vivid 
picture of the Great Depression and how the New Deal paved the way for dynamic changes 
in the private sector through the enactment of federal regulations that promoted private 
sector growth.  Contemporaries during the New Deal, such as Charles Roos, Alfred 
Bernheim and Dorothy Van Doren, Charles L. Dearing and others, and Lois MacDonald, 
Gladys L. Palmer and Theresa Wolfson; provided readers with detailed information about 
the agencies of the NRA, how they were organized and the responsibilities of the different 
internal boards.48  This dissertation relies upon these works as well.  Subsequent analyses 
have expanded on these early works on the NRA and enumerate some of its deficiencies.   
In newspaper coverage from the New York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune in 
1933 and 1934, General Hugh Samuel Johnson and other officials discusses the roles and 
responsibilities of the NRA.  Some of Johnson’s speeches in which he addresses his critics, 
were reported in newspapers as well.  The NRA was viewed by many, especially American 
corporate leaders, as a controversial agency.  These primary sources illustrate in detail how 
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the NRA officials attempted to weather the political storms that came their way during the 
process of the carrying out many of their duties.      
Beyond the NRA, this dissertation examines the roles of Herbert Hoover and 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in bringing about economic and industrial changes during the 
Great Depression.  Hoover wrote three sets of memoirs that address the Great Crash of 
1929, how the Great Depression started, and who should be held responsible.  In them, he 
described his opposition to the New Deal and the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to 
resolve the economic crisis.  Hoover’s public papers contain letters, media statements and 
speeches from his presidency in which he discussed in great detail his economic and 
political policies.49  Hoover wrote two books, in which he discussed his beliefs in American 
principles and how they differentiated the United States from the rest of the world.50  For 
Hoover, these Republican ideals fell by the wayside during the New Deal, because his 
successor, Roosevelt, espoused central planning of the national economy and social 
programs, not the self-help that Hoover envisioned and emphasized.  Although this 
dissertation touches upon Hoover’s role as a food administrator during the First World 
War, much effort is placed upon defining his responsibilities as Commerce Secretary and 
President.  His memoirs and public statements enabled me to document his political 
mindset as a public official and the negative effects that the Great Crash had on his 
administration. 
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The New Deal era generated a voluminous public record.  Roosevelt’s public papers 
are much more extensive than Hoover’s, because FDR served four terms as president of the 
United States.  The archives contain his letters to American and foreign policymakers and 
corporate leaders, his speeches to the American people, such as his 1932 campaign 
addresses and some of his Fireside chats, his press releases and public media statements in 
which he addressed his presidential press corps as well as correspondence with 
constituent voters.51  Roosevelt’s children along with historian Bernard Asbell published 
his memoirs and these serve as an indirect method of explaining Roosevelt’s political 
mindset as he created the New Deal and the NIRA.52  This dissertation will not describe 
Roosevelt’s private life, such as what Bernard Asbell accomplished in his Roosevelt 
biography, but will discuss his roles as governor of New York State and president of the 
United States during a period of profound economic collapse.  It differs from other works 
because it examines the Roosevelt administration’s expanded role in the private sector as 
the Executive Branch enacted the NIRA and the AAA.  In addition, it elucidates the duties of 
Roosevelt and his efforts along with Frances Perkins, Donald Richberg, Harold Ickes and 
General Hugh Samuel Johnson to redefine the federal government’s private sector 
responsibilities.  Each policymaker was obligated to work with corporations in the 
automobile and petroleum sectors to promote industrial growth during a period of 
economic collapse.   
Frances Perkins’ The Roosevelt I Knew examines the roles that she, as labor 
secretary, played during the negotiations for the NIRA and the professional relationships 
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that she maintained with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, General Hugh Samuel Johnson, Harold 
Ickes, and Donald Richberg.53  These memoirs reveal the process by which the New Deal 
was created, and stand as evidence of Roosevelt’s unique approach to policymaking.  
Frances Perkins was instrumental to the creation of the NIRA, but this dissertation 
somewhat departs from her analytical work, because it examines the substantial team 
effort that it took to enact this important bill.  Her role is muted slightly in this dissertation 
in an effort to describe the organizational structure of the NRA and its role as a federal 
regulator for the national economy.    
Third, this dissertation discusses how the automobile and petroleum industries in 
particular were affected by the NIRA.  Historian Sidney Fine, along with Clarence J. 
Huddleston whose papers contain interviews about the Banking Crisis in Detroit in the 
1930s, enumerated the roles of Henry Ford during this period.54  Sidney Fine’s papers 
contain newspaper articles and accounts of the Edgewater strike in New Jersey during the 
1930s, in which Ford workers agitated for the legitimation of trade unionism.  Both Sidney 
Fine and Clarence J. Huddleston describe Ford Motor Company during the Great 
Depression and this dissertation differs from their works in that it enumerates the 
interdependent roles of both Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation during 
the negotiation process for the automobile code.  Sidney Fine focused on Ford Motor 
Company and its relationship to the NRA but this dissertation seeks to go a little farther to 
provide more information about the industrial codes that affected the automobile industry 
from 1933 to 1935.  Additionally, it touches upon how the automobile industry was 
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interwoven with the petroleum sector as oil commodities along with the manufactured 
products from the automobile industry became essential consumer goods for the American 
people and global citizens.   
The Benson Ford Research Collection at the Henry Ford Museum contains account 
books and ledgers used by management at Ford Motor Company.  They reveal how 
management functioned under the NIRA.55  The Ford Archives have anonymous letters to 
Thomas Edison, in which an unknown author advocated against the passage of the NIRA; 
and discussed the supposed damage that it would cause the automobile sector if enacted.  
The Ford Archives have the petroleum and automobile codes in their entirety.  Historians 
Lonnie Bell, Douglas Brinkley, David L. Lewis, Sidney Fine, and John B. Rae provide readers 
with snapshots into the origins and history of Ford Motor Company and how this company 
fared during the New Deal.56  These books also analyze the effects that the NIRA had on its 
corporate operations and provide detailed analysis.    
David Farber’s Sloan Rules illustrates the responsibilities of Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who 
served as the president of General Motors until 1956, and his efforts to work with the 
NIRA.57  However, the history of General Motors is difficult to dissect during the 1930s, 
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because the GM Heritage Center Collection has few of the firm’s files from the New Deal 
period to the present.  Sloan’s private documents have been destroyed, and there are only 
limited primary sources at the GM archives, such as sales account books and ledgers from 
the 1930s.  Sloan’s manuscript from his My Years with General Motors is on file at the GM 
archives.58  This book provides readers with first-hand information about the 
interworkings of General Motors Corporation under his helm.  Moreover, there are many 
New York Times articles from the summer of 1933 that illustrated the roles of Sloan who 
served in the NRA’s Industrial Advisory Board.  Sloan’s critical position in the NRA allowed 
him to shape the board and the agency itself.  This dissertation attempts to illustrate vividly 
General Motors Corporation during the Great Depression and fills in the gaps in this 
company’s historiography throughout this critical period in the United States.     
In addition, Ed Cray’s Chrome Colossus discusses some corporate aspects of GM, but 
it relies solely on newspaper articles from the period and limited private correspondence.59  
Farber’s Sloan Rules examines more primary source materials, such as letters between 
Sloan and Roosevelt and other New Deal policymakers, and has a host of secondary source 
material.  Kettering University, which had been named previously General Motors 
Institution in Flint, Michigan, has some New Deal primary source materials, such as letters, 
corporate documents and account books; but their records are limited, because of the 
paucity of surviving GM documentation.60  Douglas Reynolds and Ernest Dale chart the 
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history of General Motors under Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who had a powerful automotive mind 
and his efforts to work with the Roosevelt administration during the New Deal period.61 
In terms of the petroleum industry, the literature is rich with detail.  This 
dissertation is somewhat similar to prior works from Donald R. Brand and Norman E. 
Nordhauser that describe the petroleum industry during the Great Depression and provide 
expanded views of the negotiation process for the oil code throughout 1933.  Many 
corporate executives and governors especially from the Southwest, were mentioned in 
Congressional hearings for the NIRA.  The oil industry in the 1930s is further discussed 
thoroughly in many newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, the 
Chicago Daily Tribune and the Los Angeles Times.  The Department of Justice also contains 
some files about the Teapot Dome crisis from 1921 to 1924 and how the petroleum 
industry fared, because of this political event in the years before the Depression.  In the 
1930s, this crisis was overshadowed by the emergence of the Great Depression.   
There were some efforts by Harold Ickes to regulate the oil industry and to apply 
the petroleum code to corporations in this sector.  In Fightin’ Oil and The Secret Diary of 
Harold I. Ickes, Ickes discussed his efforts at reforming the petroleum industry; but he 
mainly illustrates his role in the logistics and shipping of oil to American soldiers fighting in 
Europe during the Second World War.62  Ickes’ memoirs describe his political life during 
the heart of the New Deal from 1933 to 1936.  Norman E. Nordhauser, and the National 
Petroleum News cover the development and shifts in the petroleum industry during the 
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New Deal period.63  Historian Gerald D. Nash examines the negotiations for the petroleum 
code while Donald R. Brand described the petroleum industry during the New Deal and 
how the industry faced difficult challenges with the enactment of the NIRA.64  Collectively, 
these works help to provide a picture of the NRA through two of its most important target 
industries.  This dissertation relies heavily on these works about the petroleum industry 
during the Great Depression and describes how price and production controls were 
debated upon and negotiated during the hearings for the oil code throughout the summer 
months of 1933. 
Dissertation Chapter Review 
Ideally, this dissertation will contribute to the historical and political debate about 
the New Deal, its successes and its failures, by examining the passage of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933.  This dissertation scrutinizes its implementation 
and effects, and its demise after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Schechter v. the 
United States in 1935.  First, this document outlines the problems that faced the Herbert 
Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt administrations and their efforts to redress the 
effects of the economic crisis that took place from 1929 onward.  All of the chapters 
attempt to link the political and economic events of the 1920s, such as the Great Crash and 
the emergence of the Great Depression in the 1930s to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to 
target reforms to redress the industrial and economic crisis.  Much effort is devoted to 
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describing the economic and industrial events before the emergence of the NIRA and AAA 
and sets the tone for future discussions.  By focusing on the events that led to the 
enactment of the NIRA and AAA, readers can comprehend more thoroughly the need for 
the federal regulations inherent in both laws.  The American economy was in a shambles 
and this dissertation enumerates the differing roles of the presidency as both Hoover and 
Roosevelt sought to devise solutions to the industrial and economic crisis.    
In Chapter Two, I focus on how the petroleum and automobile industries fared 
during the 1920s, before and during the Great Crash of 1929.  This chapter will examine 
how both sectors expanded their international market-share as the federal government 
sought to create the conditions for economic growth.  The chapter will discuss Ford Motor 
Company, General Motors Corporations, and the myriad of petroleum companies.  The 
chapter illustrates how both industries developed global relations as they expanded their 
business operations.  It will discuss the important issues, such as conservation, production, 
technology, corporate and market innovations, and labor relations, that affected 
corporations in the petroleum and automobile industries. 
Chapter Three discusses the Great Crash of 1929 and the coming of the Great 
Depression in the 1930s.  Scholars believe that there were many reasons for these financial 
crises.  Under-consumption, overproduction in American industries, technological 
innovation in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and the price instability of 
manufactured goods were the key industrial causes of the economic crises.  The national 
economy’s problems with a metallic standard, the lack of programs to address the crisis 
under President Herbert Hoover, the promotion of private charities and a balanced federal 
budget, Stock Market speculation, and the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve System 
26 
 
 
 
were implicated in the continued economic, social and monetary crises of the 1930s.  Thus, 
the national economy was changing under the Hoover administration, but it could not 
respond effectively in large part due to Hoover’s lack of flexibility, while the Roosevelt 
administration addressed the crisis with Keynesian policies that Roosevelt termed 
“experimentation.”  FDR decided to act for the American people and reform the diverse 
elements of the national economy.65  
Chapter Four addresses arguments about a laissez-faire approach to the crisis in the 
United States as well as the introduction of alternative economic ideas and policies.  It 
further follows the scope and range of political responses to the economic crisis.  Both 
Hoover and Roosevelt maintained divergent political views about the national economy.  
This dissertation seeks to point out those differences and examine their policy approaches 
through their speeches, press releases, public statements and correspondence, and other 
primary and secondary source material.  Moreover, it contends that the United States and 
its approach to the national economy were adapting to the new context of the global 
economy.  Politicians and government administrators sought to address the global crisis 
with new policies. 
Chapter Five examines the interregnum period following the presidential election of 
1932.  It discusses the lingering conditions present during the early years of the Great 
Depression.  It elaborates on how Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, and 
the petroleum industries maintained their profitability during the growing crisis.  The 
chapter provides a glimpse into how families survived during troubling times and the role 
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of Hoover and Roosevelt as policymakers who attempted to resolve the crisis.  How 
families made ends meet during a period of widespread unemployment and how the 
petroleum and automobile industries maintained difficult relations are addressed as well.  
Lastly, the chapter looks at the foreign debt crisis between Europe and the United States 
that was not resolved before the presidential inauguration of March 4, 1933.  During this 
period, Hoover and Roosevelt began to drift apart ideologically, and their differences were 
not resolved. 
 Chapter Six examines the Roosevelt Administration’s efforts to stem the problems 
of the Great Depression by adopting a form of centralized planning in the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.  The War Industries Board, headed by Bernard Baruch and 
that had been established during World War I, served as a successful template for 
centralized planning of American industries.66  The WIB had regulated the production 
process of American corporations in the United States to mobilize material resources for 
the war effort.67  It enabled policymakers realize that centralized planning of the national 
economy offered some positive effects for corporations and had the capacity to enhance 
their profits.  Run by corporate executives called “one dollar men,” the WIB became both an 
example of overreach for some conservatives but also an exemplar of the potential of 
economic planning to resolve economic uncertainty.68  Johnson and others who served in 
this agency realized the importance of maintaining sound interconnected relationships 
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with the private sector, because this improved supply chains or logistics for American 
soldiers fighting in Europe during the First World War.  
In this section of the dissertation, I discuss the provisions of Title I, which created 
the NRA, the codes of fair competition, and collective bargaining.69  Both provisions in the 
NIRA were aimed at putting the United States on the right track toward economic recovery.  
The Title I provisions paved the way for worker rights and better labor conditions, because 
corporate executives had to follow the codes of fair competition that contained collective 
bargaining stipulations.  The industry codes intervened in both the commodities and labor 
markets, and they were originally designed to provide workers with an improved work 
environment.  The codes were the first step toward economic justice and financial solvency.  
The NRA became an important agency that worked with industry leaders to devise, 
approve and enforce the codes of fair competition.70   
Although the NRA was not long-standing, it created hundreds of codes that 
reformed the economic environment and provided workers with tangible rights.71  
American workers had new access to better wage determination schema, improved 
working conditions and benefits for themselves and their families.  Moreover, American 
workers did not have to join company unions or be subjected to yellow-dog contracts.  The 
NIRA expanded upon worker rights and freedoms and led to new judicial interpretations of 
labor laws.   
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The NIRA, however, was not without its critics.  The National Association of 
Manufacturers and the corporate executives who were its members were opposed 
vehemently to the NIRA.  They did not approve of this law and protested against the 
passage and implementation of the NIRA.  The American Liberty League, which was a non-
partisan organization with conservative values, such as the intense protection of private 
property and limited government regulations of the national economy, also opposed both 
the NIRA and the NRA.72  Their opposition led to court challenges and the eventual 
dismantling of the NRA and AAA in the mid-1930s. 
In Chapter Seven, I look at the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and how its 
operations developed the codes of fair competition to which corporations in each industry 
were to adhere.  The NRA codes set up production quotas, eliminated child labor, improved 
wages, limited weekly work hours, and provided employees with collective bargaining 
rights.  Contemporary observers, such as Clair Wilcox in America’s Recovery Program, 
Charles Frederick Roos in NRA Economic Planning, and Charles L. Dearing in The ABC of the 
NRA illustrated the steps that American corporations had to follow in an effort to receive 
the Blue Eagle seal.73  The Blue Eagle was a federal license that corporations obtained, if 
they had approved and adhered to an industry code of fair competition.  With the Blue 
Eagle, the federal government recognized corporations as having the approval to conduct 
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business operations under this new law.74  Codes of fair competition were in place, and 
American corporations could transact business with domestic and foreign counterparties.  
By early 1935, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began to seek a two-year 
extension to the NIRA, but events during this period prevented him from achieving this 
goal.  In May 1935, the Supreme Court ruled that the NRA was unconstitutional, because 
the law interfered with the interstate commerce authority of Congress.75  In particular, 
Schechter v. the United States served as a test case for the many individual suits that were 
argued in the lower branches of the Federal Judiciary, State Supreme Courts and Courts of 
Appeals.76  Many court cases had targeted and attacked the codes of fair competition, public 
works’ provisions of the NIRA, and collective bargaining rights.  Another issue that the 
Supreme Court reviewed was the determination of intrastate commerce versus interstate 
commerce in the transactions of American businesses.77  If a company maintained 
primarily local operations while only minor transactions were national or international, 
did this imply that it had violated the interstate commerce authority of Congress and, thus, 
the United States’ Constitution?   
The court cases that dealt with violations of the petroleum and live poultry codes 
were central to the discussion, because they addressed the constitutionality of the NIRA 
and its industry codes.  The petroleum code cases dealt with the excess shipment of oil or 
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petroleum products throughout the United States and how that affected the prices for those 
goods (cut-throat prices).  The live poultry code law suit dealt with infringements against 
wages and hours provisions of the code.  The petroleum and live poultry code violations 
were argued in federal court, because the justices had to iron out whether the commerce 
clause of the United States’ Constitution had been violated.  These code challenges 
determined the fate of the NRA.   
Overall, the Supreme Court decision’s overturning of the NIRA paved the way for 
new industrial reforms.  The Executive branch realized that it could affect indirectly 
collective bargaining through the discontinuation of federal agencies, such as the NRA and 
stimulate American industrial production in other ways than regulation.  In 1935, National 
Labor Relations Act was passed, and it affected private sector industrial growth and wages 
in the national economy.  Policymakers sought to push for trade unionism and the 
emergence of collective bargaining between workers and employers as a necessary step to 
protect American workers and corporate management entities.  This freed the hands of the 
Roosevelt administration.  
Chapter Eight focuses on the death of the NIRA, but it contends that collective 
bargaining after the curtailment of the NIRA became the norm in the United States through 
other means.  In fact, the NRA’s hearings on industrial conflict, done through regional labor 
boards, provided the model for the National Labor Relations Board’s system of adjudicating 
labor conflict, running certification elections, and hearing worker and union grievances.78  
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Section 7(a) then was only the first stage of the Roosevelt administration’s experiment with 
labor.79  The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which followed the demise of the NIRA, 
played an important role in continuing the tradition of collective bargaining and trade 
unionism in the United States.  The NIRA and its section 7(a) were only the beginning steps 
toward establishing worker rights in the labor force and corporate settings, and with its 
curtailment, a new industrial and economic methodology has been promoted since the New 
Deal period to promote the longevity of trade unionism in the American industrial 
landscape.   
In many ways, the United States is still affected in a positive manner by the passage 
of the NIRA during the New Deal period.  The law, importantly, was the first step in 
peacetime to regulate directly the national economy.  As students and scholars examine 
this period, they will witness the unfolding of the modern political state in the United 
States.  Roosevelt opened the presidency and his administration to the American people 
and this differed immensely from President Hoover, who was not convinced that 
Americans understood the foreign and domestic policies that he attempted to establish.  
This dissertation serves as a mechanism for debate about these issues in the United States 
and global system.  These lessons can strengthen American concepts of independence 
versus interdependence, and the country can move forward.   
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CHAPTER 2:  THE INDUSTRIAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE 
1920s 
In the 1920s, American businesses experienced a series of economic highs and lows 
due to monetary deflation and financial crises.1  There was a minor recession after the First 
World War, and, despite widely perceived prosperity, by 1926, real wages were stagnant.  
During these minor recessions, 4,750,000 persons remained on the unemployment lines 
and could not locate work.2  In addition, there was enormous volatility in the financial and 
stock markets.  As the United States moved to a consumer-based national economy, 
corporate executives such as Henry Ford, William Durant, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. and Pierre S. 
du Pont faced enormous economic instability as they sought to promote the viability of 
their respective companies.3  In the past, scholars may have discussed the monetary causes 
of the instability prior to 1929; but the manufacturing sector and its practices contributed 
to economic volatility even during the 1920s.  While many middle-class Americans were 
participating in the Stock Exchange, industrial practices such as overproduction and price 
fixing, as Michael Bernstein and other economic historians have shown, were at the 
forefront of the economic discussions in the United States.4  Scholars such as Arthur B. 
Adams have argued that business booms have often been followed by national and/or 
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global depressions.5  This chapter seeks to address the economic circumstances of the 
1920s focusing on the industrial sector and in particular automobile manufacturing and oil 
production.  It examines the automobile and petroleum industries and how they fared 
during this dynamic period in United States’ history.  Even as Americans were purchasing 
vehicles in mass numbers, and new highway construction linked the rural areas to urban 
sector, there were signs that the prosperity built on the new car economy had its limits.6  
Additionally, I discuss the business practices of Henry Ford, who considered himself 
an American Individualist, and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., a calculated risk-taker at the helm of 
General Motors, to illustrate how they adapted their companies and production processes 
during the economically volatile 1920s.  The ways in which their businesses were 
organized determined whether Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation 
would re-emerge as industrial juggernauts during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Both 
companies, in the early 1920s, experienced an economic slowdown in vehicle sales and 
profitability, but they weathered the storm well when compared to smaller automobile 
companies that lost market-share or went bankrupt during the decade.  Although the 
automobile industry became more concentrated as many companies folded, the Big Three, 
consisting of General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation 
became dominant in this sector.  This chapter also seeks to illustrate the emergence of 
Fordism in the United States, because Ford Motor Company enabled average Americans 
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own vehicles and improve upon their standards of living.7  With Fordism, Americans 
entered the industrial age.8   
General Motors had not always been a successful enterprise and had ample 
competitors for market dominance before the Great Crash of 1929.  So, how did General 
Motors Corporation become such a powerful corporation in the United States?  How did it 
surpass Ford Motor Company, which had been the industry leader until the replacement of 
the Model T with the Model A in 1927?9  While both Ford and GM had been competitive 
before the Great Depression, and suffered in the initial stages of the economic crisis, they 
emerged at the end of the decade stronger, while smaller competitors failed.  Both General 
Motors and Ford Motor Company were able to adapt to a difficult economic environment 
and reshape their corporate policies, which enabled them to mitigate harsh industrial and 
financial conditions.  In fact, the two companies took different approaches to the National 
Industrial Recovery Act and the industrial codes that were designed to address the crisis of 
overproduction and high unemployment. 
In its second half, I discuss the emergence of the petroleum industry in the United 
States as it profited from its manufacturing connections with the automobile sector.  The 
petroleum sector became an important industry by 1924.  It produced commodities that 
were used throughout the United States and the global system, especially the automobile 
sector.  The public and private sectors had begun to use oil and gasoline products to power 
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their newly developed technological innovations, such as cars, airplanes, sea vessels or 
tractors.  The petroleum industry further benefited from domestic policies that contributed 
to high levels of profitability.  The 1920s proved to be a period of profound economic 
growth and uncertainty.  Both the automobile and petroleum industries worked hand in 
hand to promote the nation’s economic viability.  Although corporate executives from both 
sectors were not always altruistic, they developed industrial technologies that enabled the 
United States to become an economic and industrial hegemon.   
Ordinary citizens from the 1920s onward wondered about the industrial 
modifications of the national economy in the United States.  The national economy already 
had become global, and many corporations that used advertising campaigns to showcase 
their products could not keep pace with new global competition.  The production of 
consumer goods was expanding, and American corporations began to use research and 
development strategies to determine and grow customer demand.10  The economic 
conditions of the 1920s were somewhat volatile as monetary contraction gave way to 
monetary expansion.   Some industries failed to muster enough financial support to sustain 
profitability and remain competitive, even though their advertising campaigns promoted 
new product designs.  American businesses in the 1880s spent about 200 million dollars on 
advertising for their various products, but by 1920, they paid about 3 billion dollars for 
print campaigns.11  By 1929, American advertising companies were spending more than six 
billion dollars targeting domestic consumers through their print campaigns in national 
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newspapers and magazines.12  Daniel Pope illustrated the importance of advertising by 
arguing, that in 1920 alone, there were three companies that spent millions of dollars on ad 
campaigns--Proctor & Gamble, Goodyear Tire and Quaker Oats.13  Ad agencies became 
informational missionaries that discussed and enumerated the major qualities of consumer 
goods.  They were the nation’s “town criers” who brought to the general public interesting 
details about manufactured products sold on the open market.  They educated the 
American people and helped them to improve upon their standards of living.14  Because of 
the efforts of advertising agencies, corporations in the automobile and petroleum sectors 
enhanced their profitability. 
By contrast, many companies in the textile and apparel industries did not fare well 
during this period.  Synthetic textiles such as rayon and nylon replaced wool and silk as 
prominent commodities.15  Rayon became so popular among consumers that, by 1925, 
corporations produced annually about fifty-three million pounds of that fabric, taking a 
significant share of the textile market.16  Other manufacturers in industries such as 
metalworking and cabinet-making could not generate enough profitability to remain 
attractive for investment.  They struggled with new market conditions.  Small businesses in 
a number of sectors began to lose market-share.  The small business owners did not 
generate enough revenue to survive in a newly volatile marketplace, because they could 
not compete with the newly developed multinational corporations.  In 1908, there were 
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253 automobile companies that produced cars for the national economy; but this number 
decreased to 44 in 1929.17  The automobile sector is a case in point that illustrates 
industrial consolidation.  By 1929, three car companies—General Motors Corporation, Ford 
Motor Company and Chrysler--controlled the global market.  
The number of factory workers in the United States also continued to increase.  
Leland Olds in the Federated Press argued that between 1899 and 1925, factory employees 
advanced from 5.2 million to about 9,772,000.18  This consisted of an increase by more than 
88%.  In other corporate sectors such as manufacturing and mining, there were 221 
consolidations as these industries became smaller in size.19  In 1925, 554 firms closed their 
doors while in 1928, approximately 1,038 similarly closed down.  Consolidation reshaped 
the market and competition became intense as multinational corporations began to 
dominate the global marketplace.  Automobile corporations continued to expand 
production and hired more workers.  For example, by 1913, Ford Motor Company had 
about 14,000 employees that produced 248,307 cars per year.20  This number increased 
more dramatically in the 1920s.  By 1929, Ford Motor Company’s Rouge plant employed 
more than 103,000 white and blue collar workers.21    
During the decade, the automobile industry flourished; and by 1929 about one in six 
American families had acquired a vehicle for home use.22  It was the new mass production 
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methods that enabled Americans to make more consumer goods available and to purchase 
them in the marketplace.23  With increased use of electricity and new production 
technologies, consumer goods could be produced more efficiently and effectively.  Along 
with consumer goods, electricity enabled many American households to use new 
technological innovations such as refrigerators, phonographs, irons, fans, lighting, toasters, 
and vacuum cleaners.24  Moreover, from 1920-1930, American inventors filed and were 
granted more than 400,000 patents in the United States alone.25  If the 1920s was a period 
of economic growth, some Americans still faced acute deprivation and destitution.26  Social 
stratification continued to be the norm as Americans had differing income levels and 
different racial and ethnic communities.   While many households witnessed economic and 
social change, others failed to benefit from these new technologies.     
As historian Frank Stricker has argued, the United States was an affluent nation by 
the 1920s; but prosperity had its limits.  For many workers, wages began to decline by the 
end of the decade.27  The stagnation of wages had several causes, including upgraded and 
more efficient machine production, scientific management, and what some began to call 
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“technological unemployment.”28  It also had several consequences.  While many working-
class and middle-class people were spending more, and acquiring durable goods such as 
cars and household appliances, everyone did not had access to the new consumer culture.  
Indeed, many sought and obtained a higher standard of living in ways that created dynamic 
social change in a wide range of arenas—transportation, urban growth and city culture, as 
well as work.   Unfortunately, there were large parts of American society that lacked access 
even to the electrical power to fuel these goods or consumer credit to finance them.29   
In terms of consumer credit, Martha Olney, to cite one example, argues that most 
Americans, before the mid-1910s, purchased their automobiles with cash.  In the 1920s, 
credit became an important financial tool used as a mechanism to improve living standards 
especially during an absence of liquidity in the private sector.30  Private credit companies 
were virtually non-existent before the First World War.  But when private credit companies 
emerged in the 1920s, they asserted themselves in the automobile and other 
manufacturing sectors.  As a side note, Olney argues that since Black Americans had lower 
incomes than their White counterparts, they were more than likely to use installment plans 
to acquire new merchandise, especially in the durable goods market.31  Lastly, as it pertains 
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to the difficult situation of providing Americans in the south with electrical power, it was 
partly rectified with the coming of the Roosevelt administration and the emergence of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority that built dams and power plants in Tennessee, North Carolina, 
Kentucky, Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia and Alabama.32  The Southern states did not have 
greater access to new consumer innovations than the north, initially, but President 
Roosevelt attempted to improve upon their social conditions and standards of living.  
Despite worries about job prospects, consumers spent more money on recreation 
and entertainment during the 1920s.33  New consumer goods led to higher standards of 
living and increased demand for leisure time and activities.34   Most citizens began to 
venture out to theatres, where they could see plays or watch movies.  They also began to 
spend their money on enhancing their education and that of their children.  Women 
increasingly entered the labor force throughout the 1920s, and working in the outside 
world contributed to family and economic success.  The emergence of commodities and 
mass culture enabled Americans to live longer, and life expectancy rates improved to well 
over fifty-eight years of age.35   
From the end of the First World War until 1929, there were a few short recessions, 
and some volatility in the market; but outside rural areas, most Americans remained 
confident that they could handle any instability that came their way.  For some 
contemporary observers, however, the handwriting was already on the wall.  Overvalued 
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stock, weakness in the agricultural sector, loose credit policies and global instability led the 
country into depression.  Still most economists and politicians believed that the prosperity 
would continue into the foreseeable future. It is important to remember that Americans 
who participated in the stock market boom of the 1920s did not have the modern-day tools 
that stockbrokers on Wall Street use today.  Most contemporary market observers, despite 
these tools, failed to see the 2008 crisis.  In the 1920s, when broad-based stock investments 
were relatively new, failure to see the ensuring crises might have been expected.   
With greater access to living wages, a greater number of Americans were acquiring 
cars even as massive highway construction projects were underway.36  People used less 
public transportation, and they became more independent socially, because of the 
emergence of automobiles and a national system of roads and streets.37  Automobile icons 
such as Henry Ford, William Durant, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., and the DuPont family, who 
controlled a majority of GM preferred and common stock and its board of directors after 
1920, began to apply their material and monetary resources for the construction of new 
transportation networks.38  Many thousands of miles of roads were constructed.  
Transportation times decreased, because the emergence of a new highway system that 
linked states together and increases in the production and sale of automobiles.39  Scholars 
have shown that modern style roads made from cement or asphalt increased in mileage 
                                                           
36 John Earl Haynes, ed., Calvin Coolidge, 196. 
37 John B. Rae, The American Automobile Industry, 92-93. 
38 Melvyn P. Leffler in “Expansionist Impulses and Diplomatic Constraints,” Economics and World Power:  An 
Assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789 edited by William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1984), 261. 
39 W.F. Ogburn in “The Influence of Inventions and Discovery;” Report of the President’s Research Committee on 
Social Trends, Recent Social Trends in the United States Volume 1, New York:  McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 
1933.  Ogburn argued that mechanical inventions such as the automobile paved the way for the linkage of major 
cities to the suburbs, but it also led to the emergence of oil crises as Americans required more petroleum to use 
their vehicles. 
43 
 
 
 
from 161,000 (1905), to 521,000 (1930).40  More cars were on these roads.  Private car 
registrations advanced from 8,000 (1900), 1,258,062 (1913) to 26,545,281 (1930).  Thus, 
there was more road construction in the United States that was used by new American 
vehicle owners.   
As new technological innovations came to the forefront in the United States and the 
global system, Michigan emerged as an important state that led the nation through its 
promotion of economic growth and higher standards of living.  Prominent scholars such as 
Doris B. McLaughlin and Charles K. Hyde argue that Michigan was the logical geographic 
center and production capital for the automotive industry.41  The state had important 
copper, lumber, and iron resources and a small but easily accessible steel industry.  It also 
was the home of the bicycle and carriage sectors before the automobile industry took hold.  
In Michigan and other parts of the Upper Midwest, there was a skilled labor force, 
experienced in machine tools and in locomotion, that supported the industry’s emergence 
in that region.42   
In 1887, the Olds Motor Works Company produced the first American mechanized 
automobile.  The carriage had a steam engine that was run by coal, and it was cumbersome 
because of its massive size/weight and lack of maneuverability.43  These first automobiles 
were very expensive, ranging in price from between one to two thousand dollars.  At the 
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time, the average male worker earned about five to six hundred dollars annually.  
Automobiles were priced out of an average person’s range.  By the 1920s, however, 
installment payment plans were created that finally enabled middle and lower class 
families to acquire automobiles.44  The technology used to build cars had improved, and 
over time, the price for them decreased.  This link between new technologies, and 
especially new forms of automated production, bolstered the rapid growth of the auto 
industry, but had paradoxical effects on its labor force.  According to Joyce Shaw Peterson, 
the number of vehicles registered in the United States increased from 55,290 in 1904 to 
26,704,825 in 1929.45  Clearly, Americans were acquiring vehicles and earning a higher 
standard of living.   
Over time, the manufacturers in the automobile industry increased the wages of its 
employees, and jobs in automobile plants were among the best paid in the manufacturing 
sector during these decades.46    The practice of providing auto workers with decent wages 
and benefits was continued after the 1910s, when Ford created the assembly line and 
established the five dollar a day wage.  Upton Sinclair in The Flivver King argued that Henry 
Ford spent about one billion dollars per year in wage costs.47  Although wages increased at 
Ford Motor Company, employees still worked in physically difficult conditions even as 
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many Americans viewed Henry Ford as the “Great Benefactor.”48  Henry Ford became a 
Horatio Alger economic success story and many citizens wanted to emulate his work. 
  Thus, for many people, Henry Ford was an automotive icon and legendary car 
manufacturer.49  He built an industrial empire in which village or cottage factories took 
center stage.50  He understood, and later proclaimed in an almost ideological way, that 
producing low-priced or economical vehicles that maintained their value both expanded 
the market and democratized automobile ownership.  It also made Ford one of the richest 
manufacturers in the country.51  Ford liked to claim that he wanted to make vehicles for 
“the common man” who could become socially mobile in life’s journeys.52  In Henry Ford’s 
quest to develop inexpensive cars that consisted of interchangeable parts, he created a 
factory system that enabled him to capitalize on the labor of unskilled workers in his plants 
throughout the Detroit area.53  Like other believers in scientific management, Ford believed 
that most workers did not have to think; machines did this for them.54  With the emergence 
of the assembly line that Henry Ford perfected in the 1910s, he developed a factory system 
in which fewer workers labored more efficiently, because they had only one task at a time.  
From there, Ford workers produced more vehicles per shift and maintained a market-share 
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of about 50 percent.55  With the use of interchangeable parts, Ford Motor Company could 
produce a more affordable car that was durable and met the needs of the American public.  
The entire industry became so successful that by 1929 Ford and other car companies 
manufactured about four million vehicles per year.56 
In 1903, Henry Ford became a permanent fixture in the automobile industry.  At the 
inception of Ford Motor Company, there were “more than 2,000 steam, electric, and 
gasoline automobiles in the United States.”57  Moreover, there were over one hundred 
automobile companies, but many underperformed because of George B. Selden and his 
patent (no. 549,160) for the internal combustion engine.58  Between 1903 and 1911, Henry 
Ford had to contend with George B. Selden and his patent of two stroke internal 
combustion engines.59  Thus, Henry Ford and George B. Selden went head to head in federal 
court in the Southern District of New York in the case--Electric Vehicle Company and George 
B. Selden versus C.A. Duerr & Company and Ford Motor Company, because the Associates of 
Licensed Automobile Manufacturers believed that Selden’s patent of a gasoline-powered 
engine was legitimate and valid.60  This patent (No. 549,160) would have given Selden an 
absolute monopoly within the automobile industry as new manufacturers would have had 
to pay royalties to utilize his product designs.  Ultimately, Judge Walter Chadwick Noyes 
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provided Ford Motor Company with a favorable decision at the Court of Appeals in 
Southern New York, in January of 1911, and the Selden patent was invalidated.61 
While the Selden case continued, on March 18, 1908, Henry Ford introduced and 
began to manufacture his famous Model T, or the Tin Lizzie.62  The vehicle had four 
cylinders and was priced at $850.  Between 1908 and 1927, when the Model T was 
discontinued, Ford Motor Company sold over fifteen million of them.  The Model T was so 
popular that it eventually found new audiences in Great Britain, France and Germany.63  It 
was advertised in the Saturday Evening Post and throughout the press, as a vehicle with 
four cylinders, twenty horsepower and could seat up to five persons.  Henry Ford was 
confident that he could produce them for the American people at an affordable price.  “On 
top of the starting price of $850, a customer could easily add $135 for extras, that figure 
covering a top, windshield, speedometer, headlamps, and a carbide generator to power the 
last two.”64  By 1909, the extra features were included in the base price for the Model T at 
$950.   
On January 5, 1914, Ford Motor Company released its newest incentive for current 
and future employees.65  Henry Ford sought to pay his workers five dollars per day.66  The 
Board of Directors at Ford Motor Company established a ten million dollar profit-sharing 
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program that led to the implementation of this new incentive package.67  John R. Lee was 
selected by the Ford Board of Directors to administer the new incentive plan.  A plenitude 
of Ford hourly workers had originally made $2.34 per nine hour shift.68  When this new 
incentive was announced to the general public, it caught everyone by surprise.  This 
minimum wage standard was an impetus or catalyst to recruit new workers and retain 
those employees with a high seniority.  The new Ford wage was about 62.5 cents per hour.  
This new money wage rate was one of the highest in the country and when James Couzens 
made the announcement, he knew this would garner a lot of attention.   
After the First World War, Ford Motor Company experienced some economic and 
financial growth.  From 1920 to 1927, Ford Motor Company continued to expand its 
domestic and international transactions and investments.  More Model T’s were produced 
and the company sustained its profitability.  In 1921, Ford Motor Company had 
manufactured one million Model T’s at the Rouge plant in Dearborn and the Highland Park 
plant in Detroit.  This unprecedented production awed, shocked and surprised the world.  
Overall, 928,750 cars had been produced in the United States, 42,860 abroad and 42,348 in 
Canada.69  Ford Motor Company became the number one automobile maker in the global 
system.  Henry Ford continued to expand his business and he hired an unprecedented 
amount of laborers at his new Rouge plant.  As David Lewis reported, “by 1924 the Rouge 
had 42,000 workers; by 1925, 58,000; by 1926, 75,000; and by 1929 more than 103,000.”70  
The new Rouge manufacturing site was located on more than 1,115 acres, and overall the 
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factory maintained about 160 acres of work spaces to manufacture the Model T and 
subsequent vehicle models.  Ford Motor Company became one of the nation’s first 
multinational corporations with global and domestic operations.  Henry Ford became one 
of the wealthiest men in the United States with enormous personal assets at his disposable.   
Moreover, during the 1920s, Henry Ford attempted to re-establish his company in 
the public spotlight.  These were rebuilding years for Ford Motor Company.  Although the 
Model T was still the top selling car in the United States, the vehicle was becoming 
outmoded and its features were obsolete.  Edsel Ford, who had become president of the 
Lincoln division in 1922, sought to convince his father that the company needed a new 
flagship model.  The Model T was not selling as well and initially, Henry Ford did not listen 
to his son.  Acquiring Lincoln was an important step for Ford Motor Company, because it 
was a luxury brand and some of its designs could be used in the process of developing the 
new Model A.  Ford Motor Company purchased the Lincoln branch for about eight million 
dollars.  The purchase of this luxury car company was inexpensive, because this 
corporation had been in bankruptcy.   
The Lincoln acquisition was also important, because this business brought in new 
ideas to Ford Motor Company during a period of time in which General Motor was 
attempting to flex its industrial muscles.  Ford Motor Company and its Model T could not 
compete with General Motors and its Chevrolet and Cadillac models.  These General Motors 
cars were high tech for the period and had newer features that attracted the attention of 
American consumers.  Edsel Ford attempted to convey these ideas to his father but initially, 
he would not listen.  He was loyal to the Model T, because that vehicle had brought Ford 
Motor Company great success and wealth.  But Henry Ford began to listen to his son when 
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he realized that sales of the Model T were down.  The Model T continued to be priced 
cheaper than its General Motors’ counterparts but the features of the Model T became sub-
standard.   
After 1924, Ford Motor Company had reached a crossroads.71  What had been 
working in terms of production and marketing was no longer as effective. The Model T was 
not selling as well, and Chevrolet was competing strongly with Ford products.  The Model T 
was a sound product, but many of its features were outmoded.   Consumers sought a little 
more power, a better design, and more choices in their automobiles.  By 1924, the price of 
the Model T continued to decrease until the overall cost stabilized at $265.72  The low price 
kept Ford in the market, but the company began to lose market-share.  Dealers were 
disappointed with Henry Ford, because he did not have different models of cars that could 
sustain the company’s profitability, once the Model T became obsolete.  The change in 
consumer taste and demand hurt Ford Motor Company’s business operations, because 
Henry Ford depended upon one type of vehicle to earn all of its revenue and maintain its 
competitiveness. 
In 1927, Henry Ford and his engineering staff crafted the new Model A.  For this 
vehicle, nine different styles were offered from “a snappy roadster to a dignified Fordor 
Sedan, complete with a landau roof.”73  The Model A even reached speeds up to sixty miles 
per hour, which was an improvement from the Model T’s forty miles an hour pace.  By 
December 1927, many hundreds of thousands of orders for the Model A had been placed 
and Ford Motor Company became another industrial and financial success story.  In 1927, 
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Henry Ford began to mass produce the new Model A car, but he could not regain his 
dominant position in the automobile market.74  With the coming of the Great Crash, Ford 
Motor Company continued to perform well but the Great Depression that followed was 
difficult to bear.  Ford Motor Company sold approximately two million of the Model A 
vehicles in 1929; but in 1930, sales of the car dropped by one and one half million 
automobiles.75  By that time, Ford’s market share had declined to 31.3 percent while 
General Motors took the lead at 32.3 percent.76  Ford Motor Company needed to find new 
ways to appeal to customers, because the mass production of one or two models of 
automobiles put it at a disadvantage to General Motors, which had a growing market with 
its many different car lines.77 
 
General Motors and the Political Economy of Automobile Manufacture 
 
The history of General Motors is a different industrial and economic story.  With the 
ascension of Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., as president of GM in 1923, the company underwent 
unprecedented change.  Sloan began to establish new forms of statistical data to improve 
GM’s profitability and sales.  Sales projections and corporate executives began to examine 
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their profit margins to determine which vehicles to mass produce, in order to capture a 
larger share of the market.  General Motors differed substantially from Ford Motor 
Company, because of the use of statistical analysis.  This enabled GM to position itself to 
challenge Henry Ford’s efforts to produce an in-expensive and standardized vehicle that 
appealed to the masses.78  General Motors analyzed cost projections to establish payment 
plans for its customers, so that the cost of a vehicle became more affordable.79  The 
company’s strategy also focused on designing and producing diverse models for its 
different car lines.  Durant and Sloan aimed to produce a different car that was affordable 
to ordinary consumers.  Both Durant and Sloan sought to manufacture a “car for every 
purse and purpose.”80 
In 1908, William Durant established General Motors Corporation and became its 
president with the merger of Buick and Oldsmobile into one automobile company.81  His 
presidency was marked by rapid growth and the diversification of the company, but Durant 
left General Motors with some structural and organizational problems and a large 
leadership gap.  During his tenure as president, Durant acquired other car companies and 
incorporated their ideas and resources into the parent company.82   Without relying on the 
technical advice of his division heads, Durant could not determine the pace and growth of 
the consumer market.  In 1909, to use one example, Durant purchased the Elmore 
Manufacturing Company for one-half million dollars; seven years later, it sold for only 
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$50,000.  Durant was certain that the company produced marketable goods, because it 
manufactured the two-cycle motor that, in thirty years, became the diesel engine.  Durant 
lost money on this acquisition.  This occurred on many other occasions, such as the 
Durant’s unprofitable purchases of Carter Car Company, Scripps-Booth Car division, 
Sheridan Car project and the Sampson Tractor Company.83 
President of General Motors until 1920, Durant had shown great intuition and 
insight.  As one observer said, he “worked from the top of his head.”84  Durant did not 
commit his concepts and ideas to paper.  He worked without direction and mastered the 
details of the inter-workings of GM.  Under Durant, General Motors became a diversified 
entity with many different divisions and segments.85  Durant was seen as more risky than 
his successor Sloan, and even reckless in how he moved the company forward.  Later GM 
president Sloan took risks, but he did so when he had the statistical data to support his 
claims.86  Durant believed in the individual or executive who maintained an audience of 
subordinates that turned to him for direction.  In many ways, his company leadership was 
similar to the administrative skills of Henry Ford, who believed in corporate centralization 
and worked only with a few given individuals.  When Durant was ousted in 1920 due to his 
unsuccessful stock market dealings, Sloan was given a free hand by Pierre DuPont to 
restructure GM and make it a more profitable and organized entity.  
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Under the leadership of the DuPont family from 1920 to 1923, GM executives and 
management practiced corporate paternalism in its factories and among its workers.87  
Douglas Reynolds argued that this practice of promoting corporate paternalism was 
necessary for establishing social control over workers and maintaining organized work 
conditions at the level of manufacturing plants.  It also was important in retaining workers, 
especially skilled workers, for efficient factory production.  Corporate paternalism enabled 
General Motors to become more technologically astute; because most workers benefited 
from a vast array of corporate social programs, and new machines were continually 
introduced at the various General Motors plants.  The DuPont family cared for many of its 
employees within this rhetoric of paternalism and sought to produce vehicles for the 
masses.  But according to John Cunningham Wood and Michael Wood, GM’s paternalist 
housing and savings programs were eliminated in 1932 as the Depression took hold.88 
Under Durant’s leadership, GM had begun to show signs of trouble due to its lack of 
management centralization.89  Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who was then a junior executive, 
observed these problems, and he created an “Organization Study” after Durant’s departure 
in 1920.90  In this study, Sloan developed the concept of organized decentralization or 
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diffusion for the company.91  Each division would be independent and have its own 
responsibilities, but division heads would be brought together to discuss management 
policies and practices under the leadership of the company’s president and directors, who 
took on the ultimate management role.  Each division handled its day-to-day operations, 
and the centralized management core made the executive decisions.92   At the same time, 
each division contributed to the decision-making processes of the entire corporation 
through new channels.  Each division was linked by an administrative core that worked on 
budgeting, hiring, forecasting, and reporting sales.93  Lastly, each division maintained sub-
divisions that were responsible for advertising, purchases, car design and production. 
GM’s Executive Division was the central planning entity that, combined with the 
Finance and Inventory Divisions, was in charge of the allocation of resources and logistics.  
The Operations Division handled the ideas and contributions from division managers,94 
but, here too, the Executive Division maintained the ultimate decision-making powers.  It 
confirmed and ratified any proposals from the lower echelons of General Motors 
Corporation.  Sloan believed in sustaining this type of de-centralized process, because he 
maintained that the division leaders followed more willingly and enthusiastically decisions 
and directions in which they took a part in developing.  The division leaders realized that 
their ideas had a place in the company.  Sloan did not believe in using the carrot or the stick 
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to reward or sanction corporate behavior.  He wanted all parties to become involved and 
play a dynamic role in the betterment of corporate practices.95 
 Sloan used cost accounting and profitability measures to shape the company’s 
expansion and diversification.  Sloan did not just examine sales percentages but he looked 
at profitability.  In contrast, Sloan believed that cost accounting could be used to augment 
sales projections and establish their relationship to profitability.96  In Sloan’s eyes, the 
volume of sales was less important than profitability and performance. 
From its origins until the 1920s, GM produced a wide range of vehicles, but it did not 
examine supply and demand curves to determine production levels.   The number and 
diversity of models that GM produced each year left the company with excess inventory 
that both reduced cost effectiveness and ate away at profits.  This differed from Durant who 
was only concerned with producing vehicles.  He did not examine what was in demand or 
the marginal utility of certain products.  What appealed to the consumer was not discussed 
until Sloan began to forecast sales and analyzed supply and demand.  As a result, Sloan 
established the “annual operating forecast,” which enabled executives to perform a 
comparative analysis with the other divisions and coordinate production with their 
financial aims.97   
Sloan encouraged each division to create sales reports and budgets to illustrate how 
the allocation of capital would be used and its projections on an annual basis.  Each 
divisional chief executive produced pricing studies and monthly sales projections, so that 
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GM could establish a pricing system that was competitive with other automobile makers.  It 
allowed them to design a product line that appealed to the masses.  Monthly forecasts 
enabled divisional managers to examine trends from other companies in the automotive 
sector and project their sales percentages.  Every effort was made to determine the 
conditions of the marketplace so that GM products could be placed safely in the consumer 
demand environment.98 
General Motors integrated new production technologies during the decade, creating 
greater efficiency, but also reducing the number of workers needed to produce vehicles.  
The adoption of each new generation of machine technology eroded the skill base of 
assembly line workers.   Innovation created machines that performed a growing number of 
tasks.  This meant two things—first, the amount of training most production workers 
needed steadily declined; second, most workers were no longer specialized in particular 
tasks.  Many General Motors’ employees worried about their jobs and sought to retain their 
positions, even though they could be terminated at any time.  With corporate paternalism, 
management controlled worker behavior and conditions in plants could improve.99 
 On May 10, 1923, Pierre S. DuPont resigned as President of General Motors and was 
replaced by Alfred P. Sloan Jr., who also served as Chief Executive Officer for the 
company.100  This was an important step for Sloan, who had an extensive industrial and 
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manufacturing background.  He had graduated with a degree in electrical engineering from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the age of twenty and worked for Hyatt Bearing 
Company of Newark, New Jersey, before taking a position at General Motors 
Corporation.101  Sloan had been so successful at Hyatt that he invested five thousand 
dollars in that company and within six months had generated a profit of over twelve 
thousand dollars.102  Sloan had maintained complete control over Hyatt and the company 
had been better served, because of his presence and decision-making capabilities.103      
Sloan was selected to become the Chairman of the Executive Division, the entity that 
made the important administrative decisions for GM.  The Executive Division consisted of 
the president of GM and member representatives from the various sub-divisions.  Sloan 
maintained executive control, and he made the most critical decisions for GM.  Sloan 
worked with the Financial Division, which made all of the economic and financial decisions 
for the firm.  The Financial Division allocated capital and material resources to the many 
divisions at GM so its industrial role was taken seriously. 
 General Motors Corporation began to work on the organization and the updating of 
production, inventory control, and economic planning during the early 1920s.  This 
occurred, because Sloan and Donaldson Brown, who served as vice president for the 
Financial Department, argued that material resources used in the production process were 
in peril; inventory control was non-existent, and the company had borrowed over eight 
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billion dollars.104  There were no financial or fiscal requirements or stipulations that each 
division had to follow.   Brown felt that it was imperative and essential for him to 
communicate his viewpoints with Sloan who immediately provided him with the necessary 
assistance to track inventory stocks.  Normally, if sales projections were high, then the 
volume of inputs or material resources was increased to target and meet demand.  
Corporate executives at GM had to publish and present to the management core an Analysis 
of Production Requirements.  According to Anil K. Kashyap and David W. Wilcox, “the 
function of this analysis was to record each of the elements of the inventory accumulation 
identity:  stocks on hand at the beginning of the forecast period, projected retail deliveries 
during the forecast period, desired stocks at the end of the forecast period, and—as a 
residual—the indicated maximum production required.”105  This report enabled corporate 
executives and dealers-principal at GM to anticipate stock levels and consumer demand.  
Moreover, dealerships held on to merchandise during the off-season and received more 
vehicles during peak periods.  The analytical report enabled dealers and GM executives to 
determine when to deliver cars to all dealerships and when to anticipate their arrival date.  
 By 1929, GM was faced with deteriorating economic conditions, including declining 
stock prices, tighter credit, a slow-down in consumer purchasing, and price deflation.  It 
also had a growing inventory at a time when competition among car companies increased.  
As two analysts noted, “new car registrations fell more than 2.7 million units (over 70 
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percent) between 1929 and 1932.”106   Fewer Americans were purchasing vehicles; still, if 
the new sales and inventory projections had not been put in place, GM would not have been 
able to keep track of its inputs and vehicle accessories and overproduction would have 
continued to hinder the company’s performance. Its monetary resources would have been 
wasted on unneeded spending. While it did not serve its workforce well, company 
leadership cut production lines and tried to adjust to the economic crisis.  With the Great 
Depression came new GM policies such as the curtailment of the Preliminary Analysis of 
Production Requirements.  After May 1932, the management core or central office was only 
notified by the various divisions about inventory levels when there was a modification of 
ten percent or more in the total production figures for a given forecast period, because this 
affected the entire GM sales predictions.  Under Sloan, G.M.’s market-share increased from 
12 percent to 52 percent globally.107  General Motors Corporation surpassed Ford Motor 
Company in 1927, because of its strong Cadillac and Chevrolet sales; and assumed the 
responsibilities of an industrial superpower in the production of more diverse vehicles 
from its various car lines. 
In summary, General Motors Corporation experienced some of the economic 
downturns and successes in parallel ways to the Ford Motor Company in the 1920s.  For 
example, in terms of profitability during the first half of 1926, General Motors Corporation 
generated a profit of $93,285,674 or $17.33 per share of common stock.108  Clearly, GM did 
make substantial profits that drove them pass Ford Motor Company and into the number 
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one spot in automobile sales and market-share.  Ford and GM, however, maintained 
different corporate policies that drove their day-to-day business operations.  GM believed 
in using projections and forecasting to sell their durable products while Henry Ford sought 
industrial centralization.  Henry Ford did not want to relinquish control over his decision-
making processes to interior or outside parties.  He sought total control.   Both Sloan and 
his predecessor, Durant, believed in corporate diffusion, which was a tool used by Ford 
Motor Company and Chrysler in later years.109  The ways that both companies operated 
determined the rate at which they handled the effects of the Great Crash of 1929 and the 
Great Depression in the 1930s.  Both companies weathered the storm, but Ford Motor 
Company suffered a little more, because of the lack of diverse product lines while GM sold a 
plenitude of vehicles that had different design features.  Standardization affected Ford 
Motor Company in a negative way, because it only mass-produced one type of vehicle that 
could be “painted in any color as long as it was black”110 while GM purchased new 
companies to incorporate design qualities into their final products. 
As we will see in later chapters, both Ford and GM were affected with the emergence 
of the Roosevelt administration and the creation of industry codes under the National 
Industrial Recovery Act.  Henry Ford was dissatisfied with the ascension of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt to the American presidency while Sloan was more content with Roosevelt and 
the New Deal’s initial policies.  Sloan was excited with the inauguration of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt on March 4, 1933.  Henry Ford was less inspired by the Roosevelt 
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Administration, because he had been an avid supporter of Herbert Hoover.111  Henry Ford 
did not sign the codes of fair competition for the automotive industry until August of 1934, 
while Sloan approved them wholeheartedly.  Both companies believed in fair wages and 
the reduction of hours to improve upon employment levels, but Henry Ford did not 
approve of section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.  Sloan was more 
accommodative in the sense that he argued in favor of the codes and collective bargaining, 
but did not stand for the closed shop.  We will see in subsequent chapters how Roosevelt’s 
policies played out in the automotive sector and the roles of Henry Ford and Alfred P. Sloan 
Jr.  It made for interesting politics and profound business transactions.  
 
The Petroleum Industry and the Political Economy of the 1920s 
 
The petroleum industry was another key player in the market for automobiles and 
in the economic expansion of the 1920s.  The remaining portion of this chapter will discuss 
the efforts of American policymakers and corporate executives from the petroleum 
industry to control their business operations.  It will also illustrate the efforts of American 
policymakers to handle the Teapot Dome crisis from 1921to 1924, as this event shows a 
different relationship between government and industry.   
The oil industry in the 1920s emerged from the Great War with great confidence.  
Petroleum was and is an important commodity.  Oil production and refining helped drive 
the national economy, especially as the automotive sector developed rapidly in the United 
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States and global system.112  Throughout this period, the oil industry experienced an 
economic boom and production increased exponentially.  For example, from 1910 to 1920, 
oil production in California increased from 77.7 million barrels to 103.4 million barrels.113  
Also, Oklahoma served as the nation’s largest oil producer until 1923, when it was 
surpassed by California.  Oklahoma produced 278 million barrels of oil in 1927.114  
Moreover, in the United States, gasoline production increased at a rapid pace.  Petroleum 
production accounted for about 48 percent of all forms of oil commodities and by 1929, its 
manufacture increased fourfold.115     
Overproduction and the determination of oil prices have been a controversial issue 
in the petroleum industry.  American businessmen such as John D. Rockefeller of Standard 
Oil sought to control the production and shipment of oil and gasoline in the United States.  
But he was not able to corner the market, in part because each state maintained its own 
petroleum regulations.116  Moreover, the number of oil companies proliferated as gasoline 
became the oil industry’s chief product, because most technological sectors benefited from 
the rise of the internal combustion engine that used gasoline.  Their central market was 
supplying filling stations with enough gasoline to cater to their consumers on roads 
throughout the United States.  For instance, by 1929, there were approximately fifteen and 
one half thousand petroleum companies that provided gasoline stations with their 
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manufactured products throughout the Middle West.117  The federal government had 
regulated loosely the oil industry during this period, but state laws also shaped petroleum 
drilling, transport, and refining.  Further, each state had its own goals and obligations.  As 
an example, the state of Texas had its own regulations regarding proration which were 
forms of price and production controls.118  Humble Oil (Exxon) under its President William 
S. Farish attempted to receive a proration contract to produce 30,000 barrels of oil per day 
at the Hendrick field in Texas in the 1920s.119  Although Farish was unsuccessful, this move 
would have been unprecedented if it had been implemented. 
Surpluses of oil have always been problematic for the large producers such as 
Standard Oil.  Large supplies and multiple suppliers lowered prices and led to an 
oversupply of oil.  The federal government, however, maintained an enormous amount of 
public lands that had mineral resources.  If these lands were sold to the private sector, then 
the government might, on the one hand, encourage further oil drilling but also stood to lose 
strategic oil reserves.  Under the business-friendly Harding and Coolidge administrations, 
this was not entirely unwelcome.    At the same time, however, greater oil production 
lowered oil prices.  For example, in 1929, the American Petroleum Institute attempted to 
limit oil production in Texas, because the supply of this commodity expanded greatly 
causing depressed prices from 3 dollars per barrel to a few pennies per barrel.120 
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Private lands in the United States were utilized by petroleum corporations to 
generate high profit margins, but public lands were not tampered with and oil companies 
had to receive special permission to lease those lands.  Thus, the private sector worried 
about the oversupply of oil.  They were concerned deeply if and when public lands were 
placed within the hands of the private sector and how the transfer would occur.  Obviously, 
companies wanted access to petroleum reserves, but they sought to limit competition and 
discourage new companies from entering the market.  Malfeasance and corruption did not 
always plague the private and public sectors, with the exception of the Teapot Dome 
Scandal of 1921-1924.  Both sides sought to ensure that the American people benefited 
from the regulation of the oil industry and that the interests of oil corporate executives 
were satisfied. 
During the 1920s, there was an enormous scandal that involved the leasing of public 
lands reserved for the United States’ Naval fuel.121  The naval oil reserves were necessary, 
because naval sea vessels were no longer using coal.  The United States had begun 
powering their ships with petroleum by the First World War.122  From 1921 to 1924, 
Secretary of the Interior Albert Bacon Fall sold the rights to the naval petroleum reserves at 
Elk Hills, Buena Vista in California and the Teapot Dome in Wyoming to private sector oil 
corporations.123  The leasing of these public lands was not the problem, but Secretary Fall 
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accepted a questionable loan of about one hundred thousand dollars from Edward B. 
McLean and Edward F. Doheny.  Secretary Fall’s son-in-law received three hundred 
thousand dollars in bonds from Harry Sinclair.  Sinclair’s Mammoth Oil Company provided 
these funds to Secretary Fall and his family members, because the company acquired a 
lease of the entire Teapot Dome reserves in Wyoming and other reserves in California.  The 
lease contract was questionable, because Secretary Fall did not allow other private 
companies in the United States bid for the rights to drill on these lands.124  Secretary Fall 
argued that he could obtain more lucrative leases without the establishment of public 
auctions.  An investigation uncovered this scandal.   
After Senate hearings headed by Thomas J. Walsh from Montana,125 and a court case, 
Secretary Fall was sentenced to one year in prison and one hundred thousand dollars in 
fines.  Other parties, including Sinclair and Doheny, as well as the Attorney General, were 
involved in this debacle, but no one else was prosecuted.126  Historian Frederick Lewis 
Allen has argued that even Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon may have been 
involved in this scandal, and accusations of graft and corruption surrounded the Harding 
administration.127    
During the 1920s, the oil industry in the public sphere argued for a policy of 
government non-intervention, but, in fact, like most mining and mineral concerns, the 
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petroleum industry was heavily subsidized by government resources.  Each company had 
its own corporate rules and regulations, and the state, local and federal governments did 
attempt unsuccessfully to regulate the industry and ensure that each business played by 
the same rules.  Moreover, corporations began to examine supply and demand curves as 
well as production figures to develop their prices for oil, prices that many argued were the 
products of corporate collusion and clandestine dishonesty.  Further, restrictions on 
petroleum extraction and refining served the interests of corporations.  High demand 
meant a lowered supply with high prices for petroleum while high supplies led to 
discounted oil prices.128   
With a growing emphasis upon the use of proration, which were forms of price and 
production controls, supply and demand levels for oil and, thus, prices were controlled to 
make sure that all businesses benefited from this industrial and economic system.  As 
overproduction in the United States became more problematic, the oil industry continued 
to press the federal government to limit supply and provide this sector with price supports.  
The south and southwestern states such as California, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas 
produced the majority of this nation’s oil, and it became necessary to provide these states 
with the appropriate regulations to raise oil prices and establish production controls.129  
Throughout the 1920s, oil supplies in the United States were high, which caused 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Persian to export a large part of 
their oil reserves overseas.130  Moreover, in 1900, the United States produced forty-three 
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percent of the world supply of oil, while, in 1926, American corporations produced seventy 
percent of the global reserves.131  The United States was noted for its automotive industry, 
but the petroleum sector supported the economic transactions of their automotive 
counterparts.132  Oil became a defining commodity that could be used for the betterment of 
the national economy.  The rise of the internal combustion engine and its use in automobile 
production meant that oil and gasoline were two commodities that redefined American 
living standards and promoted social mobility.  Moreover, it led to the rise of American 
multinational corporations that controlled valuable material resources and pursued strong 
American policies domestically and internationally.  Oil companies and their counterparties 
in the automobile sectors dominated public policies and promoted the growth of their 
business practices. 
Although oil supplies were already high in the United States and corporations began 
to perform their own statistical analyses, new oil fields, especially in Texas, were 
developed.  Some corporate leaders such as Henry L. Doherty of Empire Gas and Fuel of 
California started to advocate for conservation policies, in part to control access to 
petroleum reserves and out of a sense of how future supply and demand might play out.133  
Other Americans sought to preserve the national landscape and to avoid looking for new 
reserves, because oil was so plentiful in this country.  In the Southwestern part of the 
United States in such places as Texas, Oklahoma and California, new reserves were located 
and oil was drilled, which increased the supplies of this commodity nationally.  However, 
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transportation networks that needed to move the commodity from the drilling grounds to 
the filling stations may have been largely underdeveloped.  This implied that oil stocks 
were not widely available in all parts of the United States.134 
American corporations, following the Great War, sought to work together for the 
benefit and betterment of the oil industry, but Norman Nordhauser believed that their 
efforts were somewhat misplaced.  The maturation period of American oil companies may 
not have occurred, because the oil men did not worry about working together when there 
were no new oil fields and the supply levels could be maintained.  Thus, corporations did 
not discuss the unification of state and federal laws, because supply levels did not always 
increase dramatically.  But as the automobile companies produced more vehicles, demand 
for oil increased and this implied that petroleum corporations had to work together to 
maintain supplies.  For example, American oil consumption increased by fifty-three percent 
from 1915 to 1919, and in 1920, the use of petroleum advanced by 27 percent.135   
In December of 1924, Doherty’s efforts at conservation came to the forefront; and 
the Coolidge administration created the Federal Oil Conservation Board.136  This 
organization had been designed to study and research issues of grave importance to the 
petroleum industry, and to report their findings to the federal government and industry 
leaders.  Finally, corporate executives and government officials began to communicate with 
one another for the betterment of the oil industry.  In an effort to assist the Conservation 
Board, the American Petroleum Institute established a special committee to locate 
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statistical data and provide that information to the Conservation Board.  Their job was 
strictly research and their findings could enable the Conservation Board to develop sound 
industrial and economic policies.  This was a significant development in the United States. 
By 1929, American oil corporations produced a substantial amount of energy 
commodities.137  The United States became the largest energy producer and led the world 
in the production of coal, petroleum and electricity.  American corporations produced a 
majority of steel and natural gas on the globe in the 1920s and the national economy was 
able to use petroleum and oil commodities to further standards of living in the United 
States. 
In summary, in ways similar to General Motors in the 1920s, corporations in the 
petroleum industry began to use statistical analysis to limit the oversupply of oil in the 
United States.  Although the petroleum industry was rocked by scandal, proration138 and 
conservation, initiatives emerged as a means to control the supply and market for 
petroleum.  But after 1929, the petroleum industry pressed for economic and industrial 
change.  Oil companies not only sought to adapt to the reduced demand of the Depression, 
but also as a means of controlling market conditions in the future.  Corporate executives 
argued that government controls over production were problematic and a detriment to 
their industry, but they wanted assistance in shaping the market.  They sought 
policymakers who addressed these important issues.  During the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the NIRA and the industry codes provided sanctions to the oil industry; but overall, 
the oil men were not completely satisfied with the laws, statutes and other forms of 
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regulations that had been written in their favor.  For example, throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, there was an intense debate about price controls or proration versus anti-price 
regulations or production controls.139   
Moreover, policymakers and corporate executives from the petroleum industry 
vacillated as to whether the Interior Department could develop regulations for the oil 
sector.  However, in other parts of the United States, especially the city of Los Angeles, 
policymakers had to contend with pollution in commercial fisheries as drilling sites 
proliferated.140  Los Angeles had experienced an oil boom toward the end of the 19th 
century, and by the 1920s, Union Oil Company of Los Angeles became one of the largest 
petroleum firms in the region.141  But with excess pollution, the California state legislature 
sought to regulate the oil industry.  The state of California attempted to nationalize the 
entire oil industry in the Los Angeles area to prevent pollution from destroying its natural 
wild life.  This implied that some states that produced large oil stocks strove to promote 
conservation as an alternative to poor environmental conditions that resulted from 
excessive drilling.  Additionally, by the beginning of the Great Depression, production and 
price controls became essential for the oil industry, including Union Oil Company, that 
experienced a supply boom, which hampered the sector as petroleum decreased in 
value.142 
During the Great Depression, the Department of the Interior became an important 
cabinet level agency that served as a dominant regulatory agency for the oil industry.  
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Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior under the Roosevelt administration, was an 
industrial czar for the oil industry, and he provided petroleum companies with information 
so that their professional operations improved.  The petroleum industry did maintain some 
industrial codes, but overall various companies were not completely satisfied with the 
ways in which the regulatory system was established.  When the NIRA was declared 
unconstitutional in 1935, oil companies breathed a sigh of relief.  Corporate executives had 
been concerned about the roles that the industrial codes played within their business 
operations.  Industry leaders did not want the federal government to tell them how to 
conduct themselves in the domestic and global marketplaces.  They wanted industrial and 
economic change, but the nature of these changes was in dispute. 
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CHAPTER:  THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929 
 
 The causes of the Great Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Depression of the 1930s 
have been the subject of ongoing economic and political debates in the United States and 
global system.1  Central to these academic exchanges have been whether global or domestic 
circumstances such as the Treaty of Versailles, the use of a metallic standard and gold 
outflows, Stock Market speculation in the United States, or Federal Reserve policies and the 
banking system under the New York Branch Presidents Benjamin Strong and George 
Harrison were the major explanations for the economic crisis.2  As Commerce Secretary 
and President, Hoover believed that globalization was key to understanding the crisis and 
that the United States could not remain an isolated nation in a multilateral world.  Others 
such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt looked at domestic policies, such as Hoover’s use of 
American Individualism and other self-help strategies, investments among the middle and 
working classes, and growing unemployment toward the end of the 1920s due to 
overproduction and depressed pricing for commodities and consumer goods.3 
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 Michael Bernstein, Eric Rauchway, William Leuchtenburg, Elliot Rosen, Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., Bernard Asbell, George McJimsey, Peter Temin, Charles Kindleberger, Ellis 
Hawley, David Kennedy, John Kenneth Galbraith, Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson 
Schwartz and others have argued that there were internal and external reasons for the 
coming of this difficult period in American history.  This chapter seeks to point out the 
primary reasons for the emergence of the Great Depression by enumerating the central 
causes for the Crash of 1929.  It will largely look at global and financial concerns, especially 
investment and credit strategies of consumers and corporations during the Hoover 
administration, and how they affected American and European economies.4  It will assert 
that speculation, foreign loans, the Treaty of Versailles and German reparations, and the 
use of a metallic standard played a major role in bringing about economic and financial 
instability in the United States and its allies during this complex period in American 
history.5   
 This chapter seeks to chart the events that paved the way for the Great Crash of 
1929.  It will address the reasons for the economic crisis, examine the various 
interpretations of this event, and highlight the approaches that scholars have taken when 
they discuss this important event in American history.  It will examine the domestic and 
international economic environment and how that affected public policy in the United 
States.  There were many economic and political developments that took place globally 
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4 David M. Kennedy, “The Great Depression and World War II, 1929-1945,”  The Gilder Lehrman Institute of 
American History, http://www.gilderlehrman.org. (accessed February 7, 2015).  Kennedy, in this article, examines 
the internal and external causes for the economic crisis and Roosevelt’s response as president after 1933. 
5 “Investigating the Panic of 1929,” New York Times, December 6, 1931. New York Times reporters argued that in 
1931, the Senate was determined to locate the causes of the Stock Market Crash and argued that speculators had 
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following the First World War.  This chapter enumerates how the early years of the roaring 
1920s became one of economic strife in 1929.  It illustrates the emergence of economic and 
political interdependence, due to the coming of the collective security pacts of the League 
of Nations, and economic strategies such as the use of metallic standards and stock market 
speculation. 
The Great Crash of 1929, from the stock market crisis to the onset of the economic 
depression, was a catastrophic event that caused political and social instability at home and 
abroad.6  Some scholars have speculated whether it could have been prevented.7  This 
chapter will not address this hypothesis but will focus on the central reasons for the 
emergence of one of the worst economic crises in American history.  The Great Depression 
changed the ways that Americans and their international allies viewed the economic 
system in ways that are still reflected in domestic and foreign economic policies; and it 
must be understood as a crisis of the global system.  The global system had become more 
interdependent and both Hoover and Roosevelt realized that the United States could not 
remain isolated from the rest of the world. 
  For most of the 1920s, the United States experienced unprecedented economic 
expansion and growth both domestically and globally.  First, following the First World War, 
the United States became a creditor nation with a net balance of approximately $3.5 
billion.8  It furthered its status as an economic juggernaut.  Although many Americans were 
                                                           
6 Debra Reschke, “National Petroleum News’ 100th Anniversary,” National Petroleum News, March 2009. 
7 Gary Richardson, “The Great Depression, 1929-1941,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org. (accessed February 7, 2015).  Richardson argued that during the Crash, the 
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8 Melvyn P. Leffler in “Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints,” Economics and World Paper:  An 
Assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789, edited by William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1984), 227.  
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cautiously optimistic, they seemed somewhat uncertain about their nation’s new global 
role and its expanded responsibilities.9  Public opinion was increasingly isolationist during 
the interwar period, as some scholars have denoted; but the United States took on its newly 
acquired global status, especially in the areas of international trade and investment.10   
As Western Europe sought to recover from the war’s devastation, the United States 
saw a mild postwar depression followed by rapid economic growth in key sectors of the 
economy.11  The country controlled about forty percent of the world’s gold reserves and, 
after the war, reigned as a powerful nation that provided liquidity or monetary resources 
to its European allies.12  Since the United States became an immense global creditor nation, 
its portfolio contained about 12.6 billion in public accounts and among corporations of the 
private sector.13   
With the end of the war, Woodrow Wilson asserted that Americans had to adopt a 
more international face.  His successors followed that advice.  From 1921 to 1933, 
American policymakers looked abroad and expanded their vision of foreign policy as a way 
to sustain world peace and further domestic economic growth.14  Throughout the 1920s, 
the Republican administrations of Harding and Coolidge gave new priority to assisting 
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http://.www.econlib.org/ (accessed November 2, 2012); Donald A. Ritchie, Electing FDR:  The New Deal Campaign 
of 1932 (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 2007), 9; Martin L. Fausold, The Presidency of Herbert C. Hoover 
(Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1985), 63; Frank Costigliola, “Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 
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their allies through the support of international trade and investment, even as they 
emphasized the importance of domestic issues on the public agenda.  No one expected that, 
toward the end of the decade, economic instability would become a global norm.  
Americans began to suffer from acute financial insolvency and a lack of liquidity that was 
equally, if not more, dire than Europe’s postwar situation.15   America’s postwar economic 
strategy of loans and investment partially set the stage for the economic woes of the 1930s. 
Historian Martin Kitchen has argued that Western European governments were 
isolationist after the war, because they had to face constituents at home, who may not have 
been as supportive of the League of Nations.  Despite the guarantees of the Versailles 
Treaty, European nations worried about their national security concerns.  For example, 
France demanded punitive restrictions be placed on the German military in the peace 
process and sought to control the Rhineland, which served as the German industrial base.16  
France sought further reassurances from the United States and Great Britain that both 
nations would come to its aid militarily in the case of another German invasion.  Although 
the United States did not ratify the League of Nations treaty, its foreign policy sustained 
relations with other nations through trade and treaty obligations.17  The Postwar treaty set 
the context for economic relations and also for the economic developments of the decade.  
The Wilson administration fell short of its international goals in terms of the League, 
because of the absence of the Senate’s ratification of the League of Nation’s pact.  His 
successors pursued an expansive trade policy and continued intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt completed the task started by his Democratic 
                                                           
15 Eric Arnesen, “And the Market Crashes,” Cobblestone, April 2006, 32. 
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predecessor with continued engagement in European affairs and a foreign policy 
positioned for American leadership.  Roosevelt’s stance eventually modified public opinion 
and enabled Americans to assume their important place in the global system.  He formed 
the industrial and manufacturing sectors in the United States and this relieved the domestic 
and global pressures for economic change. 
In The Great Crash:  1929, economist John Kenneth Galbraith argued that, while 
many Americans were unsure about the country’s role internationally, some of them began 
to invest in the Stock Market, foreign investments, and to speculate on Wall Street.18  For 
middle-class Americans, stable production, steady wages, and low unemployment allowed 
them to imagine investing in the market.  A growing number of citizens learned about 
stocks and bonds, and they were able to purchase shares of stock in American 
corporations.  They did not necessarily want to “get rich,” as scholars have traditionally 
asserted.19  They were in it for the long haul and wanted to improve upon their economic 
station in life.  Harold Bierman, Jr., also argued that investors that participated in the stock 
market were knowledgeable individuals.20  They understood the fundamentals of 
economics and used their know-how to buy and sell stocks.21 The new stock market trends 
led middle class Americans to invest in the global economy. 
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(accessed March 14, 2015). 
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The new middle class’s new approach toward spending money purchasing stocks 
caused Herbert Hoover, in his memoirs, to discuss the issue.22  Hoover’s concerns remained 
muted temporarily.  He did not issue warnings against speculation, in large part because he 
did not want to promote further financial instability or volatility on Wall Street.23  
However, by 1925, the New York Times and the New York Financial Chronicle provided the 
general public with some warning that the stock market speculation must end.24  Hoover 
protested to the Federal Reserve Board Governor Daniel Crissinger and President Calvin 
Coolidge that the stock market was in a volatile range.  Calvin Coolidge remarked that the 
Federal Reserve was a separate and independent agency and that the Federal government 
could not intervene.  Later, in his memoirs, Herbert Hoover stated that he did not mention 
his concerns about the private sphere in press statements, because he believed that this 
might have contributed to economic problems.25  But he did speak with his fellow public 
servants that the Stock Market on Wall Street may be in peril.  Herbert Hoover believed 
that Americans were capable workers in the labor force.  He asserted in press statements 
that Americans should not lack economic confidence,26 even while he believed that 
Americans could turn around any economic storms that came their way.   
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22 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 16. 
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World War II Holds no Surprises,” Books & Culture, November-December 2004.  
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At first, the stock market speculation of the 1920s only seemed to contribute to a 
growing economy.  Hundreds of millions of stocks changed hands on Wall Street.  
Contemporary analyst H. Parker Willis confirmed the new phenomenon: 
During the year 1925, shares to the number of 452,000,000 had been traded in, and 
during 1926 as many as 449,000,000 shares, but during 1927 the tide mounted to 
577,000,000 shares which were brought and sold.27 
Despite new investment opportunities, Willis argued, interest rates were increasing, as 
American and British firms attempted to generate some revenue from the creation of new 
loans both at home and abroad.28  These new loans were used to further speculate on Wall 
Street.  It appeared that stockjobbers were making money, as the volume of trades 
increased steadily.  Casual speculators did not make lots of money, because obtaining loans 
was expensive and subject to high rates of interest that American banks charged.  Bankers 
made some money through the use of high interest loans, but what about stockjobbers? H. 
Parker Willis confirmed that, in 1928, loans on callable funds stood at about 15 to 16 
percent.29  Even if Americans or Europeans made money from stock market speculation, 
paying back their loans became a daunting task in the face of rising interest rates and 
fluctuating market prices. 
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American Financial Restructured Debt,” Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1992. 
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 By the late 1920s, as contemporary columnist Harold James has shown, the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average increased dramatically.  He wrote: 
Between early 1926 and the spring of 1929, the Dow Jones Industrial Average index 
almost doubled, from 158.54 at the beginning of 1926 to 308.85 at the end of March; 
then it moved ahead even faster during the summer; with a peak of 381 on 
September 3.”30   
The widespread speculation in stocks drove up stock prices. While some investors became 
squeamish, others sought to take profits from the market while it was at its zenith.  George 
D. Green, a Federal Reserve researcher, reported that between 500 to 600 thousand 
individuals owned between 75 to 80 percent of the common stock issued in the 1920s.31  
The new middle class owned common stocks, but it was the prominent investors who 
controlled Wall Street.  Stock Market wealth seemed to be concentrated mainly at the 
higher echelons of American society, but gradually, more ordinary Americans attempted, 
sometimes unsuccessfully, to acquire common shares of stock.  This viewpoint that middle 
class Americans did not possess a significant amount of common stocks differed from the 
account provided by John Kenneth Galbraith. 
After September 3, 1929, James continued, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
experienced unpredictable and dangerous declines as investors sought to sell their shares 
of stock.32  That year, October 24 to 29 were the worst days in American economic and 
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financial history.  Most scholars argue that the fall of the stock market directly contributed 
to the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s.33  In the wake of falling market prices 
throughout September and October 1929, there were bank failures in London, England, and 
the United States.  The Dow Jones dropped significantly in terms of points, and stock values 
plummeted.  On October 24, 1929, the Dow opened at 305.87 but closed at 299.47.34  
Moreover, the market lost between $8 to 9 billion in stock valuation on Black Tuesday, 
October 29, 1929.35  Weeks before, the Dow had dropped between 2 to 3 percent.36  
Americans had been accustomed to some market instability, but nothing like this had 
occurred since the Panic of 1873.37  New Dealer Bernard Asbell recalled that “when the 
New York Stock Exchange headily opened on September 1, 1929, the aggregate value of all 
stocks was some $89 billion.  He estimated that stockjobbers had lost 83 cents for every 
dollar invested.”38  The impact was devastating. 
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The value of stocks declined sharply, and both stockbrokers and ordinary investors 
who put money in the Stock Market suffered huge losses.39   Their stocks became nearly 
worthless.  Further, there was a lack of liquidity as Americans could not cash in their stocks 
at their original investment values.    Anyone buying stock in the late 1920s had paid 
substantial amounts for what were, by then, overvalued stocks.  When Americans decided 
to sell their asset-backed paper, they received only a nominal amount from their initial 
investments.  By late fall 1929, few investors looked to the Stock Market, and the market’s 
collapse hurt those who sought to put their hard-earned money into American 
corporations.  Historian Eric Arnesen argued that in the aftermath of the Crash, Americans 
lost billions of dollars, unemployment levels increased, and consumers could not purchase 
goods in the marketplace because of the lack of funds.40  For example, economic historian 
Gene Smiley reported that corporate profits decreased from $2.8 billion in 1929 to -$2.6 
billion in 1930.41  Others contend that by November 1929, the market had lost $100 billion 
in private assets.42   
Economic historian Michael Bernstein examined consumer consumption habits to 
address the Great Crash of 1929 and the reasons that recovery only occurred gradually 
throughout the 1930s.  He observed that initially, the decade of the 1920s experienced a 
major economic boom after the minor recession from 1920 to 1922, only to witness 
changes in buying and purchasing habits of consumers.  This affected the financial markets 
as the national economy became more secularized and industrialized.  He further asserted 
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that the economic recovery occurred once the Second World War started, because there 
were increased amounts of consumption to support the global war effort.   
Additionally, Bernstein argued that the United States during the Hoover and 
Roosevelt administrations failed to address the economic crisis, because of high 
unemployment that affected productivity negatively and recovery only began with the 
emergence of warfare in 1939.43  He asserted that labor costs had to remain low to prevent 
the growth in the prices of consumer goods.  Bernstein also mentioned that as consumers 
became more affluent during the 1920s, because of higher income levels in a more 
secularized marketplace, they began to purchase more durable goods for their homes, and 
retail and durable goods became cheaper and had lower demand levels.44  This affected the 
national economy detrimentally as Americans witnessed less growth during the latter 
years of the 1920s.  If there had been newer retail products in the marketplace, then 
American corporations would have been able to generate more revenue for their 
merchandise, and the Great Crash and Depression that followed could have been averted. 
In an effort to stabilize the Dow, on October 24, Richard Whitney, vice president of 
the Stock Exchange and member of J.P. Morgan, went to the Wall Street.45  He purchased 
between 10,000 to 25,000 shares of United States Steel for $205.00 per share.46  So, how 
did the two most powerful automotive companies:  Ford Motor Company and General 
Motors Corporation fare during the economic crisis?  Ford Motor Company and General 
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Motors Corporation were mainly unaffected by the Stock Market Crash.  Ford Motor 
Company was a corporate proprietorship and did not maintain publically traded stock, 
while General Motors Corporation did experience a slight reduction in the prices for 
common and preferred stock47.  Sales volumes for General Motors common and preferred 
stocks did plummet but the company’s profitability was sound during the period.48    
On October 24, however, the Dow closed at 299.47, still down 1.78 percent, while 
12,895,000 stocks had changed hands.  Normally, Wall Street was accustomed to volumes 
at the one to two million exchanges per day.  This day was unprecedented.  So why did it 
happen?  What caused the Dow to move into this volatile range?  What explanations have 
been given about this economic event in American history? 
 Business columnist Maury Klein offered many suggestions to explain the situation.  
He argued that the Federal Reserve branch of New York and Washington D. C. should bear 
some of the responsibility for the 1929 crisis, because of their cheap money policies in the 
mid-to-late 1920s.  The Federal Reserve continued to lower interest rates during the 
decade, which resulted inexpensive loans to consumers.  Some then used this money to 
speculate in the stock market.  Klein confirmed that Federal Reserve Board member Adolph 
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Miller mentioned that the institution’s cheap money policies toward American banks 
caused much of the economic instability.49  In his memoirs, Herbert Hoover assigned some 
of the blame for the Great Crash of 1929 to the Federal Reserve System.  He argued that, 
before 1928, the Federal Reserve System was responsible for the emergence of cheap 
money policies that promoted the revitalization of European economies and currencies.50  
In 1925, Governor of the Federal Reserve Branch of New York Benjamin Strong expanded 
its open market operations, and lowered interest rates at the behest of Montagu Norman, 
head of the Bank of England, Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, and Charles Rist of the 
Bank of France.51 This policy immediately aided Europe, but it had a long-term negative 
impact on the United States.  Domestically, easily available credit had fueled the stock 
market bubble. 
As president, Herbert Hoover stated that he had confronted Federal Reserve 
officials about their cheap credit policies; but he was overruled by them.  At the same time, 
Hoover asserted that the economic crisis might not have occurred without the coming of 
the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles.  It was his contention that the Stock 
Market Crash and the Great Depression started in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America 
first and then spread to the United States.  Thus, the United States was not completely 
responsible for the coming of the Great Depression.  It was an international crisis.  
Economists Galbraith, Fisher, and Keynes contended that stock market speculation was one 
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of the causes, but Wall Street throughout the 1920s was within a healthy economic range.52  
Economist Paul Samuelson argued that the Great Crash of 1929 did not display any visible 
causes.  Many investors did not see it coming.  Moreover, Samuelson asserted that 
throughout American History, economists and policymakers had been able to predict a 
majority of the recessions or depressions in this country, but there were some events that 
caught them by surprise.53  These unexpected economic events, such as the Great Crash of 
1929, were severe when they did occur.   
In a report by the National Bureau of Economic Research, scholars argued that 
Bolivia, Australia, Germany, Brazil, India and Bulgaria had entered their depressions before 
the Stock Market crashed in the United States.54  The economies of China, Russia, Central 
Asia, and Central Africa further had begun to show weakness before the United States’ 
economy.55 Thus, Hoover argued that the Stock Market Crash was a global, not domestic 
event.  The crises started throughout the globe and that the United States was not isolated 
nor was it the lone nation to experience this economic instability.  This global event was 
not within his control.  
Irving Fisher, a member of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, contended that the Federal 
Reserve did make a terrible mistake regarding its monetary policies, but Federal Reserve 
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economists were not responsible for the crisis.56  He believed that, before the fall of 1929, 
both economic growth and Wall Street’s gains had been legitimate.  The American economy 
had become more internationalized with consumers from around the globe participating in 
the stock market.  By contrast, Federal Reserve Vice-Governor of the Washington, D.C., 
Board Paul Warburg stressed that the Fed was responsible, because it restricted public 
credit and raised interest rates after the death of Benjamin Strong, even as Americans and 
global citizens had participated in establishing an asset bubble.  Wild speculation may have 
been the cause.57  Before the Crash occurred, Warburg believed that speculation in the 
United States could contribute to a depression.  His warnings went unheeded. 
International incidents, especially in Europe, contributed to investor uncertainty 
and, indirectly, to the Wall Street Crash in 1929.  Remember, the United States had become 
an immense creditor nation with large gold reserves.    The Stock Market Crash, thus, 
affected nations throughout the globe and strong gold reserves in the United States coupled 
with the use of metallic standards, furthered depressed the international market.   
 In the absence of a world banking system, financial leaders and economists still 
acted on a national basis.  George Harrison, successor to Benjamin Strong as the Governor 
of the Federal Reserve Branch in New York, increased interest rates after November 1928 
in response to global developments.  Harrison’s now controversial move is the subject of 
much scholarly and political debate.  Economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz 
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agree that if the Federal Reserve had not raised interest rates and, instead, had increased 
the money supply in the private sector through cheap money policies, then the economic 
depression might have been averted.  Before 1928, after all, New York Federal Reserve 
Governor Benjamin Strong had provided cheap loans to the Bank of England, which was 
working to revitalize the British economy and appreciate the pound sterling.58  This move 
was calculated to stave off the ensuing global economic downturn.   Moreover, Friedman 
and Schwartz point out, while Benjamin Strong was alive, the competitive relationship 
between the Board in Washington, D. C., and New York was balanced.59  Disputes over 
monetary policy came to the surface under his successor George Harrison.  These 
discussions had a negative impact on the actions of the Federal Reserve System.  The 
decision-making process regarding monetary policy for the Federal Reserve System was 
hampered, because of disputes between the New York Branch and Washington, D.C.60   
Each branch had a difficult time maintaining a universal and uniform economic strategy.  
The conflict between the different Federal Reserve boards exacerbated the economic crisis. 
Both the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D. C., and New York were concerned 
over stock speculation on the Wall Street exchange, but their strategy to control this 
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problem was not unified.  Hence, Harrison convinced the Board in Washington, D.C., to 
increase discount rates and curtail cheap money policies in an effort to curtail speculation.  
As this occurred, there was significant disagreement among other Fed officials.  From the 
Crash of 1929 to the Banking crisis of the early 1930s, Harrison petitioned the Board in 
Washington, D. C., to raise interest rates.  American policymakers at the Board would not 
listen to his arguments.61  Harrison believed in the use of direct pressure to compel the 
private sector to end speculation, but his approach was not agreed upon by the Board and 
the other member banks.  Both sides of the debate vacillated.62   
Economists Friedman and Schwartz have argued that the Federal Reserve could not 
make sound monetary policy and that, because of its lack of leadership, the money supply 
among member banks declined.63  This failure had a negative impact upon corporate and 
private banks, which then could not extend domestic loans to combat insolvency and 
improve unemployment levels during the stock market decline.64  Moreover, they argued 
that there was a profound lack of liquidity or available cash in circulation in the private 
sector.  The Federal Reserve refused to purchase corporate securities.  This may have 
increased the ability of multinational corporations to further invest in the economy and 
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increase employment levels and conditions in the private sector.  Political and economic 
historians such as Anne Mayhew, on the other hand, contend that Friedman and Schwartz 
failed to make the case that the Federal Reserve’s monetary contraction was the principal 
cause of the economic crisis.  Mayhew points out that high-powered money, which 
consisted of deposits in private bank accounts was in abundance in the late 1920s and the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.65  According to Mayhew, bank concerns may have been 
muted during the 1920s, especially if banks were able to prevent the withdrawal of funds 
from private accounts.   
One reason why the Federal Reserve did not increase the money supply available to 
private banks after the stock market crash of 1929 was that, initially, the Reserve Board 
examined the banking conditions of Chicago and New York to determine its monetary 
stance.  When Mayhew re-examined the data, she discovered that, throughout much of the 
early 1930s, banks in both states had sound reserves.  They did not require more monetary 
resources, but they continued to weather the financial storm, despite difficult economic 
conditions.  Thus, the Federal Reserve System did not perceive that there was a present or 
evident need for action.  Scholars have argued that, when the Federal Reserve purchased 
corporate and foreign securities, the global economy prospered.  Bank borrowing normally 
decreased when the central bank acquired asset-backed paper or securities.66  The Federal 
Reserve may have been able to increase the outflow of public credit to the national 
economy through purchases of government securities and corporate bonds, not necessarily 
through just fiscal policies.  Economist David Wheelock contended that private banks were 
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reluctant to borrow from the Federal Reserve System and viewed this agency as the lender 
of last resort.  There could have been other financial mechanisms that could have assisted 
private banks infuse cash into their institutions if needed.67 
One problem that central banks face is that, during booms, private banks were 
willing to lend more money, while if there is a downturn, then monetary contraction 
became the norm.  The Federal Reserve may have been reluctant to provide loans to 
corporate banks, because they have viewed the national economy as one in which there 
was a slowdown.68  Moreover, restricting public credit disenabled the outflow of gold.  
Hoover was determined to prevent substantial losses of gold reserves, which could have 
increased the federal deficit.   
Economic historian Peter Temin offered a perspective that contrasts with the 
arguments put forth by Friedman and Schwartz and confirms the theories presented by 
Anne Mayhew.69  Temin argued that the money supply did not decline at the end of 1930, 
as Friedman and Schwartz had specified.  Temin contended that, despite the number of 
bank failures, the national economy returned to normalcy at the end of 1930.  Friedman 
and Schwartz, in his opinion, were incorrect.  From the Crash of 1929 to the Banking Crisis 
of the early 1930s, there was an increase in the amount of credit (money stock) in the 
private sector, which could have prevented the economic downturn.  On the other hand, 
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Temin argued that Herbert Hoover was a monetary deflationist, because he believed in the 
use of a metallic standard, which normally depressed prices.  This may have been the 
reason that he restricted the outflow of gold from the United States and for the decrease in 
the amount of available credit (money stock) in the country.70  Deflation implied that public 
credit was reduced and the use of a metallic standard, causing the appreciation of the 
currency and the depression of consumer prices.71  
There is one problem with Temin’s argument.  Cheap money policies had 
contributed to the economic downturn.  If the Fed had increased the money supply further 
in the private sector, then consumers might have purchased more stocks or used the 
money stock to support their earlier margin purchases of stock.  The American middle class 
may neither have spent the money to bolster consumer demand nor deposited their 
monetary resources into banks.  Instead they spent it on the acquisition of already 
overpriced stocks.  During the early years of the economic crisis, Americans lost valuable 
financial assets, and their savings were reduced to nominal amounts.72  Many middle class 
investors had made intelligent decisions in their stock acquisitions, but the crash caught 
many off-guard.  They did not expect this crisis nor were they prepared for it.  But 
Economic historian Harold Bierman, Jr., argued that the economic indicators were present, 
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such as the risky increase in stock prices.73  Herbert Hoover attempted to warn Wall Street 
and the Federal Reserve and banking system to no avail.  Policymakers, economists and 
stockbrokers immediately blamed the crisis on speculators who acquired large amounts of 
common stocks and supposedly made poor investment decisions.74 
Maintaining global metallic standards have been one of the sources of economic 
stagnation that contributed to the crash in 1929, but so too was the belief that a balanced 
federal budget should trump other policy priorities.  Herbert Hoover, throughout his public 
career, believed that government intervention in the national economy was, at best, a 
cumbersome approach toward solving private sector woes.  The Federal Reserve’s 
approach was neither a coherent nor a sufficient response to the crisis.  Moreover, 
President Hoover, once called the “Great Engineer,” prevented the federal government 
from playing an active role in mitigating the crisis after 1929.75  Many in the financial 
world, including Hoover, believed government actions should be limited.  Further, a 
metallic standard based upon the sale and acquisition of gold in the public sector, they 
believed, put the United States on the path toward economic recovery.  Critic and historian 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., quipped that Hoover felt that gold “was a metal enshrined in human 
instincts for over 10,000 years and he did not mean to abandon it.”76  His rock-solid belief 
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in the gold standard did not persuade various European nations, including major trading 
partner, Great Britain, from renouncing their use of a metallic standard.77  
Patricia Clavin, among others, has confirmed that the gold standard contributed to 
the market crash in 1929 that gradually transformed into a deep international depression 
during the 1930s.78  The United States and Europe could not establish an exchange rate 
policy that all nations could agree upon, because of its use of metallic standards.  Clavin 
further argued that each country developed their own policy rules for the maintenance of 
their metallic standards.  Each metallic standard used among the Westernized countries 
was distinct, so efforts to change their monetary policies had to be negotiated.  By 1930, 
most nations tended to use deflationary policies and a contraction of their domestic money 
supply to prevent massive outflows of gold through the use of import tariffs and other 
economic measures.79   
Finally, Clavin stressed that once nations removed their currency from a metallic 
standard, and expanded their money supply, their economies improved.  Any hope of 
maintaining a gold or other metallic standard required global economic agreement.  Each 
nation could not have policies that were differentiated from their international 
counterparties if the systems were to function properly.  Without global metallic standards, 
creditor nations such as the United States were regarded as lenders of last resort.  The 
abandonment of metallic monetary standards and the use of floating exchange rates 
created economic tensions in the United States.  Nations such as France, the Netherlands, 
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Belgium, and Switzerland sought to sell their holdings of American banknotes for gold.  
These nations were convinced that the United States would discontinue its gold standard in 
similar ways as Great Britain and Germany.80 
Prominent historian William Leuchtenburg argued that Hoover was ideologically 
committed to maintaining the United States on a gold standard, even at the cost of a 
deflated national economy and high unemployment levels.81  In response to his critics, 
Hoover contended that gold stabilized the prices for manufactured goods.  In his opinion, 
this conservative move eventually increased consumer demand and thus regenerated the 
economy.  Still, as Leuchtenberg and others have argued, Hoover’s limited government 
actions, coupled with his insistence on balanced federal budget, put the government on the 
path toward temporary solvency.  But it did not answer larger structural problems nor did 
it put food in the mouths of the unemployed and impoverished.  Rutgers historian Elliot 
Rosen concurred with Schlesinger and Leuchtenburg in arguing that Hoover sought to 
maintain the gold standard.82  He convinced Great Britain, which had abandoned the gold 
standard, to reestablish its global economic and fiscal role.  Again, scholars such as Kristie 
M. Engemann of the St. Louis Federal Reserve branch and others have argued that many 
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foreign nations were concerned that once Great Britain left the gold standard, the United 
States would follow in its footsteps.83  
Another international problem that Hoover faced was that Germany, which still 
owed massive war reparations and became deeply in debt to American banks, was 
undergoing severe economic instability.  In 1930 to 1931, Hoover was uncertain that the 
German government would be able to pay its reparations as stipulated under the Treaty of 
Versailles.  The Postwar Reparations Commission had estimated that German reparations 
amounted to about 132 billion gold marks.84  France received about fifty-two percent of the 
reparations while their British counterparts were to gather about twenty-two percent in 
reparations payments. 85    
Moreover, German multinational corporations began, after the war, to borrow 
heavily through loans from the United States.  It appeared likely that Germany would 
default on its domestic and foreign loans.  Both the Dawes plan of 1924 under the Coolidge 
administration and the Young plan of 1929, devised under Hoover, were designed to solve 
the reparations crisis in Europe, but the crisis had not been resolved following their 
enactment.86  Prominent banks in the United States loaned to German local governments 
and corporations between 50 to 75 percent of the monetary resources for the expansion of 
their national economy.  J.P. Morgan provided Germany with between $100 to 200 million 
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in loans for postwar revitalization efforts.87  American companies such as Chase and 
Guaranty Trust further had invested two billion dollars in German infrastructure.  It was 
unclear if these loans could be re-paid.88  The private and public sectors in Germany were 
devastated, and policymakers had to devise sound solutions to manage this economic issue. 
Postwar loans were important, because the United States was determined to 
reconstruct Europe and to ensure that its allies (especially Great Britain and France) had 
the wherewithal to pay off their massive wartime debts.  Hoover realized that, if Europe 
was to be saved, bailing out Germany had to take priority.  On the one hand, German 
reparations had to be addressed.89  From a foreign policy standpoint, the government 
worried about Communism; and they were determined to use Germany as a bastion against 
the newly emergent Soviet Russia and its radical political ideology.90  Hoover and his 
predecessor thus faced a financial and political dilemma.  They had to address the issue of 
German reparations.  They also understood the issues of European reconstruction and war 
debts were interlinked.  The Hoover administration was especially concerned with France, 
because he was certain that France had a vested interest in promoting a docile German 
nation.  In turn, France was worried that Germany would rearm and return to a militarized 
state.   
The Laval administration was determined to use its political and economic powers 
to prevent any new forms of German aggression.  The question that policymakers had to 
ask themselves was whether Germany could pay its reparations, even if they were reduced.  
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Owen D. Young, a corporate executive and the architect of the Young plan of 1929, 
contended that Germany could not pay its reparations.  Western allies had to renegotiate 
some of the financial stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.91  Young’s stance, however, did 
not move the French or British governments to renegotiate, but the German default on its 
reparations payments caused both France and Great Britain to experience much economic 
instability. 
 From 1929 to 1932, as the crisis in Germany, and secondarily in France and the 
Great Britain, accelerated, many Western centralized banks and government treasuries 
prevented the outflow of gold.  Gold was hoarded, and beggar-thy-neighbor policies came 
to the surface.92  Historian Elliot Rosen noted that over twenty-one nations curtailed the 
use of the gold standard and barred or limited gold exports.93  Great Britain was a 
dominant political actor in this new fiscal and monetary strategy.94  Germany and Italy also 
established foreign exchange constraints, and countries with nominal economic resources 
propagated moratoriums on intergovernmental debts and credit for businesses in the 
private sector.95    
 In the face of this crisis, the Federal Reserve Branch in New York and the Board in 
Washington, D.C., were determined to prohibit the exportation of gold to foreign countries.  
Their moves led to a major contraction of international credit in an effort to prevent gold 
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outflows.  It also deepened the banking crisis in the years from 1929 to 1933.96  Moreover, 
after the summer of 1931, there were multiple major bank failures, such as the closing of 
Credit-Anstalt, a powerful bank in Austria.97 Overseas trade in Austria and Germany 
became problematic, due to loan defaults; and unemployment levels in both countries 
increased drastically.98 
Hoover responded that it was important to target the reparations issue, because 
restoring the German economy and the economic balance within Europe was the only way 
to restore confidence in the global economic system.  His response did not consist of solely 
global strategies but domestic policies as well.  Hoover sought not just to bolster European 
stability through the Young plan and limit intergovernmental loans.  He was inclined to 
sustain the gold standard, balance the federal budget, and use his executive powers to 
avoid the collapse of state and national banks and maintain domestic economic solvency.  
Thus, he sought to restore confidence in the developed nations of the world.99   
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 In terms of his direct policies, Hoover issued a moratorium on reparations payments 
and intergovernmental loans in the early 1930s, so that Germany was not responsible for 
reparations payments for one full year.100  This step was important, because the United 
States was one of Germany’s major creditors.  American banks held billions of dollars in 
German securities and loans.  If Germany was to fail, then the United States and its 
economic security would be in peril.  Most New York banks held German securities, and 
Wall Street had vested interests in making sure that the German government and private 
sector remained solvent.   In an effort to promote global peace, Hoover hoped that the 
moratorium would encourage domestic political forces in Germany and Austria to limit 
military spending.101   
The moratorium eliminated German reparations payments for one year, but neither 
Hoover nor his European allies believed that the overall debt should be cancelled.102  Most 
European nations agreed to the principles behind the moratorium, but France was 
dissatisfied with this development.  France had been using the reparations payments to 
revitalize their national economy after World War I.  But the Laval administration argued 
that the United States failed to contact them about the proposal in a timely manner.  France 
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temporarily backed off, but its disappointment was exacerbated when Hoover threatened 
to negotiate the proposal without French approval.  French public officials continued to be 
concerned about German military might, which limited their willingness to sign on to the 
U.S. plan.103 
  Some scholars now argue that Hoover’s moratorium may not have been a step in the 
right direction.   In making this temporary easement of the reparations payments, 
European and American policymakers missed a great opportunity to make fundamental 
changes in the global system.104  The main problems were the crisis of the expansion of the 
public credit, the decrease in farm prices globally, and a general loss of confidence in public 
and private banking.105  Policymakers might have attacked the issue of liquidity or ready-
available cash and in turn strengthen public and private credit.  Available assets were 
illiquid so that the money supply could be expanded.  As the market crisis continued, the 
issue was not the enormity of debts, but how to pay for these debts with readily-available 
cash.106   
The road to domestic economic solvency in the United States was difficult at best, 
but trying to coordinate global developments and pushing to move the economy forward 
was nearly impossible.  Before issuing the moratorium on reparations payments, President 
Hoover was reluctant to offer Germany and Austria any financial concessions.  Two global 
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conferences to discuss the issue further were held—the Lausanne conference of 1932 and 
the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933.  The results of these conferences 
were disastrous.107  In both conferences, Americans and their European counterparts held 
talks about the gold and silver standards, disarmament and collective security issues, tariff 
limits and reductions, and reforming the Treaty of Versailles.108  They did not, however, 
agree on an economic plan of action.  Still, international hostility and competition 
remained.  
 At the beginning stages of the Great Depression, gold started to flow slowly in and 
out of the United States and Western European countries.109  At the same time, many 
nations such as Canada, Argentina, and Uruguay were forced off a metallic standard 
because of gold flight.  Liquidity and massive loan defaults and bank failures remained 
problems,110 and they caused massive deflation in the Western World.  Unemployment 
levels increased dramatically in both Europe and in the Americas.  Many nations remained 
economically insolvent.   Banks in the United States, as elsewhere, suffered from economic 
instability, and many began to fail.  Hoover tried to put on a brave face, but banks were 
forced to liquidate their assets.  These actions further contributed to the declining values of 
stocks and severely weakened investment.   
In 1931, 2,290 banks excluding mortgage companies that also faced some financial 
hardships, had closed their doors in the United States alone.111  And in the three years after 
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1929, approximately five thousand banks were no longer in business.  There was a 
decrease of money in circulation, the dismantling of metallic standards in Europe, an 
appreciation of the dollar and a decline in prices for consumer goods.  Trade gradually 
came to a halt.  People during this period began to hoard cash.  They stored it in their 
homes, rather than banks, because they did not trust bankers or policymakers.112  They felt 
threatened by the economic collapse and did not know who they could count on for 
financial support and relief. 
The global credit crisis forced the hand of the Hoover administration.  Something 
had to be done to improve liquidity and to encourage re-investment in the stagnant 
economy.113  First, Hoover solicited some private funds and established the National Credit 
Corporation (NCC) on October 13, 1931.114  He called for a meeting at Secretary of the 
Treasury Mellon’s apartment with corporate executives such as Thomas W. Lamont, George 
Whitney of J.P. Morgan, Albert H. Wiggins of Chase National Bank, Charles E. Mitchell, 
chairman of National City Bank, William C. President, president of Guarantee Trust 
Company of New York and others.  Hoover’s proposal for a private credit corporation did 
not go over well.  A majority of the participants sought federal action and a government 
response to the Banking Crisis and Great Depression. 115   
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Still, the National Credit Corporation went forward.  The NCC was to be managed by 
the domestic corporate executives and insurance leaders.116  It was a private sector 
organization that loaned money to American banks, but private banks did not approve of 
the lending policies of the NCC, which required them to use their most liquid assets as 
collateral.117  With assets of about one half billion dollars, the NCC accepted asset-backed 
paper as collateral for redevelopment loans designed to re-invigorate the economy.118  
Small banks and businesses could not participate, because the NCC required member banks 
to provide it with two percent of their assets as collateral.    Hoover suggested that, if 
necessary, he would re-establish the War Finance Corporation, an idea promoted by 
Washington, D.C., Federal Reserve Board Governor Eugene Meyer.  He believed that 
modeling a new initiative on the WFC, which had served business well during the World 
War I, could now be a solution to the looming crisis.119  The difficulties ahead would open 
the door for Meyer’s solution.120   
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From the beginning, NCC was a disaster in the making.  Small banks were excluded 
from participation, and the process to obtain new loans was “slow and cumbersome.”121  
The organization was so ineffective that, by January 1932, only fifty-five million dollars, or 
a little better than ten percent of its funds, had been disbursed to various parties.  The 
failure of the NCC paved the way for the creation of a government agency with far greater 
assets and available federal funds to promote liquidity among American banks.122 
On January 22, 1932, Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) to handle the credit crisis.123   The Senate had approved the bill 63 to 8 while the 
House supported the bill 335 to 55.124    When the law was passed, a fiduciary trust (a 
sinking fund) containing two billion dollars was established to finance its operations, 
provide business loans, and promote job creation in the private sector.125  The RFC began 
to disburse funds on February 2, 1932.126  Hoover had resisted as long as possible 
establishing a new government agency that worked with public funds; but the national 
economy was in economic shambles.  He did not have a choice.  Eugene Meyer became the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation‘s first chairman, and he was quick to hire George 
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Franklin to serve as the general counsel for this agency.127  As President of this agency, 
Hoover selected Charles Dawes, who had served previously as Vice-President under Calvin 
Coolidge and had been a stalwart opponent of government intervention.128  Members of the 
RFC board consisted of the following individuals:  Senate Democratic leader Joe Robinson, 
Speaker of the House John Nance Garner, Arkansas executive Harvey C. Couch, and Jesse H. 
Jones of Texas.  The Treasury Department loaned funds to the RFC, and the proceeds were 
allocated to domestic banks and corporations.  These efforts were supposed to increase the 
money supply in the private sector and improve employment levels, because the loans 
were to be allocated to hire Americans.  In addition, funding for the RFC did not just come 
from American taxpayers, but from the sale of bonds and the emergence of a fiduciary 
trust.129   
In the beginning, the RFC instilled confidence in ordinary people, but their hopes 
and aspirations were quickly dashed.  In June 1932, Charles Dawes resigned from his post 
as the President of the RFC.130  It was revealed to the public that he secured a loan from the 
RFC in the amount of ninety million dollars.  Dawes returned to Chicago and continued to 
serve the banking community in Illinois.  In the wake of this revelation, American voters 
began to feel that the RFC benefited the wealthy as a rubberstamp for their chosen policies.  
They thought that the RFC was “relief for the rich.”   As Franklin Ebersole reported, “even in 
Chicago financial district, cynical lawyers chortled that RFC stood for Relief for Charlie.”131  
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In later years, the RFC barred its members of the board of directors from obtaining loans, 
because it was considered a conflict of interest,132 as it had been for Dawes.  
 Large banks welcomed the RFC, because they could secure loans from a reliable and 
business-friendly institution.  In addition, corporations in the private sector could obtain 
RFC funding for their business operations and new investments.133  RFC funds enabled 
large banks to increase their expenditures, because there were more banknotes in 
circulation.  By the early 1930s, there was a liquidity problem in the United States and the 
rest of the world.  Henry B. Steagall, Democratic House Representative from Alabama and 
Chairman of the Banking and Currency committee, argued that the RFC was an absolute 
necessity because of the lack of funds in the private sector.   
The passage of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act was a watershed event 
in American history, because it was one of the first instances in which the federal 
government infused cash into the private sector.134  The media, such as the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, policymakers, and many ordinary Americans, felt that this was uncharted 
territory, because of its governmental intervention in peacetime.  As Jordan Schwarz wrote, 
“Representative Homer C. Parker of Georgia branded the RFC the most decided step toward 
communism any civilized government has ever taken with the possible exception of 
Russia.”135  Other observers argued that the RFC arrived too little too late.  American banks 
and corporations received an infusion of cash to support their business operations.136  They 
spent nearly all of their monetary resources on balancing their financial records.  
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Corporations did not hire new workers.137  High unemployment remained a serious 
problem. 
Some scholars such as James L. Butkiewicz argue that the RFC was somewhat 
successful.  Hoover’s efforts should be applauded, because of the plenitude of loans that 
were initiated under this institution to banks, railroads and utilities.138  From the period of 
August 1932 to January 1933, Butkiewicz showed that over 3,300 businesses enhanced 
their private credit from the RFC.139  The RFC may have assisted banks overcome the 
liquidity crisis, but did the formation of the RFC enable the elite classes to prosper at the 
expense of the lower and middle classes?  In fact, Hoover believed in internationalism and 
government cooperation but not in individual relief.140  Here, he preferred self-help.  
Private charities were promoted.  The federal role in this crisis was based upon improving 
the financial operations of businesses so that American corporations could hire more 
workers.  If ordinary Americans turned to the government for relief, then this countered his 
arguments for the maintenance of rugged individualism and social mobility based upon 
hard work and dedication.141 
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By July 1932, Congress acted further to stem the Great Depression with the passage 
of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act.  This new law increased the borrowing 
power of the RFC and enabled it to assist states and corporations that required new 
liquidity.142  It came to the aid of local governments seeking to provide some form of relief 
during the growing economic crisis.  During the Interregnum, President-Elect Franklin 
Roosevelt contended that, even though the RFC financed the operations of banks, 
corporations and state agencies, it did not necessarily promote an expanded economy with 
national growth.  In a letter to Felix Frankfurter, Roosevelt wrote that 
We do not believe that loans to corporations by such bodies as the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation even if financed by inflationary money necessarily tend to 
quicken activity.  The test here is whether they are used to finance the output of new 
capital goods.  If they are merely used to enable corporations to liquefy their assets 
they may have little or no effort in reviving activity.143  
RFC loans may have stabilized some American businesses, but private corporations did not 
necessarily expand their business operations or rush to enlarge their payrolls.  
Corporations may have had positive balance sheets, but they did not necessarily reduce 
unemployment.  Moreover, under the Hoover administration, the RFC may have been 
increasingly reluctant to provide corporations with new loans.  The Great Depression was 
also called the Great Contraction, because of the overall lack of American financial liquidity 
or money in circulation.144  New credit did not filter into the American economy on a 
regular basis,145 and even the new RFC did not extend credit quickly enough or in sufficient 
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numbers to make an impact over the short-term.  Private banks continued to be reluctant 
to provide domestic businesses with loans, no matter their industrial and financial plans 
even though this would have provided corporations with private relief, not public.  Hoover 
believed that the public sector should not play a dynamic role in strengthening private 
corporations.  The absence of liquidity in the private sector prevented banks from 
establishing more loans to American industries.146 
Some scholars contend that the United States and Great Britain sought to revitalize 
the national economies in Europe and the rest of the world.147  The only problem that they 
faced was domestic opposition.  Each nation had its own ideas about the global economy.  
They argued among themselves, because they also had national interests and security 
concerns that prevented economic compromise.  The United States, which was a nation 
with strong gold reserves and a strong competitive advantage, sought to keep open its 
borders to free trade and competition.  Other nations saw it differently.  Moreover, the 
United States did not believe that overt or excessive government regulations were the 
answers to economic strife.  The Hoover administration was determined to limit 
government action in the private sector to corporate and bank support. 
One reason for the decline of the RFC after the Crash of 1929 was that the United 
States’ government and banks did have gold reserves, but they were unwilling to increase 
credit for fear of decreasing their gold stocks.   Federal Reserve chairman Eugene Meyers 
and Treasury Secretary Ogden Mills were reluctant to hold auctions for the acquisition of 
government securities, because they did not want to increase private credit.  The Federal 
Reserve, instead, increased interest rates to diminish the money stock in the private sector 
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and avoid an outflow of gold.  Elliot A. Rosen pointed out that between the summer of 1929 
and March of 1933, “monetary currency and demand deposits fell by 28 percent, while 
industrial output declined by some 50 percent.”148  By 1928, the United States had spent 
over 500 million dollars in gold to finance its foreign bond purchases and stock market 
acquisitions.149 
The Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression were devastating events in 
American and global history.  The United States and its American citizens suffered gravely, 
because of the lack of job growth and the problems with deflation.  Americans, overall, 
were subjected to poor economic conditions.  They sought government support from the 
Hoover administration.  Hoover, however, believed in self-help although the national 
economy could no longer support a system of laissez-faire and paternalistic financial 
practices.  Corporations did not have the wherewithal to support the average citizen and 
life for ordinary Americans became uncertain.   
These events occurred on the presidential watch of Herbert Hoover, and he 
attempted to resolve the crises by initiating proposals that had an international scope.  The 
statistics listed throughout this chapter illustrate that the United States was indeed in an 
economic downturn.  But the statistics do not mention where the crises first occurred.  Was 
it an American or global problem or both?  Did the economic crisis occur in the United 
States and then spread to other countries?  Hoover based much of his domestic actions in 
light of the international causes of the Great Depression and that had consequences for how 
the economic crisis played out and was addressed in the United States.  In the 1930s, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt contended that Hoover was mistaken to argue that the 
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crises occurred in the global system first.  Roosevelt believed that the crises had to be 
resolved in the United States first before policymakers sought to address a myriad of issues 
in foreign nations.  It is difficult to assign responsibility regarding why the Great Crash 
occurred.   
Hoover probably blamed the Federal Reserve System and his international allies 
throughout Europe that used cheap money policies to revitalize their national economies 
while Roosevelt blamed Hoover for his conservative approaches to monetary and fiscal 
policies.  The policies that these presidents pursued were completely opposite in the sense 
that Hoover was a fiscal conservative while Roosevelt was a liberal progressive.  Both 
political leaders sought to undo the policies of their opposition parties, in the sense that 
Hoover even strove to prevent the subsequent enactment of New Deal laws.  Roosevelt, on 
the other hand, attempted to argue that the Great Crash of 1929 was an American 
occurrence that required domestic solutions, and that the Hoover administration was 
responsible not so much for causing as for refusing to address national and global crisis. 
Scholars must look to the domestic and international policies of the Hoover 
administration and how they shaped the political agenda for Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
once he assumed the Oval office.  In contrast to his preferences for a non-interventionist 
government, Hoover did create the Reconstruction Finance Corporation that was intended 
to promote economic growth in the private sector, but he was determined to not become 
involved in mitigating the economic crisis through direct measures.  Hoover preferred in 
the use of the invisible hand of the market where policymakers examined public sector 
growth, balanced their federal budgets and did not develop proactive responses to private 
sector woes.   
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One question that must be asked is whether the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
served as an impetus for the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.150  Both the NIRA 
and the RFC were designed to target the private sector, but the RFC was established to 
extend public credit to the private sector.  The NIRA was implemented to use centralized 
planning to reform the industrial sectors of the national economy.  Both reforms worked to 
improve economic conditions, but their methodologies were inherently distinct.  Hoover 
could not bring himself to devise private sector reforms while Roosevelt excelled by using 
liberal economic ideologies to target industrial stagnation.  What this means is that both 
Hoover and Roosevelt maintained a set of different public policies that moved the nation 
forward in profound and distinct ways.  Roosevelt’s policies were not a continuation of 
Hoover’s conservative ideology.  The Roosevelt administration moved in different political 
circles, and this meant that economic change came to the forefront in distinct ways.  In the 
chapters that follow, we will attempt to chart the new economic methods of Roosevelt and 
how he departed from the public policies of the Hoover administration. 
                                                           
150 Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, 9.  Gardner mentioned that Hoover did seek to 
move beyond the RFC, but his solutions lacked substance and direction.  Hoover needed plan, but one was not 
forthcoming. 
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CHAPTER 4: HERBERT HOOVER, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND TEHIR ECONOMIC 
VISIONS 
 
Long before the Great Crash of 1929, Herbert Hoover wrote and published an 
intriguing book entitled American Individualism in 1922.  This book affirmed Hoover’s 
belief in American competitiveness in the global economy and endorsed free competition in 
the trade sectors.1  Further, Hoover’s economic and social philosophy was not the foreign 
conception of Individualism practiced in Europe but an American Individualism in which 
social mobility was supposed to enable all citizens improve upon their living conditions.2  
Service and responsibility became the main characteristics of Hoover’s dominant 
philosophy.  Democracy enabled this economic wheel to turn as monarchs, aristocrats or 
members of the elite classes were not the only individuals that improved upon their social 
stations of life.  Hoover’s faith in the Horatio Alger economic success story applied to all 
citizens in the United States and distinguished Americans from their European 
counterparts.3  This principle of American Individualism shaped Hoover’s political beliefs 
and served as the economic foundation for his policies as president.4   
What is American Individualism?  This chapter seeks to address and describe this 
important concept and to enumerate the uses of individualism in the policies and political 
choices of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  It itemizes the principles that 
                                                           
1 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear:  The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1999), 46; Ronald William Gordon Mackay, “America 1933 and the Industrial Recovery 
Act,” The Australian Quarterly 5, no. 19 (September 1933):  32. 
2 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, New York:  Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 32. 
3 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism, 24, 48; David W. Houck, “FDR’s Commonwealth Club Address:  
Redefining Individualism, Adjudicating Greatness,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7, no. 3 (Fall 2004):  266.  In Houck’s 
opinion, only certain individuals benefited from the Horatio Alger dream of self-improvement.  All Americans could 
not experience this dream, so he differs from traditional interpretations of Individualism. 
4 “Herbert Hoover’s Book,” Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1923. 
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shaped American Individualism in the United States and how this idea led citizens to strive 
for the American dream.  By 1929, however, the dreams enabled by a belief in American 
Individualism were no longer realized.  This individualist philosophy could not serve as a 
mechanism for promoting social and financial growth among citizens in the United States 
when the supposedly self-regulating market collapsed.  Thus, American Individualism still 
affected the political debate in the United States and how Americans, especially corporate 
executives and Republican policymakers, conducted themselves in political and economic 
environments even during the crisis of authority in the Great Depression.   
This chapter will touch upon some of Hoover’s experiences and philosophical 
stances, and his use of American Individualism as commerce secretary and president until 
1933.  It will, further, examine the devastating midterm elections of 1930 in which the 
Republican party lost many seats in Congress, because of disillusionment with American 
Individualism and how this theory no longer applied to American economic and social 
conditions.  Lastly, it will address the political styles of Roosevelt and Hoover during the 
Presidential election of 1932.  The Presidential race was hotly contested, and Hoover was 
fighting for his political life and legacy.  Roosevelt won the election, but the presidencies of 
both men reflected the contradictory bent of American public culture.  This chapter will 
illustrate the failure of American Individualism to address the problems of deprivation and 
insolvency among ordinary citizens.5  This principle no longer worked in defining American 
economic, political and social culture, and hampered American efforts at maintaining its 
                                                           
5 William H. Riker, “Learning to Love the Me Generation,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1985.  In this article, Riker 
reviewed a book entitled Habits of the Heart:  Individualism and Commitment in American Life.  He argued that 
Americans had been influenced by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century, but in the 1980s, citizens became too 
selfish and individualist.  They had lost the traditional meaning of individualism and became the “me generation.” 
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power in the global system.6  Its failure also created the political context in which Roosevelt 
became president.  
When and where does the term Individualism originate?  Initially, “Individualism” 
was an European concept that came into existence as a political philosophy before the 19th 
century.7   The term was developed from the European Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution in the late 18th century.  European Individualism, or the belief in an autonomous 
social identity, was a controversial term.  Its destructive force, some believed, threatened 
communal obedience, duty, and the system of law.  Its emergence in philosophy also 
marked the age of capitalism. 
In the United States, the uses of individualism were forms of capitalist 
libertarianism that reflected race, gender, and class.8  Nevertheless, the term promoted 
democratic values that underlay the American dream.9  The strong beliefs in private 
property were cemented into the political, social and economic landscape long before the 
twentieth century, but Hoover believed that this concept of property rights was only one of 
the tenets of American Individualism as it evolved following the American Revolution.10 
American Individualism was supposedly a concept that pertained to all citizens 
regardless of class.  Moreover, it differed from old World Individualism as practiced in 
Europe, because in the United States, less emphasis was placed upon the development of 
                                                           
6 “Does Individualism Survive,” Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1929.  Dr. McBain of Columbia University, in this 
article, argued that rugged individualism was no longer prominent in the United States and that any sort of 
theoretical term that ends with ism does not always have a permanent place in any academic discourse. 
7 Steven Lukes, “The Meanings of Individualism,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 32, no. 1(January-March 1971):  
45-46; Donald A. Ritchie, Electing FDR, 23-24; Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance:  Hoover, the Nation, 
the Depression (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1965),12-13; Edgar Eugene Robinson and Vaughn Davis 
Bornet, Herbert Hoover:  President of the United States (Stanford:  Hoover Institution Press, 1975), 39. 
8 John Spargo, “Hoover, The New Phase,” The North American Review 231, no. 4 (April 1931):  294. 
9 Steven Lukes, “The Meanings of Individualism,” 59, 62-63. 
10 Peter Steinfeis, “Individualism:  No Exit,” The Hastings Center Studies 2, no. 3 (September 1974):  3. 
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monarchical values, autocracy, and privilege.11  Society, in the United States, produced its 
own intellectuals that came from the masses, not just the elite or upper classes.  Every 
person or more realistically, man benefited from equality of opportunity, liberty, and 
justice.12  According to Hoover, democracy enabled all citizens, regardless of their origins 
or social backgrounds, to achieve in an equal setting.  But achieving the American dream 
became difficult at times depending upon race, gender, and ethnicity.  Citizens could not 
always acquire more than their modest means, even if they believed in the principles of 
American Individualism.  Despite inequality among citizens, Individualism had been long-
standing in the United States, especially since the American Revolution.   
In his Democracy in America, Tocqueville emphasized that Americans possessed the 
individual freedom and liberty to achieve in a system of laissez-faire economics.13  To 
believe in “American Individualism,” according to Tocqueville, was to have fortitude, 
courage, and confidence and to strive for the American dream, whatever it happened to be.  
Moreover, a person had to believe in the American spirit and contend that their goals could 
be accomplished.14  Tocqueville continued that since men in the United States believed in 
equality, freedom, democracy and individualism that they all stood on equal footing with 
other American citizens.  With equality, men were not above others, but were placed “side 
                                                           
11 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, New York:  Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922), 24. 
12 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism, 19. 
13 Peter Steinfeis, “Individualism:  No Exit,” 5; Alpheus T. Mason, “American Individualism:  Fact and Fiction,” The 
American Political Science Review 46, no. 1 (March 1952):  11; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2000), 482-484.  Tocqueville argued that sometimes Americans became 
isolated, because of their belief in the individual spirit and worked on their own self-interested inclinations or 
desires.  
14 Donald R. Richberg, “Progress under the National Industrial Recovery Act,” Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science 15, no. 4 (January 1934):  27. 
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by side.”15  For Hoover, equality of opportunity was an important factor in his views on 
American Individualism.16  American Individualism encouraged social mobility and that a 
person could improve his economic station in life depending upon his educational 
background, professional experiences and hard work.  Hoover believed that American 
Individualism distinguished the United States from the rest of the world.  
According to critics, only a select group of American citizens, mainly dominant 
protestant white males, believed that Individualism implied that “man is his own master.”17  
Opponents contended that it did not apply to all citizens, regardless of their socioeconomic 
background, race, or gender.  As an ideology, it emerged, because American governmental 
structures were democratic in origin, and equality of opportunity became the ideal for the 
first few centuries.18  In fact, it did not apply to all; but as an ideology, it masked the 
assumptions behind it.   
American individualism had a strong root in voluntarism, and proponents of its 
philosophy saw limited use for federal programs to stimulate growth in the private 
sector.19  Small government, decentralization of the federal government, and federalism 
governed policy initiatives in the United States.20  Many presidents, including Hoover’s 
predecessor, Warren Harding, believed that American citizens and policymakers should not 
                                                           
15 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America:  Volume II, trans. Henry Reeve (Salt Lake City:  Project Gutenberg 
Literary Archives foundation, 2006), http://www.gutenberg.org. (accessed February 26, 2015). 
16 Ellis Wayne Hawley, Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce:  Studies in New Era Thought and Practice (Iowa:  
University of Iowa Press, 1981), 232-237. 
17 Peter Steinfeis, “Individualism:  No Exit,” 6. 
18 Stephen Kalberg, “Tocqueville and Weber on the Sociological Origins of Citizenship:  The Political Culture of 
American Democracy,” Citizenship Studies 1, no. 2 (1997):  199-222. 
19 “Individualism Is Key to Progress, Hoover Writes,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 11, 1922; Thomas V. 
Dibacco, “Remembering Herbert Hoover,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 10, 1989. 
20 Robert H. Zieger, “Labor, Progressivism, and Herbert Hoover in the 1920s,” 207; Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty 
of Abundance, 4. 
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expect too much from the federal government.21  Intervention in state affairs was not 
promoted, nor could it serve as an adequate solution to national economic problems.22  In 
his book, The Interregnum of Despair, Jordan A. Schwarz argued that the president was 
thought to play the role of preacher and policeman while Congress devised solutions to the 
problems of generating revenue and appropriations.  Herbert Hoover, who served as the 
Commerce secretary under Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, was somewhat 
conflicted when it came to that belief.  He believed in voluntarism but used public works 
projects to stimulate the national economy.  Thus, Hoover sought indirect forms of relief for 
Americans and longstanding corporations, but he did not believe in extending more than 
limited and-in some cases-public works to ordinary citizens.  
Historian Elliot A. Rosen has questioned whether Hoover’s individualism required 
intense competition, because of Hoover’s belief in equality and the absence of class war, or 
social stratification.23  Hoover endorsed the idea that Americans did not want to emulate its 
European counterparts.  He was determined to avoid their political and economic moves to 
either nationalization or collectivism.24  Americans, in Hoover’s opinion, were distinct from 
their European allies.  As a proponent of capitalism and a system of laissez-faire, Hoover 
                                                           
21 Jordan A. Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair:  Hoover, Congress and the Depression (Urbana:  University of 
Illinois Press, 1970), 4. 
22 John Roskam, “From the Executive Director,” Institute of Public Affairs Review, September 2008.  Roskam wrote 
that even Tocqueville worried about an over-intrusive centralized government.  Should government intervene in 
the lives of ordinary Americans; James Q. Wilson, “Tocqueville and America,” Claremont Review of Books, Spring 
2012. 
23 Elliot A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust, 42-43. 
24 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “The Man of the Century,” American Heritage, May/June 1994. 
http://www.americanheritage.com. (accessed March 14, 2015); “Hoover Points Way to Wipe Out Unrest,” New 
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was needed because this system did not address the direct needs of European citizens. 
121 
 
 
 
sought to push Americans toward economic success.25  Government had a limited role in 
that process.  He saw little value in centralized planning strategies, and he argued that such 
policies went too far in regulating the national economy.  He held the belief that the private 
market was self-regulating and could reform itself, which was the key reason that Hoover 
argued that the Great Crash of 1929 was merely an economic correction in the corporate 
marketplace.26  In Hoover’s opinion, it was a short-term economic collapse, but the Great 
Crash of 1929 deepened the economic crisis that he faced.  It was not just a rudimentary 
economic crisis, but served as a warning that American Individualism no longer held a 
prominent place in American culture.27  Moreover, instead of direct intervention to 
mitigate the economic crisis, Hoover experimented with using industrial associations and 
mutual aid societies to address financial and social problems. 
 Hoover adopted the principles of American Individualism during his academic 
pursuits at Stanford University and throughout his early career as a mining engineer.28  As 
a food administrator during the Great War, he began to develop his ideas about the public 
and private sectors.29  His wartime service reinforced his “romantic viewpoint” about 
voluntarism and the roles of individual professionals who became members of the 
                                                           
25 Jordan A. Schwarz, The New Dealers:  Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 
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New Deal, 82-83; Robert H. Ferrell, “His War Against Starvation:  Bookshelf,” Wall Street Journal, October 1, 1996. 
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government system.30  During and after the Great War, historian Kendrick A. Clements 
argued that Hoover served as the U.S. Food Administrator, chairman of the U.S. Grain 
Corporation, head of the Sugar Equalization, and chairman of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium.31  President Woodrow Wilson even asked Hoover to serve as the head of the 
American Relief Administration in 1918, because he was so successful in his endeavors.  In 
Herbert Hoover, Vernon Kellogg argued that Hoover was a great organizer of resources that 
he received from American non-governmental organizations such as the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the New York Chamber of 
Commerce and the Cardinal Gibbons Fund.32  All of these charitable groups from the United 
States were instrumental in Hoover’s relief initiatives.   
Voluntarism and professionalism were embodied in Hoover’s ideal citizen, and this 
ideal man was perfect for the political arena.  It was the tireless professional and volunteer 
who worked in government in order to serve American citizens that was Hoover’s ideal.  
His volunteer, of course, did not receive wages or compensation for his role in the public 
sector, because the volunteer had to be wealthy in his own right.  For Hoover, the volunteer 
professional provided his services, because of his belief in American Individualism.33  Thus, 
the private citizen emerged in a place of prominence in the public sector and worked with a 
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political mandate to govern.  Moreover, Hoover did not believe that government agencies 
should be highly centralized.  He trumpeted the individual spirit, even early on when he 
worked as a mining engineer.  He held on to these beliefs tightly, and they served as a 
mechanism for his government service, even before his presidency.34 
Once Hoover returned from continental Europe in the early 1920s, he was 
convinced that economic liberties were dependent upon what he called spiritual and 
intellectual freedom.  Hoover contended that all peoples needed to sustain their economic 
freedom and that it must not come at the expense of maintaining intellectual equality.  As 
he wrote, “equality of opportunity is the right of every American—rich or poor, foreign or 
native born, irrespective of faith or color.  It is the right of every individual to attain their 
position in life to which his ability and character entitle him.  By its maintenance, we will 
alone hold open the door of opportunity to every new generation, to every boy and girl.”35  
Hoover continued that: 
Business is practical, but it is founded upon faith—faith among our people in the 
integrity of business men, and faith that it will receive fair play from the 
government.  It is the duty of government to maintain that faith.  Our whole business 
system would break down in a day if there was not a high sense of moral 
responsibility in our business world.36   
Hoover believed that ordinary citizens should have faith in American political institutions; 
and he prized the American businessman in his efforts to bring about economic, political 
and social change in the United States.  But businessmen must have faith in themselves or 
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they will not have the capacity to make the appropriate changes to American institutions 
and the national economy. 
Hoover’s ideal citizen-volunteer was the ultimate professional, and he used his 
intellectual framework, and economic and political know-how to provide common sense 
solutions to the American people.37  Government officials, he argued, were professionals 
who worked for the bureaucracy; but the government was decentralized so that 
policymakers exercised considerable control over political and economic transactions.38  
The skills that Hoover developed as a Food administrator, he used to again and again as 
Commerce Secretary and as President.  From this perspective, Hoover believed that an 
extensive administration was unnecessary in most cases.  In his acceptance speech in 1928 
for the Republican Presidential Nomination, Hoover declared, under his political party’s 
leadership, that limited government with a budgeted budget had been the federal 
government’s primary goals along with the elimination of poverty in the United States.39 
Hoover’s belief in voluntarism was witnessed in all of his public policy as Commerce 
Secretary and President.  He favored Chambers of Commerce and trade associations, 
because they helped the lower-to-middle classes get back on their economic feet through 
the creation of jobs in the private sector.  Hoover believed in using indirect methods to 
strengthen the national economy through relief for American businesses who, in turn, put 
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people back to work.  He asserted that enlightened corporate executives at large American 
firms “represented a fusion of altruism and self-interest.”40  Moreover, he argued that: 
Voluntarism would result in the elimination of waste, the furtherance of 
individualism, the promise of economic expansion, and the avoidance of the cancer 
of socialism which had proven a ghastly failure in Russia.41 
With Hoover, American Individualism, coupled with a metallic monetary standard 
could serve as the basis for economic growth and expansion.  He believed that the only way 
to balance the federal budget and bring prosperity back to the private sector was through 
the maintenance of a gold standard and a strong dollar.42  With a dollar supported by 
coinage or specie, American corporate executives increased their employment numbers 
and hired more citizens.  Hoover was called the Great Engineer for that very reason.   
Hoover believed in informing public opinion, but he was not the best communicator.  
He did not give a lot of interviews, and he did not discuss his policies as commerce 
secretary or president with the press.   He was inward and serious, and he did not possess a 
fierce sense of humor.  After his experiences as Food administrator in Europe, his thoughts 
and mentality became somewhat personal and subdued, and this shaped his political 
policies regarding the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s.43  
Moreover, historian Elliot A. Rosen has argued, because Hoover’s focus was on big 
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business, his policies promoted the status-quo.  Businesses were to be reformed but not 
regulated.44   
Businesses received more financial assistance under Hoover, and this relief was 
intended to help ordinary Americans indirectly.  For Hoover, financial assistance had to be 
hierarchical.  Ordinary citizens would benefit but only from government support for the 
economy generally.  Hoover’s belief in American Individualism shaped his views and led 
him to see supporting the business community as the primary means by which to help 
ordinary Americans.45  He believed in upward mobility for the working class, but improving 
one’s station in life was to be more gradual and less direct.46  According to historian Elliot 
Rosen, Hoover did not want to change society from its roots, but he sought to promote 
business interests so that working Americans could get off the “dole” and work as members 
of the labor force.47  
Hoover’s promotion of American Individualism was a failed attempt to create public 
policies that were in line with an older vision of government.48  His Individualist 
philosophy did not function to resolve national and global economic crises, and this failure 
was reflected in the Midterm elections of 1930.  Scholars contend that due to Hoover and 
his Republican colleagues’ conservative beliefs, a global economic downturn, a lack of 
presidential popularity and profound disapproval of his policies, November 4, 1930, was a 
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disaster for the Republican party.49  But this was normally the case with midterm elections 
in the United States.  If there was an economic collapse, a new influx of young, female or 
African American voters, or if the president lacked political charisma, then the incumbent 
party did not fare well in the midterm elections.50  The Midterm elections always meant 
losses for the incumbent party, but in 1930, the Republican party lost big.   
Moreover, in The Future of American Politics, Samuel Lubell argued that Democratic 
values such as the use of strong fiscal policies and expanded government versus 
Republican ideals of limited government and deflation have been staples of American 
governmental policies since the match-up between Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential election.51  If the federal government interfered too 
much in the private sector, then the American people began to espouse more Republican 
values.  But Herbert Hoover during the 1930 midterm elections may have experienced 
some backlash from his aggressive monetary policies to bring in revenue for the public 
sector, the absence of social programs at the federal level, and his emphasis upon a balance 
federal budget during a period of economic collapse.  
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On November 4, 1930, many Congressional seats were open during these election-
day contests, and the Republicans failed to capture key legislative seats.  The Republican 
party was still popular and influential in the South, but Michigan, Massachusetts, and 
Pennsylvania were the only places in which the Republican party held preeminence in the 
Northeast and Middle Western regions of the United States.52  In Illinois, Republicans lost 
five House seats, and they only won 49.6 percent of the state votes compared with 56.9 
percent in 1928.  Democratic Senatorial candidate from Illinois James Hamilton Lewis 
defeated Republican Ruth Hanna McCormick by 700,000 votes.  In Indiana, Republicans 
only received 47.2 percent of the vote, and Democrats controlled that state by a margin of 9 
to 4; in 1928, the margin had been 10 to 3 in favor of Republicans.  In Ohio, Republican 
Representatives for the House had lost six seats.  The 1930 midterm elections illustrates 
the effects of a party realignment in which many urban, working class ethnic Americans 
voted for the first time.53  These new citizens voted for the Democratic party and they have 
laid the groundwork for FDR’s election victory.   
Moreover, in 1930, there were thirteen new Senators in Congress while eleven of 
them were seated as Democrats.54  In the House of Representatives, Democrats picked up 
forty-nine new seats.55  It was a bad year for Republicans and Hoover had lost his 
presidential mandate among Congressional lawmakers and the American people.  Congress 
was in the hands of the Democrats, and they were not supplanted easily.56  Hoover had to 
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negotiate with a House and Senate housed with more Democrats who did not have his 
perspectives or interests at heart.  
Although Republicans lost several seats in the 1930 Congressional elections, the 
Republican party, also, did not fully support the president.  In the past, Hoover had been 
viewed as one of their brethren or comrade-in-arms,57 but the Hoover administration and 
the Republican Senators did not get along well.  Hoover’s cabinet remained loyal.  In his last 
two years in office, Hoover faced significant opposition from his own party.  Herbert 
Hoover believed that Republican Senate Leader James E. Watson of Indiana lacked 
Republican loyalty and respect for the party.  Hoover sought to supplant him with David A. 
Reed, Republican Senator from Pennsylvania; but he could not generate support within 
Congress.   Watson did not view Hoover as a legitimate or serious politician, and he would 
not follow Hoover’s directions or public policies.58  Following the mid-term elections, 
Watson proposed a compromise with Democrats in Congress so that bi-partisanship would 
be the order of the day.59 This act was useful to Republicans and Democrats in Congress, 
because Republicans were not evenly matched in legislative seats.  
Later in 1931 and early 1932, Hoover worked independently to turn the national 
economy around.  He did not want to incur congressional interference to his plans to 
prevent the spread of the Depression.   Hoover was able to push the debt moratorium, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and Glass-Steagall act or the Banking act of 1933 
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through Congress with Democratic assistance.    According to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis, Julia Maues argued that the Glass-Steagall act had been developed by Senator 
Carter Glass, Democrat from Virginia and Representative Henry Steagall, Democrat from 
Alabama.60  The bill had been passed during the last days of the Hoover administration, but 
it was signed into law by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  The sales tax bill, that would have 
balanced the federal budget, tariff alterations, and public works projects were not enacted, 
because of the emerging controversies and disagreements surrounding those proposals.61  
  In contrast to Hoover’s public personality, Roosevelt’s character and political 
identity were rooted in his on-the-job experience.  He was a masterful politician.  Unlike 
Hoover, Roosevelt became a public official early on in his life, and he used his professional 
experience to emerge as a dominant political leader in the United States.  In 1910, 
Roosevelt, at 28 years of age, became the State Senator for Duchess County, New York.62   
Throughout his time as state senator, he chaired and controlled the Forest, Fish and Game 
Committee.  He attempted to establish public policies that encouraged economic growth 
and environmental conservation in New York State.63  He attempted to sanction the 
economic behavior of New York City’s chief company executives and policymakers.  
Roosevelt also distinguished himself from the actions of New York City’s Tammany Hall 
machine.64  As a progressive conservationist, FDR fought to protect the New York State’s 
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environmental conditions.  He promoted the interests of farmers.  He wanted to establish 
low-interest loans for farmers, protect farmlands, and assist with the marketing of primary 
goods.65 
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, Roosevelt began to argue that “American 
Individualism” as voiced by his opponents did not share a dynamic place in the United 
States.  Sometimes the needs of the many had to be promoted over those of the individual.  
Roosevelt argued that, throughout history, there had been a struggle between the 
individual versus the community.66  During Roosevelt’s first Inaugural Address as governor 
of New York State in 1928,67 he stressed that our civilization would not survive unless each 
citizen fulfilled their societal responsibilities in the United States and the global system.  
Our standards of living improved, because of the sacrifices of everyday American citizens 
and their foreign counterparts.68   
Roosevelt did not endorse “rugged individualism,” because it led to intense 
competition in the private sector.69  He only supported this way of life and approach if 
there were equal opportunities for all Americans and economic exploitation was non-
existent.70  American Individualism was a practice and method that was supposed to 
benefit all Americans, especially when the private sector failed to answer the needs of its 
citizens.71  In his opinion, this situation enabled the federal government to step in and aid 
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working class Americans.  He felt that the modern form of “rugged individualism” was a 
detriment to the national economy, and that the traditional approach associated with 
American Individualism had been lost.72  In addition, he believed that this had been the 
central reason for economic deprivation, destitution and collapse in the United States. 73    
From this speech, historians believed that Roosevelt was liberal and progressive.  
He believed in reforming society through government action.  He argued for social justice 
and contended that, only through responsible government, could the needs of citizens 
come to the forefront.74  Additionally, Roosevelt believed that it was through the 
completion of our public policy initiatives that made countries in the global system great.75  
Working hard and using government assistance only when necessary paved the way for 
dynamic and widespread economic growth. 
Roosevelt continued to serve as a politician; after his ordeal with polio in 1921 and 
he worked for the peoples’ interests in New York State. 76  In 1928, he won the Governor’s 
seat in New York State, while attempting to complete his private efforts at recovery and 
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rehabilitation.77   As Governor of New York State, Roosevelt listened to his constituents.  He 
understood by 1929 that the American economy was in a shambles, but he hesitated to 
bring about reforms.  He believed, as did many, that recovery was in sight.  He realized that 
this was incorrect and he acted quickly to provide financial support for his constituents, as 
the depression deepened.   
After the collapse of the Bank of the United States in December 1930, FDR called for 
more stringent regulation of state chartered banks.  He established a regional committee 
for the establishment of unemployment compensation and retirement insurance.  He 
developed social programs, such as the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration to 
provide financial assistance to New York residents so that they could purchase consumer 
essentials from the private sector and maintain a high standard of living.78  This agency was 
established in New York State on October 1, 1931 and had a sinking fund of twenty million 
dollars to provide assistance to the unemployed.79  Roosevelt, as governor, accomplished a 
series of programs to help the unemployed, such as the enactment of sweeping legislation 
that established unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, work hours stipulations and 
limits, and public works projects that promoted job growth.80 
Because of Roosevelt’s popularity in New York State, he went up against Alfred 
Smith, the former New York governor, for the Democratic nomination for president in 
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1932.  Roosevelt understood that the road would be difficult and full of political hurdles.  
The main obstacles that Roosevelt faced in his battle with Alfred Smith were the issues of 
Catholicism, Prohibition but most importantly, the Great Depression.  Roosevelt had both 
the experience and intellectual know-how to handle Smith without much difficulty.  The 
same policies that he used as governor of New York State, he applied to his presidential 
campaign.  In the end, Roosevelt won the Democratic nomination for President in 1932.81 
On July 2, he announced at the Democratic convention in Chicago, Illinois, a New 
Deal for all Americans.82  Roosevelt pledged to help “the forgotten man,” who was suffering 
from the negative effects of the Great Depression.83  This speech was important, because 
Roosevelt was not speaking for the American people, he was speaking with them.  He 
understood that times were difficult but he believed that Americans could pull through 
these difficulties with some assistance from the federal government.  This political stance 
set Roosevelt apart from previous candidates because he was not trying to speak over the 
heads of ordinary Americans.   
During his campaign, FDR established his Brains Trust, which consisted of scholars 
that supported him intellectually and developed his public agenda for the presidency.84  In 
his group were Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and Adolf Berle from Columbia 
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University, Harvard and other Ivy League institutions.85  This group of scholars was 
Roosevelt’s informal cabinet that provided him with all sorts of ideas about social and 
economic policy.  He used these intellectuals to devise political strategies, write campaign 
and presidential speeches, and establish programs that could assist the American people.86  
Moreover, all of them came from prestigious universities and had a proven track record as 
scholars in their own right. 
It was during this period that Roosevelt began to battle Hoover and the emphasis 
that he placed upon American Individualism.  Determined to avoid the mistakes of his 
Democratic predecessor, Roosevelt turned outward.  He used more public efforts to combat 
the economic crisis.  His Brains Trust, like Hoover, saw the virtue of cooperation, planning, 
and long-term solutions, but government intervention in both individual welfare and the 
market was to become central to the New Deal.     
Roosevelt did not forget that ordinary Americans had provided him with the legal 
authorization to serve as governor in New York State.87  He realized that with the political 
and economic support of “the forgotten men”, he could change social conditions in the 
United States.88  Roosevelt and the Brains Trust developed an extensive public agenda that 
included unemployment compensation and retirement insurance, agricultural regulation 
and conservation efforts, a balanced budget, strong currency and the voiding of prohibition 
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laws.89  When Roosevelt accepted the presidential nomination for the Democratic party, he 
asserted that he would create a New Deal for his national constituents.  This period had 
been tough for all Americans, but he envisioned an American people who would be “called 
to arms in a war against economic despair.”90   
Former Harvard professor and administrator, Stephen Kemp Bailey points out that 
sometimes, politicians make pledges that they cannot carry out.  Americans probably 
wondered if Roosevelt could deliver, because of the enormity of the Stock Market Crash in 
1929 and Great Depression, but he had a strong mind.  He used his experiences and 
achievements as a New York governor and applied them to the presidential campaign.  In 
the beginning, he may have favored a balanced budget approach to the public sector but he 
realized that the national economy was in shambles.  He had to act proactively to resolve 
the crisis and get Americans back on their economic footing.  Roosevelt’s pledges appealed 
to the American people, because he argued for economic justice for all of his constituents.  
The principles behind American Individualism in its focus on economic freedom and the 
power of entrepreneurship no longer functioned in the United States.91  A new path had to 
be taken.92  As a progressive reformer, Roosevelt sought to establish a national economy 
that was a mixture between a laissez-faire approach and highly centralized government 
planning and regulation.93  
In 1932, many Democrats praised Roosevelt’s political, social and economic 
qualities.  They believed that he was the right person for the presidency.  An active 
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participant in the political arena, FDR would not just stand by and watch the national 
economy and ordinary American citizens fail or fall by the wayside.  He was determined to 
act and to act now to improve economic conditions.  When Roosevelt began to serve as the 
governor of New York State, in 1929, the Democratic party watched him closely to discover 
how he responded to economic, political or social crises.94  Viewed as a dynamic leader, he 
had a sound temperament and sought proactively to address the crisis.  Senators William J. 
Harris of Georgia, Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina, William H. King of Utah, Alben Barkley 
of Kentucky, Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee and Robert Bulkley of Ohio, all believed that 
Roosevelt could win the presidential election of 1932.  The political stage had been set.  The 
political battle would be between New York State Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt and 
the Presidential incumbent Herbert Hoover. 
The presidential campaign of 1932 between Hoover and Roosevelt illustrated the 
political impasse between both candidates and a segment of the country.  Both candidates 
had worked together in prior administrations, and they understood each other’s political 
attributes, but this campaign became bitter and grave.  Both felt that American lives were 
at stake and they maintained different political approaches and ideologies.  Thus, Hoover 
continued to use the principle of American Individualism to promote his metallic standard 
and dollar appreciation in the private sector as a solution to the crisis during the 
Presidential Election of 1932, and Roosevelt promoted government action more strongly.95  
Hoover believed that a strong dollar and a metallic standard were fundamental toward 
                                                           
94 Jordan A. Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair, 180-83. 
95 Herbert Hoover:  “Address at the Coliseum in Des Moines, Iowa,” October 4, 1932.  Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/?pid=23269. 
(accessed March 2, 2015). 
138 
 
 
 
maintaining a thriving national economy.96  The absence of a metallic standard, in his 
opinion, hampered the economic recovery.  
Communications professor, Martin Carcasson argued that Hoover during the 
campaign gave many presidential campaign speeches about American Individualism and 
his Republican ideals.  Hoover ran his campaign with the goal of explaining to the voters 
how the Great Depression started.  He argued that tight credit and a metallic standard were 
important sources for distress but also provided strength.  Hoover urged that 
internationalism and interdependence were key sources of the economic crisis as well.97  
Hoover realized that he was vulnerable to attack, because of the economic principles that 
he espoused, and the performance of the failing economy.  He knew that some voters 
blamed him and said that he was responsible for the Great Depression.98  Even worse, he 
was blamed for doing nothing to mitigate troubling economic conditions.99  Hoover argued 
that he supported indirect relief, but this was not good enough for his opponent.  Roosevelt 
attacked him from all fronts, angles and viewpoints.  In July 1932, Mrs. Hoover attempted 
to defend her husband’s good name.   She argued that Herbert Hoover became president 
because he wanted to help the American people.  He was determined to do his duty.  He 
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believed in helping what she described as the “little people,” which was similar to how 
Roosevelt envisioned the common man.100   
Radio was used extensively during the presidential campaign of 1932.  It enabled 
ordinary citizens to establish political connections with the candidates, and elected 
policymakers.101   Broadcast radio stations strove to provide the candidates and their rivals 
with air time to enumerate their political agendas, policies and other initiatives.  In Fireside 
Politics, Douglas B. Craig argued that David Sarnoff, who served as General Manager of RCA, 
wanted to make the radio a household tool similar to a record player or a piano.102  By the 
Great Crash of 1929, this goal had been reached.  Between 1929 and 1936, there were 
approximately six hundred radio stations in the United States and Americans became more 
willing to use this medium to receive information about political, social and economic 
events.103   
By 1932, over 12 million American households could tune in and listen to the 
political news, and speeches.104  For the 1932 presidential campaign, NBC broadcast both 
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Republican and Democratic conventions and covered 46 hours combined of speeches, and 
political statements.  This exclusive coverage cost NBC $596,000 in advertising and caused 
the cancellation of 37 programs that would have generated substantial revenue for the 
company.105  Most Americans listened to the presidential debates and speeches through the 
use of this modern technology.  They listened to the campaign messages of Hoover and 
Roosevelt.   
In broadcast speeches, Roosevelt attacked Hoover from the standpoint that the 
Great Depression was a domestic crisis that occurred originally in the United States and 
spread to other countries.  This stance enabled Roosevelt to maintain that the economic 
crisis occurred, because of Hoover’s misdirection and poor policymaking skills.  In a 
campaign speech on August 20, 1932, Roosevelt asserted that: 
The records of the civilized nations of the world prove two facts:  first, that the 
economic structure of other nations was affected by our own tide of speculation and 
the curtailment of our lending helped to bring on  their distress; second, that the 
bubble burst first in the land of its origin—the United States.106    
 In campaign speeches from July to October 1932, Roosevelt went on the attack 
against Hoover’s tariff policies.107  Roosevelt contended that tariffs brought about the Great 
Depression, because they forced European nations off the gold standard that required them 
to ship gold to the United States in payment for their imports.  Hoover’s argument for 
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nominal government intervention did include strong tariffs.108  Instead, Hoover sought to 
financially augment banks, railroads and multinational corporations and promote public 
works projects.109  Hoover continued to preach that the government dole caused economic 
hardship, because it reduced public confidence that everyday Americans can pull 
themselves up and become viable citizens. 
Hoover’s campaign was hurt by the fact that he was not a proficient public speaker.  
He lacked sound oratorical skills, and it hampered his public image.110  Americans felt that 
he was shy and inarticulate with an explosive personality.111  He did not instill confidence 
into the American consciousness.  Martin Carcasson has contended further that Hoover did 
not believe that speechmaking was an essential tool for communicating with the general 
public.112  This stance proved detrimental to his campaign, because with the use of the 
radio, the American people could listen to his speeches and realize that he was not the best 
spokesperson for the country during the economic crisis.  Hoover went from embodying 
the image of the golden boy that specialized in global relief to a politician that could not 
resolve the Depression.  The Great Crash had damaged his image only to be compounded 
by a presidential election that did not enumerate his positive administrative qualities.  
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Hoover could not recover from the long-standing Depression that hurt most Americans and 
caused the national economy to become a shambles.   
In his speeches, Roosevelt incorporated common sense ideas into his public policy 
stances.  His speechmaking was an art form that he attempted to utilize for the benefit of 
the American people.  Moreover, when he spoke to the American people, he seemed to 
sympathize with their problems and devise solutions for their betterment.  He promised 
Americans a New Deal that would resolve the industrial and economic crisis in which the 
United States found itself mired.113  Communications historian Martin Carcasson argued 
that “Hoover faced a campaign in 1932 in which he was blamed by many for the worst 
depression in history, vilified by most of the country as incompetent, uncaring, and 
reactionary, and overmatched in rhetorical skills.”114   
From the perspective of some historians like Amity Shlaes, he seemed to have the 
interests of the people in mind, but he felt that ordinary citizens did not understand 
complex political issues.  They required political direction.  However, Hoover’s emphasis on 
internationalism came to the surface during a period when lower-to-middle class citizens 
were suffering from unemployment, deprivation, and destitution.  They did not want to 
hear from Hoover that the Great Depression was about global concerns.115  They wanted to 
know what Hoover would do for the American people.  Hoover insisted on a more global 
approach to policymaking, which alienated those voters who thought about America first.        
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By examining the campaign speeches of Hoover and Roosevelt, scholars and lay 
persons can see the differences in their oratorical approaches.  On September 29, 1932, for 
example, Roosevelt accused Hoover of becoming a big spender and without common sense 
solutions to mitigate the Great Depression in a campaign speech in Sioux City, Iowa.  
Roosevelt argued that Hoover had spent large amounts of money to resolve this economic 
crisis, but that none of his solutions worked.  The national and global economic systems 
were broken and needed fixing.  Tax payer resources had been wasted, but Hoover 
continued to spend away to rectify the situation.  Roosevelt stated that: 
I accuse the present administration of being the greatest spending administration in 
peace times in all our history.  It is an administration that has piled bureau on 
bureau, commission on commission, and has failed to anticipate the dire needs and 
the reduced earning power of the people. 116  
Roosevelt understood in this speech, both the poignant need for action and that 
expanding the bureaucracy alone was not the appropriate solution.117  Roosevelt argued 
that Hoover did not resolve the economic crisis.  Tax payer dollars were not used carefully.  
Hoover had spent taxpayers’ money during peace time for solutions that favored business 
projects over individual welfare.118  Roosevelt accused Hoover of driving the National debt 
higher and creating a massive federal deficit.  Hoover’s own preference for a balanced 
budget could only be fulfilled if he increased the tax base and taxation rates.119  Because 
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Hoover sought to balance the federal budget, he viewed any efforts to the contrary as a 
problem.  Hoover felt that balancing the budget was a step in the right direction, because it 
meant that the federal government was solvent and was using taxpayer dollars in the 
appropriate manner.      
As the campaign dragged on, Roosevelt continued to pound away at Hoover’s belief 
in American Individualism and his belief that the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression 
were global problems, not domestic.  He argued that Hoover was assigning the blame for 
the Great Depression to his European and global counterparts,120 and was not taking 
responsibility for what had really happened.  But could Roosevelt blame Hoover for causing 
the Great Depression?  Herbert Hoover would have fought against this assertion 
vehemently.   
In a speech, on October 19, 1932, Roosevelt asserted that the American people did 
not seek to blame foreign governments.  But the question became…was Hoover blaming 
foreign countries for American problems?  The American people were looking for results 
and answers to their economic problems.  They desired action and Hoover failed to comply 
with their everyday needs.  Did Hoover blame others, because he did not have sound 
resolutions to the Great Depression?  Roosevelt stated that: 
No, we need not look abroad for scapegoats.  We had ventured into the economic 
stratosphere—which is a long way up—on the wings of President Hoover’s novel, 
radical, and unorthodox economic theories of 1928, the complete collapse of which 
brought the real crash in 1931.121   
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 The heart of Roosevelt’s argument was that Hoover, his economic outlook, and his policies 
had contributed to these economic problems.  
Hoover fought back with a vengeance.  He asserted that he did not want to enter a 
blame game, but he wanted to inform the American people of the facts regarding these 
major events.  He argued that he had accomplished a great deal for the American people.  
He had negotiated various agreements with foreign countries, and many American 
businesses were economically solvent, because of his foreign and domestic policies.   
Hoover stressed that: 
He (Roosevelt) ignores the fact that today real wages in the United States are higher 
than at any other depression period, higher in purchasing power than in any other 
country in the world.  And above all, he dismisses the healing effect of that great 
agreement by which this country has been kept free from industrial strife and class 
conflicts.122      
 Following the Great Crash of 1929, Hoover said that he had appealed to the nation’s 
governors including Roosevelt, and corporate executives from American industrial sectors 
for answers to these crises.123  He sought to prevent the governors in the United States 
from reducing or limiting wages or employment levels and to have them support public 
construction programs.124  But his work with his fellow policymakers and corporate 
executives was to no avail.   
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Hoover, further, argued that Roosevelt did not possess much foreign policy 
experiences.  Roosevelt had ignored and disregarded the German moratorium, and the 
creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with two billion dollars in assets to 
benefit the American people.  Hoover went on the attack to defend his policies and fight for 
reelection.  Hoover believed that Roosevelt and his progressive principles were eroding the 
tenets of American Individualism.125  He contended in respond to Roosevelt’s campaign 
that American civilization was under attack from liberal and progressive politicians like 
Roosevelt and his Democratic allies.   
 In his books, and in his campaign speeches, Hoover emphasized the principles of 
voluntarism and self-help.  He promoted equal opportunity for all American workers.  In 
contrast, Roosevelt sought to help Americans who could not help themselves.126  This is 
where Hoover differed from Roosevelt.  Hoover did not want to allocate funds to the 
private sector for families so that citizens could get on the “dole.”  Roosevelt argued 
publically that sometimes Americans needed help, if they were destitute, due to no fault of 
their own.  Hoover lost some public strength, but he would not stop giving his message that 
the Great Depression was a global issue that required global solutions.  On the last day of 
the campaign, Hoover gave five speeches in California before he settled into his home on 
Stanford University to await the election results.127 
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On November 8, 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt won 22.8 million votes versus 15.8 
million for Herbert Hoover.128  Roosevelt had won 472 electoral votes while Hoover 
gathered 59 electoral votes.129  Hoover had lost the Presidential Election of 1932.  Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt celebrated, because he had won the Presidential Election of 1932 and had 
convinced the American people that they should place their confidence in him.130  Scholars 
contend that the Presidential Election results from 1932 signaled a resounding defeat for 
the Republican party.131  It was their worst defeat in American history.   
This presidential campaign had been bitter, but the American people had spoken.132  
As a lame-duck, Hoover understood that his job would not end until March 4, 1933, but his 
ability to act was limited.  On the evening of November 8, 1932, Hoover contacted 
Roosevelt, and congratulated him on a hard-fought and difficult presidential campaign.133  
Hoover now recognized that he had to work with Roosevelt in the remaining months of his 
presidency.  He knew that the transfer and transition of presidential power would be 
difficult.   
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Great Britain and France had been following the presidential election as well.  They 
were determined to resolve their economic problems and wanted to negotiate with Hoover 
and Roosevelt in an effort to make a smooth transition between both administrations.  The 
British and French governments were aware of the importance of this presidential election, 
and they wanted to have Hoover and Roosevelt excuse or renegotiate their foreign debts.  
Thus, Roosevelt had to make some tough decisions, but he could wait out the British and 
French governments.  Roosevelt thought that it would be best to select his cabinet and 
work on building stable coalitions so that his administration could implement policies once 
he assumed the presidency.   
In conclusion, following the Presidential Election of 1932 Hoover and Roosevelt 
remained at an impasse.  Both politicians continued to disagree, and Hoover did not 
espouse the New Deal policies of Roosevelt.  Hoover felt that Roosevelt would take the 
United States along a difficult path and the Americans would suffer from Roosevelt’s 
decision-making processes.134  Even in the mid-to-late 1930s, Hoover continued to argue 
against the New Deal.  The presidential election of 1932 was still in his heart and soul.  He 
would not forget his defeat and would not admit that he had caused the Great Depression. 
The presidential campaign of 1932 benefited Roosevelt immensely, because of his 
strategic planning and powerful speechmaking abilities.  Hoover, who began his career in 
global relief especially in Belgium, was a powerful politician and engineer but the Stock 
Market Crash and Great Depression proved to be his undoing.  Roosevelt, on the other 
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hand, started as a state senator from New York State only to emerge as a dynamic speaker 
and prolific policymaker as governor and president.  He surrounded himself with 
individuals that enhanced his communication and administrative skills, and his networking 
abilities proved to be formidable.  But could Roosevelt deliver?  This became an interesting 
question for which American people had to ponder during an economic crisis that seemed 
to be unending.     
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Chapter 5:  Hoover, The Economic Crisis and the Interregnum of 1932-1933 
 
 In his book, The F.D.R. Memoirs, Bernard Asbell painted a devastating picture of the 
early stages of the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933.  Using various sources (letters, 
memoirs, memos), he argued that these years represented a turning point in American 
history because of FDR’s presidential election victory.  When Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
had secured the Presidency on November 8, 1932, most Americans believed that he would 
lead the nation in a positive direction.  As Iowa State professor emeritus George McJimsey 
wrote, “Roosevelt carried every state south and west of Pennsylvania and received 57 
percent of the popular vote; the electoral vote was 472 to 59.”1  The electoral shift brought 
the Democratic party to power, as Americans attempted to reconstruct their financial and 
social lives and improve their prospects.  The years between 1929 and 1933, however, 
were difficult for American citizens, even as President Hoover and the President-Elect 
Roosevelt sought to discover solutions to the economic crises and mitigate citizen 
concerns.   
Historian Jordan A. Schwarz has argued that Herbert Hoover had established a 
reputation as a man who handled economic crises, but the Great Depression proved to be 
his undoing.2  Why did Hoover fail?  Hoover’s prior experiences as Food Administrator gave 
many Americans confidence that he could address the concerns of ordinary people.  In 
response to the Depression, however, Hoover’s philosophy de-emphasized addressing 
poverty.  Instead, he sought indirect aid for the unemployed.  By the second year of his 
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Presidency, many felt that Hoover was in the employ of big business, not ordinary 
American citizens.  Jordan A. Schwarz argues, that Hoover during the initial stages of the 
Great Depression was not “a do-nothing President,” but neither was the president suited 
for the modern welfare state.3  Hoover did not repudiate the gold standard or the principles 
of American Individualism and limited government.  He held fast to these traditional beliefs 
even though they no longer worked.  Thus, Hoover held numerous conferences to address 
the economic situation of 1929-1930 and discussed issues with voluntary or private 
charities; but he did not commit the federal government to financial or material relief.  He 
saw federal intervention as “pork barrel” politics and did not want to promote a centralized 
planning system or an expanded federal government.4  Because he did not directly address 
the concerns of ordinary citizens, Hoover could not earn the confidence of the American 
people; and he lost the Presidential Election of 1932 by a landslide.   
This chapter will describe the period of Hoover’s administration and the months 
between the 1932 election and FDR’s Presidential Inauguration.  U.S. citizens struggled 
immensely to make sense of this economic crisis while policymakers fought to develop 
sound economic and fiscal strategies to resolve high unemployment.   First, we will discuss 
social conditions in the Midwest and along the eastern seaboard, as Americans attempted 
to make ends meet during the first years of the Depression.   Second, we will examine the 
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banking crises of the early 1930s as a context for exploring the political environment and 
the conflict of ideas between Hoover and the incoming President Roosevelt.  I also examine 
how the bank crisis affected Detroit and the responses from Henry Ford, James Couzens, 
and Alfred P. Sloan Jr, and their reaction to the growing crisis.  I will discuss the 
relationship between Hoover and Roosevelt before the Inauguration of March 4, 1933.  This 
changing of the guard was important, because it meant that Americans witnessed a 
peaceful transfer of power during a difficult and conflict-filled period in United States’ 
history. 
During the autumn months of 1932, Fortune magazine estimated that 34 million 
men, women, and children were members of families that had full-time income.5  Between 
thirteen and seventeen million Americans were unemployed in the United States during the 
same time period.6  Asbell specifies that this figure did not include farmers, because the 
numbers would have been higher.  Production in the manufacturing sector had been 
reduced by fifty percent; and fourteen million Americans remained unemployed during the 
winter of 1932 and 1933.7 
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Some Americans had experienced unemployment and poverty in the late 1920s, but 
the Crash in 1929 made the situation more serious.  The decade of the 1920s had 
experienced deflation, but ordinary citizens handled these problems with precision.8  The 
Great Depression intensified the crisis conditions.  In major urban centers in the United 
States, homeless people established shantytowns, because families had lost their homes.9  
Others, in an effort to avoid starvation, searched and scavenged for food.  They examined 
garbage cans in order to find food that had been thrown away.10   
In Chicago during the early months of the Great Depression, principals told teachers 
to ask their students if they had eaten, before they punished student behavior.11  After 
1931, Chicago teachers like educators in other cities had not received their wages for 
months; but they still felt obligated to feed hungry children in their classes.12  Former 
Australian lawyer and politician Ronald William Gordon Mackay reported that 14,000 
Chicago teachers had not been paid for over nine months.13  They did not have sufficient 
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monetary resources, but this did not matter.  In 1933, one quarter of Chicago residents 
were receiving federal, state and local assistance, such as food and clothing.  During the 
summer months, Chicago superintendents asked the Federal government to step in to 
ensure that no child was hungry during the summer when school was in recess.  In New 
York, teachers had many of the similar experiences.  Feeding hungry children became the 
calling of teachers.  Public school teachers contributed $260,000 in a given month, so that 
students could be fed on school grounds.14  Even as teachers fed students, the federal 
government did not step in to relieve this crisis before 1933.  Providing relief was the 
responsibility of the private sector, not policymakers.  New York residents, who were lucky 
enough to be employed, donated one percent of their salaries, so that police officers could 
purchase food to feed their families.  This money did not come from high-ranking 
government officials, but from low-ranking public servants from New York neighborhoods 
who just wanted to help.15   
With the emergence of the Great Depression, many Americans suffered from 
economic deprivation.  Unemployment levels increased and many American corporations 
began to cut work hours and lower wages among pre-existing employees.  Hiring came to a 
halt.  Those workers with seniority were overworked while those who were unemployed 
could not find new jobs.  Wages also declined.  For example, Ford Motor Company 
increased wages to seven dollars per day for hourly workers in 1929, but by 1931, this 
figure was cut to six dollars per day.16 Wages at Ford Motor did not rebound until 1935.  
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Workers earned less and worked longer hours, and employers faced with declining 
consumer demand worried about profits and the costs of production, as they worked to 
strengthen their balance sheets.17   There were no guarantees that Americans would or 
could purchase cars.  Despite this decline, corporate executives often felt that improved 
wages were not the answers to economic decay.  Most Americans were not accustomed to 
federal intervention,18 and corporate executives did not want the federal government to 
tell them how to run business operations.  Self-help organizations such as the Allen County 
Unemployment Association (ACUA) formed, instead, to provide relief to ordinary citizens.19  
 During the Great Depression, state and local authorities continued to fund public 
schools, but the resources had to come from somewhere.  Students could not be left 
behind.20  Some young people continued to receive training in post-secondary educational 
facilities, because they were unemployed after high school graduation.21  Children who 
might have left early continued to attend school during the crisis, in part, because there 
were few jobs.  Graduation rates began to increase for elementary and secondary schools.22  
Colleges and universities also began to have budgeting problems.  Institutions of higher 
learning decided to decrease the wages of faculty, and curtail promotions.23  They did not 
replace retired faculty members from 1930 to 1934, because of declining enrollment and 
                                                           
17 Ronald William Gordon Mackay, “America 1933 and the Industrial Recovery Act,” 28. 
18 Iwan Morgan, “Fort Wayne and the Great Depression,” 122, 132, 142 
19 Ibid, 142. 
20 Alfred P. Sloan Jr., “Business has an Interest and Duty to help them,” 18-19. 
21 William Dow Boutwell, “Schools Aid the Unemployed,” New York Times, July 3, 1932. 
22 David Leonhardt, “Half a Degree,” New York Times Magazine, May 9, 2010.  http://www.nytimes.com.  
(accessed March 13, 2015). 
23 Winifred D. Wandersee, Women’s Work and Family Values, 1920-1940 (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 
1981), 21, 32.  From 1928 onward, Yale University faculty and staff, on most cases, struggled to make ends meet, 
according to Wandersee.  Their salaries ranged from average to substantial, but faculty and staff had families to 
raise and had to provide their children with consumer goods, even though the costs of living during the Depression 
had declined. 
156 
 
 
 
nominal state support.24  Colleges and universities struggled to decrease their expenditures 
because of funding issues.  One thousand, three hundred and eighteen educational facilities 
were closed in Georgia; and, in Akron, Ohio, teachers had unpaid wages of $330,000.25  
State and local authorities, also, did not have the money to pay the salaries for public 
workers. 
An example that illustrates the deepening financial crisis was the closing of public 
schools in Iowa.  In Iowa, farmers paid taxes on their lands, which contributed to funding 
schools.  During the Great Depression, farmers stopped paying taxes, because the prices of 
farm goods decreased exponentially causing farmers to lose money.  Ninety-five percent of 
remaining farm income was utilized for paying taxes, and when this system collapsed, 
junior colleges and universities were closed.26  Farmers suffered from declining farm 
income and their children lost the capacity to attend schools, because of a decreasing tax 
base.  Total farm income in the United States declined from $12 billion in 1929 to $5 
billion.27  Equally significant, the average farm family that produced cash crops and other 
agricultural goods earned about $273 annually in 1929.28      
 During the early Depression, Americans spent a majority of their time just 
attempting to make ends meet.29  They continued to mend their clothing and did not 
purchase new outerwear or apparel.30  Children ate less substantial meals.  Some men were 
no longer the sole breadwinners for their families while their women and children looked 
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for work.  In The Hungry Years, Tom H. Watkins argued that some Americans became apple 
vendors on a full-time basis.31  But Census Bureau viewed apple sellers as employed full-
time, because they generated revenue from the sale of primary goods.32  When selling 
apples did not work, some citizens committed acts of violence or other criminal activities to 
avoid starvation and deprivation.  Increased violence and theft occurred in many cities in 
February 1933.   
In Detroit, residents who suffered from high unemployment levels targeted grocery 
stores, and stole food for themselves and their families.  Many did not believe that their acts 
were unjustified.  According to the Census Bureau, 13.3 percent of the workforce, or 76,018 
workers, had been unemployed in Detroit.33  Detroit had one of the highest unemployment 
rates among larger cities in the United States during the 1930s.  Asbell argued that, before 
Roosevelt’s inauguration, there were many hunger riots in which mobs formed and citizens 
attempted to press for social and economic change.34  They pressured the federal, state and 
local authorities to act on their behalf, and to improve social conditions in Detroit and other 
major cities.   
Other examples of desperation occurred.  In Iowa, unemployed residents who had 
worked for the utility companies stole gas and electrical power.  In difficult financial 
situations, they were trying to keep their families warm and nurtured.  Coal miners who 
had lost their jobs used stolen coal, so that they could heat their homes and keep their 
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children warm in the cold winter months.  Moreover, in Minnesota, Iowa and Nebraska, 
farmers got together and inhibited the sale of foreclosed farms.35  They were enormously 
successful, even though farmers had lost their lands because of tax liens.  Asbell cites the 
case of the John Hanzel farm in Pennsylvania.  His lands were auctioned off to the highest 
bidder.  But bidders were very clever and crafty.  They decided to only sell the property for 
a nominal amount.  Thus, local farmers purchased the property for a few dollars during the 
auction, and Hanzel was persuaded to accept this property back in the form of a rental 
contract.36  Lastly, if there was an oversupply of some crops, then farmers destroyed 
produce and livestock in an effort to increase the demand and price of those goods.37  Most 
farmers during the Great Depression could not make ends meet.  They used different 
strategies, such as the destruction of crops or auctions, to turn difficult economic 
conditions around.  
In an effort to address poverty, some citizens established private charities and 
foundations.  In New York State, a Committee on Unemployment and Relief for Chemists and 
Chemical Engineers was created.38  Members of this organization had, in the past, been 
gainfully employed but some had become destitute.  They had worked for high-scale 
corporations; but now slept in railway cars.   Another group, The Association of Unemployed 
College Alumni, was established in New York City.  It consisted of university graduates from 
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schools such as Harvard and Columbia.  Many of them had become dependent upon 
government assistance and had been unemployed for a long period of time even though 
they had earned college diplomas.  Many also relied on relatives for financial support, 
because most college graduates, that lived along the eastern seaboard, encountered some 
difficulty finding employment.39 
 Private charities began to play a dynamic role in relieving the American low-and-
middle income classes from economic insolvency.  McJimsey stated that, as early as 1930, 
private charities began to raise money during their fundraising campaigns to assist with 
relief programs.  The state public sector began to provide residents with financial 
assistance.  New York City, to use only one example, increased its relief expenditures, from 
$13.6 million in 1930 to $79 million in 1932.”40  Although Hoover and other conservatives 
believed in private efforts to address the crisis, the public sector had the resources to 
contribute to everyday Americans.  Only state and local institutions stepped in prior to 
1933; but they could not keep pace with demand, because of the declining tax revenue.  
Americans had been paying taxes to finance relief programs, but as unemployment rose 
and the money dried up, residents could not fall back on institutions that they had financed 
years earlier.  McJimsey confirmed that the situation had become so dismal and dire that 
relief workers could not provide financial and material assistance to families, unless they 
had exhausted all of their sources of income.  Private and public relief programs both were 
poorly funded.  This may have been the reason for the lack of local and state assistance to 
families in need.  Most citizens, however, did not believe in using private or public charities 
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until they were completely destitute, without shelter and employment.41  The number of 
families that turned to state and local relief is all the more telling, since many saw charity 
as humiliating. 
 As domestic conditions deteriorated, there was a bank crisis in the United States and 
worldwide that President Hoover had to address.  Approximately, twenty-two states 
established bank holidays, and the various governors closed down all of their banks.42  
Detroit, in 1933, as Amos Kiewe pointed out, faced difficult economic conditions, poverty, 
and a bank crisis affected the city.43  Hoover, faced with these conditions, was uncertain as 
to what type of response was satisfactory.  He discussed the situation with Secretary of 
Commerce, Roy D. Chapin, and Treasury Undersecretary, Arthur A. Ballantine.44  They were 
sent to Detroit in February of 1933 to have a meeting with Henry Ford at his Fairlane 
residence.  They understood that Henry Ford had the capital and industrial know-how.  
They believed that Henry Ford could provide the banks with capital and other financial 
resources if needed.   
Both policymakers tried to secure a loan of $7.5 million from Ford Motor Company 
for the Detroit Union Guardian Trust Company and the Detroit Bankers Group.45  Just prior 
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to this, Detroit Union Guardian Trust Company had secured two loans from the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation but the bank remained economically insolvent, and 
the RFC had other banks to address.46  This loan would have revitalized these banks.  Ford 
Motor Company owned and operated both banks while James Couzens was the founder of 
Highland Park State Bank and Bank of Detroit.  Both of the latter two banks had merged 
into one and became the Guardian Union National Bank of Commerce.47  The Federal 
government wanted to enlist economic support from Ford Motor Company, which had 
been performing fairly well during this crisis. 
Henry Ford poured many millions of dollars into his banks, but the Detroit Union 
Guardian Trust company owed about 14 million dollars to its creditors in late 1932.  It had 
no more than six million dollars in convertible assets against deposit liabilities and 
borrowings of approximately twenty million dollars, a shortage of at least fourteen million 
dollars.48   In January 1933, the RFC started the application process for the trust company 
in an effort to approve a 65 million dollar loan, but the bank only had 37 million dollars in 
collateral.  The loan was not approved.  At this time, President Herbert Hoover sought to 
obtain the financial support of Henry Ford and James Couzens.  Neither Henry Ford nor 
Senator James Couzens of Michigan thought that the crisis could be abated.  They refused to 
extend their assistance to prevent the bank from failing.  Henry Ford stated vehemently to 
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federal policymakers Arthur A. Ballantine and Roy D. Chapin that neither he nor James 
Couzens could not resolve this banking crisis singlehandedly.49 
Henry Ford contributed to the banks’ instability, because he threatened to withdraw 
his funds if the bank executives did not open for business.  This was a legitimate threat.  
Henry Ford had 7.5 million dollars in the trust company, 32 million dollars in the Guardian 
National Bank of Commerce, and 20 million dollars in the First National Bank of Detroit.50  
If Henry Ford withdrew his funds from all three banks, then the banks would lose millions 
of dollars in capital and liquid assets.  It was even more important, because during the 
banking crisis, liquidity was problematic, and banknotes and gold were in short supply.  In 
order to prevent Ford from carrying out his threat, F. Gloyd Awalt, who served as acting 
Comptroller of the Currency, declared a bank holiday.51  Michigan Governor William 
Comstock on February 14, 1933, also instituted a ten day statewide bank holiday.52   
The role of Henry Ford in the bank crisis of 1933 has continued to attract attention.  
Clarence J. Huddleston, who was aligned with James Couzens and Henry Ford during the 
Great Depression, provided readers with some insight about their roles regarding the 
banking crisis in an interview on February 12, 1968.53  Detroit Union Guardian Trust 
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Company was a Ford Bank.  Ford Motor Company played a dynamic role in the daily 
operations of this bank, but why did Ford choose not to provide the bank with financing 
during the crisis if this was the case?  Moreover, was Henry Ford a stockholder in this bank, 
because Huddleston affirmed that Ford and Couzens owned other banks such as Highland 
Park State Bank.54  Initially, Henry Ford had been a stockholder at Highland Park State 
Bank, but Huddleston stated that Henry Ford got out immediately and Couzens stayed on to 
conduct its public business.    
Although Henry Ford and his Ford Motor Company suffered from the slow effects of 
the Bank Crisis and the Great Depression, Henry Ford attempted to maintain wages and 
work hours for all of his employees regardless of the crisis.  Moreover, the Model A, which 
was the second mass-produced car offered by the company, was reduced in price in an 
effort to make it more affordable.55  Henry and Edsel Ford believed that it was important to 
reduce the prices of their vehicles, not their quality or value.  They were determined to 
offer a low-priced vehicle that was competitive with the other American cars.  Henry and 
Edsel Ford were adamant that work shifts were not to be reduced nor should workers be 
subjected to massive lay-offs.  Ford Motor Company, in an effort to make his vehicles more 
affordable, established a payment plan that enabled Americans to pay for their cars over 
time or gradually.  General Motors already had instituted a similar program, but Edsel Ford 
thought that this plan would work wonders toward eliminating the Great Depression.56   
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During the Great Depression, Ford Motor Company started out paying its workers 
between five to seven dollars per day.57  Clearly, this promoted social mobility during a 
period of economic distress; at the same time, the company also cut its workforce.  
Employment at Ford Motor Company dropped dramatically during the beginning of the 
1930s.  In March 1929, the number of employed workers at Ford was 122,680 but this 
statistic declined to 100,500 by December 1929.58   
On March 7, 1932, Communist organizers headed by John Schmies and Albert Goetz 
in Detroit held a rally called the Ford Hunger March59.  Between three to five thousand 
demonstrators walked from downtown Detroit to the Rouge plant in Dearborn, and they 
had a long list of demands.60  Most notably, they stressed that all laid-off employees should 
be rehired.  They demanded fifty percent of their full wages, a seven hour day without a 
decrease in their take-home pay; and they wanted to eliminate the speed-up of the 
assembly line.  Per shift, demonstrators suggested that workers should receive two fifteen 
minute breaks, an end to racial discrimination in hiring, and an end to foreclosures on the 
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homes of former Ford employees’ property.61  Lastly, they wanted to curtail the use of the 
security forces at Ford Motor Company.  The march was a watershed in American 
industrial history, because workers fought for social change and mobility.  But the event 
turned violent and deadly.  Five men, including Joe York, Joe Russell, Joe DeBlasio, Coleman 
Leny and Curtis Williams were killed by Dearborn and Detroit police as well the Ford 
Security guards that were involved in suppressing the demonstration.62  Days afterward, 
more than seventy thousand former Ford employees participated in the funeral march to 
celebrate the lives of the fallen, and Joe Rushing, Chairman of the Young Communist League 
and others demanded punishment for those responsible for the violence.63    
Many former Ford employees and Communist sympathizers felt that Hoover and 
Roosevelt had let them down.  Other unemployed Americans were determined and 
continued to lobby for the Workers Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill H.R. 7598.  
This act would have provided financial compensation equal to the average weekly wages 
and give families ten dollars per dependent each week.  But the Ford Hunger March 
somewhat damaged the international status of the Ford family, because of the use of 
security forces at the Rouge to quiet labor discontent.  Many Americans suffered from the 
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Great Depression but Ford Motor Company took some necessary steps to alleviate the 
worst effects of the economic crisis.  Henry and Edsel Ford traveled to Washington, D.C., 
along with other American industrial leaders to confer with President Herbert Hoover and 
discuss ways to end the Great Depression.  They were not successful, because of conflicting 
viewpoints, but some applauded these corporate executives for making any effort to 
discuss the issues of manufacturing in the United States and the plight of the American 
worker.   
In Detroit, General Motors experienced financial and industrial decline with the 
Great Crash of 1929 and the onset of Great Depression.  It had to close some plants and 
lower its corporate stock values.64  At that time, Sloan had been president for over five 
years.  He had the intellectual know-how to produce vehicles that improved upon GM’s 
market-share and earn a substantial profit from car sales.65  Sloan eventually built an 
automotive empire at General Motors Corporation.  He was noted as an industrial icon, who 
had worked his way into the higher echelons of the company and served as president and 
chairman from 1923 to 1956.66  Sloan incorporated some aspects of Fordism to reform 
GM’s industrial capacity, such as the use of interchangeable parts.  General Motors had just 
surpassed Ford Motor Company in 1927 in terms of market-share.67   Its Chevy line up won 
the favor of American consumers.  The Chevy was an inexpensive vehicle, but it had solid 
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features that appealed to ordinary Americans who looked to acquire a new standard of 
living for their families.     
Despite his success at GM, Sloan did not predict the Great Crash of 1929, as historian 
David Farber argues.  Both Sloan and his company were unprepared for the economic 
event.  Sloan did not sell any of his personal stock holdings in GM nor any of his other 
companies before or after the crisis.68  Farber writes that Sloan’s reactions to the crisis 
were not recorded, and scholars do not know or understand his motivations regarding Wall 
Street during this period.  Those who had a greater stake in Wall Street experienced a sharp 
decline in disposable income, and their standards of living were hampered for the short 
term.  Whether Sloan had personal losses because of the Great Crash of 1929 is unknown.69  
After 1929, Sloan began to examine sales projections and other key indicators to 
determine market demand.  He did not want to experience the same corporate failure as 
William Durant did, in 1920, when he was forced to resign, because of his stock market 
speculations.  By contrast, Sloan has been described by many as a calculated risk taker.  He 
ensured that he did his research, and the data drove his decision-making.70  While Ford 
handled the Stock Market crisis by reducing his car prices so that sales volumes increased, 
Sloan knew that increased sales did not always mean profitability.  The data told GM 
executives where to place their money.  With all of the statistical analysis, GM still 
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produced too many vehicles that the market could not absorb.  Sales were down.71  While 
sales were disheartening to Sloan,72 small automotive companies fared worse than GM and 
Ford Motor Company.  They could not compete with these two economic giants, and they 
were forced from the automobile market by the crisis.  By 1929, the Big Three already 
controlled more than 75 percent of the industry’s market-share.73  The Great Depression 
further consolidated car companies, and Big Three became dominant in years after the 
Great Crash.  Only twelve other smaller firms remained in the market by the end of the 
1930s, and they slowly lost ground.74   
By the early 1930s, GM sales were increasingly strong and rebounding.   
Policymakers on Capitol Hill attempted to increase excise gasoline taxation to improve 
upon its revenue base and tap into the resources of automobile owners.  Much of GM’s 
workforce had been laid-off because of the economic downturn.75  During this period, the 
tax bases in many states had declined.  Additional revenue was needed to sponsor 
increased government expenditures.  Sloan had been a member of the National Automobile 
Chamber of Commerce (NACC), and he served on the taxation committee.76  Sloan opposed 
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increases in gasoline taxes.  He felt that the federal government was penalizing the 
automotive industry for performing fairly well in the private sector.  Edsel Ford, who 
served as president of the Lincoln division, was against the tax bill.  He did not join Sloan 
and other industry leaders in fighting the tax bill.  Consequently, Congress approved the 
Revenue Act in early 1932.77  This new act was proposed to generate revenue to finance the 
construction of new roads and streets, and employ road crews.  The federal government 
earned one cent in taxation for every gallon of gasoline that consumers purchased.78  
Scholars have remained divided about the impact of the new act.  Did it led to highway 
construction and better road conditions or higher employment?  This issue has not been 
examined thoroughly to decide the effectiveness of this law. 
In speeches throughout 1932, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. argued that there was a lack of 
confidence among American consumers since the crash.  The Bank Crisis of 1931-1933 also 
loomed large in public speeches.  In a press release dated July 19, 1932, Sloan asserted that 
production figures for GM were down.  Prices for GM vehicles and other industry products 
had decreased before 1934 as there was an oversupply of automobiles and a slower 
market.79  Sloan argued that tax cuts were the answer for all Americans, because it would 
put more disposable income in their pockets.  Sloan’s proposition that tax cuts were 
necessary in 1932 has resonance among conservative policymakers in more contemporary 
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times, but it was economic orthodoxy in 1932.  In the 1930s, policymakers and corporate 
executives in American industries argued for a reduction in the tax rate, because they 
argued that it created more jobs in the private sector.  But what about social programs and 
public expenditures?  If Americans could not work, then should they receive financial 
support from the public sector?  During Hoover’s presidency, public assistance was not the 
dominant practice in the United States.80   
Along with Detroit and other Midwestern cities, New York, the financial haven for 
Wall Street, experienced similar financial difficulties.  The Bank of the United States, which 
had over $200 million in deposits and other monetary assets, collapsed; and the New York 
clearing houses would not step in to increase its liquidity.81  Hoover, in his memoirs, 
contended that the American banking system already was weakened by the late 1920s.  
There were too many banks in the United States and many did not belong to the Federal 
Reserve System.   Only about one-third belonged to the Federal Reserve.  As Hoover wrote, 
“in 1929, there were about 25,000 commercial banks, trust companies and savings banks 
entrusted with the people’s deposits.  Of the commercial banks, 7,500 were national banks 
and 14,300 state banks.”82  These banks lacked sufficient monetary resources to conduct 
their day-to-day operations.  Hoover argued that “more than 3,500 had less than $100,000 
capital and of these, some 1,500 had less than $25,000 capital.”83  There was not enough 
capital held in banks for depositors.  For that reason, after the Crash of 1929, citizens had a 
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strong inclination to hoard cash.  They did not believe that their assets were safe and 
secure in private banks.84   
The Federal government’s approach toward resolving this bank crisis under Hoover 
was not sufficient.  Members of the Hoover administration, such as Treasury Secretary 
Mellon, believed that the federal government should not become involved or try to create 
fixes to the national economy.  Mellon believed that the only way to save the banks was to 
let them collapse.85  Further, Mellon believed the crisis would purge and eliminate the 
“rottenness” from the national economy.  He was, however, countered by Undersecretary of 
the Treasury Mills, Governor Young of the Reserve Board, Secretary of Commerce Lamont, 
and Agriculture Secretary Hyde.  Along with President Hoover, these men believed that the 
Federal government should act to resolve the crisis.  Even so, the Federal government acted 
only indirectly.  It did not provide relief to everyday citizens under Hoover, but rather it 
sought to strengthen financial and commercial institutions in an effort to promote job 
growth.  In his memoirs, Hoover defended his choices for defined indirect versus direct 
relief.  He stated that: 
At the outset, I must clarify a distinction between direct relief and indirect relief.  
Direct relief means relief given directly to individuals or families through charitable, 
local, county, municipal or state action.  Indirect relief comprises Federal and state 
public works, together with stimulation of private construction, the spreading of 
work, restriction of immigration, government financial measures to support private 
employment and actin in the foreign field.86 
Hoover added that indirect relief consisted of federally-funded public works projects, such 
as construction work.  He called one form of indirect relief non-productive public works, 
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which consisted of roads, buildings, and harbor modifications.  The second form of indirect 
relief was “productive works” that were financed by the public and private sectors.  Private 
businesses, for example, received government loans to begin the hiring process at their 
firms and improve upon employment.  Still due to the extent of the crisis, Hoover sent aid 
in the form of 85,000,000 bushels of wheat and 500,000 bales of cotton to the Red Cross for 
distribution to deprived families during the Bank Crisis of the early 1930s.87    
In his memoirs, Hoover recalled that he contacted the nation’s governors and 
mayors to ask them to expand upon their public works programs.   Thus, Hoover did act; 
but many citizens viewed him coldly, because he did not provide the direct relief or support 
to the low-to-middle classes.  Rather, Hoover held conferences in Washington, D.C., with 
labor leaders and private relief organizations from throughout the country.88  In line with 
his belief in cooperative labor relations, he sought to eliminate strikes, to sustain wages, 
and to get employers to provide relief to their workers and work-sharing.  His policies 
supported relief, financed by the private sector, not by federal institutions.  Hoover 
promoted instead local and state relief.  Control over federal funds for relief was to be 
transferred to state and local entities.  The question that policymakers had to ask 
themselves was whether the federal government should allocate resources directly to the 
low-to-middle classes rather than local and state governments?  Hoover felt that local and 
state institutions had better information about its residents and understood their needs.  
However, Hoover argued that individual and family relief was not the issue, but the 
organization of resources and assistance was the subject of discussion among American 
policymakers.  Thus, Hoover decided that federal institutions should be called upon for 
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assistance only after exhausting all of the resources from local and state entities.  The states 
and its various cities understood the needs of its citizens.89 
 As Hoover fought to address the economic crisis with domestic and international 
policies, ordinary Americans looked for stronger leadership from the office of the 
presidency.  Some scholars argue that Hoover did not fill this void, and Americans began to 
look toward Governor Roosevelt of New York State, the Democratic party candidate, as the 
answers to their prayers.  On November 8, 1932, Roosevelt won the presidency in a 
landslide victory over Hoover.  Roosevelt did not, however, assume the Office of the 
Presidency until March 4, 1933.90  In the interim, Hoover was determined to obtain the 
assistance and advice of Roosevelt.  Hoover sought to bring Roosevelt up-to-date on 
domestic and foreign policy issues.  He was determined to provide Roosevelt with the 
necessary slant on the major concerns to promote a smooth transition of power.  However, 
Hoover realized that Roosevelt’s time was limited.  Roosevelt was still the Governor for the 
State of New York and had to fulfill his duties until March 4, 1933.  Moreover, Hoover knew 
that Roosevelt had public opinion on his side, because of his overwhelming electoral 
victory in the 1932 Presidential Election.  Roosevelt carried the popular vote as well.  But 
he worried about aligning himself closely with the Hoover administration. 
 After the Presidential Election of 1932, Hoover sought to assist Great Britain with its 
economic woes.91  Great Britain wanted to remain financially solvent, but it did not want to 
return to a metallic standard.  In November 1932, Hoover received notification from 
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debtors in Europe that foreign policymakers sought to defer their loan payments until 
December 15, 1932.92  Hoover telegrammed Roosevelt to see if he wanted to become a part 
of the policymaking discussions.93   In order to simplify this debt crisis, Hoover sought to tie 
the British debt resolution to a re-establishment of a metallic standard in that country.94  
Roosevelt issued a statement that concluded that each debtor nation should be examined 
individually, because each nation was distinct and could not be treated the same.95  
Roosevelt’s statement was unsettling to Hoover, who sought linkages among the European 
debtor nations.  He saw Roosevelt’s distancing as a problem.  On two occasions only 
Roosevelt’s team decided to make visits to the White House to confer with Hoover.   
 By this time, Hoover sought to have Roosevelt make a link between the maintenance 
of a metallic standard and debt payment from Europe.96  In response, Roosevelt argued that 
metallic standards and the debt crisis in Europe should not be linked.97  Hoover conflicted 
with Roosevelt’s approach to economic policy, because he argued that the European crisis 
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created economic instability at home.  Thus, two meetings were scheduled for November 
22, 1932 and January 20, 1933 to discuss the economic situation in Europe.98  Economist 
Raymond Moley and Norman Davis, who served as a delegate of the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference, along with Roosevelt met with Hoover on both occasions.  They refused to 
cater to Hoover’s demands to link foreign and domestic economic policies.  Hoover further 
wanted Roosevelt to assist him in the establishment of a special delegation.99  He had an 
inclination to press Roosevelt to choose individuals who could negotiate with European 
nations, especially Great Britain, who wanted its debts excused.100  Both Hoover and 
Roosevelt were internationalists, but President-Elect Roosevelt sought to examine 
domestic conditions and propagate national, not foreign policies.   
In the interregnum, according to Amos Kiewe, Hoover sought to prevent Roosevelt 
from abandoning a metallic standard and devaluing the greenback, because it increased 
domestic prices for primary and manufactured goods.101  Hoover further gave high priority 
to monetary policy and exchange rates, because they served as the life-blood for his 
economic and fiscal strategies internationally.102   This is, perhaps, where the conflict 
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between the President and President-Elect was most heated.103  Hoover wanted to 
maintain a metallic standard, while Roosevelt sought to eliminate gold as the principal 
medium of exchange and legal tender.104  Hoover believed that a return to a metallic 
standard in Europe could occur if Great Britain and France paid their debts.105  He believed 
that a metallic standard contributed to sound monetary and fiscal policies.  Roosevelt took 
a different approach. He did not link debt repayment with a metallic standard, but he 
sought to establish domestic policies that put America first. 
After the first meeting on November 22, 1932, Roosevelt issued a public statement.  
Although Hoover was aware of the statement, he also issued a press release announcing 
that the meeting had taken place.106  In Roosevelt’s message, he thanked Hoover and his 
staff for their hospitality and kindness; but he disagreed with Hoover on the steps that 
should have been taken regarding foreign debts.  Roosevelt believed that a creditor nation 
should make the effort to maintain regular contact with its debtors.  Both Hoover and 
Roosevelt were convinced that the Western European countries were intent upon paying 
their debts, and that nothing should deter them from accomplishing this goal.107  However, 
Roosevelt felt that Congress could not impede him from establishing relations and signing 
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financial treaties with other nations, including those who defaulted on loan payments.  
Thus, Roosevelt asserted publically that: 
No action by the Congress has limited or can limit the constitutionality of the 
President to carry on diplomatic contacts or conversations with foreign 
governments.  The advantage of this method of maintaining contacts with foreign 
governments is that any one of the debtor nations may at any time bring to the 
attention of the government of the United States new conditions and facts affecting 
any phase of its indebtedness.  It is equally true that existing debt agreements are 
unalterable saved by Congressional action.108 
Roosevelt and Hoover accepted treaties.  Once treaties have been negotiated and signed, 
they could not be altered without Congressional approval.  In the context of the ongoing 
crisis, Great Britain and France wanted to change some of the provisions of their loans.  But 
these provisions first had to be approved by their own governing bodies.  In contrast to 
Hoover, Roosevelt had a sophisticated understanding of the political dynamics.   
 In terms of establishing his impact on foreign policy as President-Elect, Roosevelt 
would not comply or act further.  He argued that he would not become president until 
March 4, 1933.109  His status allowed him political cover to refuse to endorse Hoover’s 
policies.  Hoover defended the maintenance of a metallic standard and the importance of 
balancing the budget as essential for economic independence.110  This political impasse 
proved difficult to resolve and led them to endorse different policies.  
In February of 1933, just a month before FDR’s inauguration, the bank situation 
grew worse.  Large quantities of gold and greenbacks had been withdrawn from banks in 
the United States.111  As historian Amos Kiewe asserted, “the Federal Reserve Branch in 
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New York saw its gold reserves reaching the low level of nearly 22 percent.  On February 
24, 1933, William Woodin, the Treasury Secretary-Elect, was clearly worried over the run 
on the banks.”112  Hoover responded differently to this economic crisis.  He attempted to 
use his political power to convince the incoming president Roosevelt to change his public 
stance and endorse preexisting policies.  Roosevelt did not want to espouse Hoover’s 
insistence on maintaining gold standard and appeared uncertain about how to handle the 
European debt crisis and the German moratorium.  This caused him to select members of 
his cabinet that could advise him on foreign policy such as Cordell Hull who became his 
Secretary of State.     
On February 27, 1933, Roosevelt sent Woodin to confer with President Hoover and 
Secretary of the Treasury Mills.113  At this time, Roosevelt had refused to issue a policy 
statement.  It became Woodin’s job to listen to the discussions and to suggest policy 
solutions.  Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan believed that Roosevelt’s approach was not 
enough.  He urged the president-elect to do more and issue a statement.  Roosevelt finally 
did in March 1933.  Roosevelt stated publicly that, once in office, he would cut the budget 
by 25 percent, balance the federal budget and cut government expenditures as 
president.114  Hoover sent Mills another memo on March 1, 1933, in an effort to have him 
persuade Roosevelt to issue more public statements about the bank crisis, but only if 
Roosevelt supported Hoover’s policies.  Hoover did not want the national economy to 
destabilize, but he was concerned about Roosevelt’s aims.  This political and economic 
impasse between Hoover and Roosevelt was not resolved.  Roosevelt also did not want to 
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lose creditability by becoming a spokesperson for Republican policies with which he did 
not agree and which failed to achieve their end.115   
Until inauguration day, Hoover and Roosevelt continued to correspond, but there 
was no consensus on foreign economic policy between both individuals.  Europe still faced 
dire economic circumstances.  Roosevelt would not become involved and he focused on 
selecting his cabinet.  He wanted an administrative team in place that could address the 
growing bank crisis and other American economic emergencies once in office.           
Roosevelt worked toward a smooth transition of Presidential and administrative power.  
He felt that it was necessary to select a team that would enhance his policymaking 
decisions and augment his political agenda.  In terms of Roosevelt’s cabinet, the President-
Elect sought to establish links with both liberal and conservative Democrats and also 
progressive Republicans.  He appointed both Democrats and Republicans to serve in his 
cabinet.  He further sought to select individuals who were respectable and had garnered 
some support among colleagues.  As historian George McJimsey writes, for Secretary of 
Agriculture, he chose Henry A. Wallace, who was a key figure that specialized in 
agricultural economic policy.116  Despite his Republican background, Wallace examined but 
did not support the farm policies of Hoover, even though Wallace’s father had had sound 
political connections and had served in the Harding and Coolidge administrations.  
Roosevelt was familiar with his politics and felt that Wallace would make sound political 
decisions and support his farm policies. 
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More importantly, Roosevelt made an unprecedented move by selecting a colleague 
that he worked with during his years as Governor of New York State:  Frances Perkins.117  
Perkins became the Secretary of Labor, which was an increasingly important 
administrative position, especially during the crisis of unemployment.  Perkins was 
instrumental in the creation and implementation of the NIRA in May and June of 1933.  She 
became the first female to serve as a member of a presidential cabinet.118  Mary Dewson, 
who served as the Chairwoman of the Democratic Woman’s Committee persuaded 
Roosevelt and supported the decision to make this crucial selection.119  Perkins came highly 
qualified and she had worked with Roosevelt in New York as an Industrial Commissioner, 
so he understood her credentials.120  
 Similarly, Roosevelt selected Senator Carter Glass of Virginia to become the 
Secretary of the Treasury in an effort to satisfy Bernard Baruch, a member of Roosevelt’s 
Brains Trust.  Baruch was conservative, and the selection of Glass appeased the 
conservative section of the Democratic party.  Glass was a proponent of bank reforms and 
the gold standard.  He agreed to take the position only if Roosevelt promised to remain on 
the gold standard.  This selection proved unworkable, because Roosevelt would not commit 
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himself toward remaining on any metallic standard.  Roosevelt chose, instead, William H. 
Woodin who had substantial knowledge and experience with international commerce and 
the railroad sector.  Woodin was committed to Roosevelt, and Roosevelt felt reassured that 
Woodin would not let him down.  This also satisfied conservative Democrats, because 
Woodin had been a Republican businessman and served as president of American Car and 
Foundry Company.121  He also supported Roosevelt as Governor and during his Presidential 
campaign in 1932.   
 Roosevelt chose Cordell Hull, who served as a United States Senator from 
Tennessee, as his Secretary of the State.122  Hull had considerable foreign policy experience, 
and sound political and diplomatic background.  Roosevelt felt his appointment was 
necessary to achieve his foreign policy goals.123  Further, Hull believed in transparency and 
accountability at the State Department.124  United States Senator Claude Swanson of 
Virginia became his Secretary of the Navy.  This selection really benefited the Roosevelt 
administration because, as Swanson left the Senate to become Secretary of the Navy, 
Senator Key Pittman of Nevada became the Chair of the Foreign Relations committee.  This 
selection enabled Roosevelt to work on foreign policy and to avoid the policy mistakes of 
the Hoover administration. 
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 For the Departments of the Interior and Justice, Roosevelt had been determined to 
select progressive Republicans, but they were difficult positions to fill.  For the Interior, 
Roosevelt was inclined toward Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico.  Roosevelt wanted 
Cutting, as George McJimsey writes, because: 
Cutting had supported Roosevelt in the election, had a long and consistent 
progressive voting record, shared Roosevelt’s Groton and Harvard background, and 
was his fourth cousin.  The senator had sponsored public works legislation, and 
Roosevelt intended to give the Interior authority over public works projects.125 
Cutting, however, refused to accept the position, and so did Roosevelt’s next choice, Senator 
Hiram Johnson of California; but Johnson recommended Harold Ickes, because he had 
supported Theodore Roosevelt’s “Third-party bid in 1912.”126  Ickes had considerable 
knowledge of administrative budgeting and practiced financial frugality in government.   
Next, Roosevelt selected the head of the Justice department.  For Attorney General, 
he considered many individuals as possible candidates.  Philip LaFollette, who had served 
as a Governor of Wisconsin, was an obvious choice.   He was the son of Robert M. LaFollette, 
a Governor, Senator and progressive candidate for the presidency.  Roosevelt felt, however, 
that he had to reward the Democratic United States Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana 
with the position.  Walsh had worked under the Harding administration, served as a 
member of Roosevelt’s Presidential campaign and had worked at the Chicago Democratic 
convention.  Walsh passed away before Inauguration Day.  Thus, Roosevelt appointed 
Homer S. Cummings Attorney General.  The Commerce position went to Daniel Roper of 
                                                           
125 George McJimsey, The Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 30. 
126 Donald C. Swain, “Harold Ickes, Horace Albright and the Hundred Days:  A Study in Conservation 
Administration,” Pacific Historical Review 34, no. 4 (November 1965):  455, 457. 
183 
 
 
 
California; George Dern of Utah became the Secretary of War, and James A. Farley became 
the Postmaster General.  Roosevelt made cabinet selections that displayed his 
bipartisanship and confidence.  He was determined to avoid the mistakes of the Hoover 
administration and felt that his cabinet could advise him on domestic and foreign policies 
necessary to turn the country around.  Similarly, Roosevelt’s Brains Trust played an 
important part in decision-making.  He realized that he needed them and his cabinet 
members to devise sound policy measures.    
 While Roosevelt assembled his cabinet selections, he continued to correspond with 
Hoover.  Their relationship had become very cold.  On March 3, 1933, Herbert Hoover 
performed one of his last presidential acts when he had a news conference with the 
media.127  He thanked them for their support and service.  He believed that they had 
attempted to keep the American people informed about his public policies and presidential 
policy agendas.  He admitted that he did not always agree with the tactics that the media 
used in order to bring political news to the forefront, but he believed that their efforts had 
benefited the American people.   During this public meeting, Hoover wanted to tell them 
that he appreciated their service.128   
By Inauguration Day, however, Hoover and Roosevelt were not speaking to one 
another.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his wife Eleanor made it to the White House at 11 
am on March 4, 1933.129  They did speak with the Hoovers, but the conversation was 
basically polite.  There was enormous tension between Roosevelt and Hoover.  They both 
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had their own policy aims, and they seemed to move in opposite directions.  Hoover felt 
that Roosevelt was taking the American people down the wrong path, but there was 
nothing that he could do.  Roosevelt sought to avoid the mistakes of his predecessor.  He 
believed that Hoover had forgotten about ordinary Americans.  It was too late for Hoover 
and Roosevelt to change their political framework.  “After the swearing-in ceremony, 
Roosevelt gave his first presidential speech to the American people.”130  He began his 
inaugural address by assuring his audience that the “nation will endure as it has endured, 
will revive and prosper.”  In his first assertion, Roosevelt confirmed that “the only thing we 
have to fear is fear itself.”  
In his Inauguration speech, Roosevelt asserted that the United States had 
experienced much turmoil; but it would endure as it had done throughout its history.131  As 
Cordell Hull recalled, Roosevelt realized that high unemployment levels were problematic 
and that he would be foolish to not recognize the difficult times that this country was 
witnessing.132  Citizens had lost confidence in federal, state, and local authorities, and 
Roosevelt sought to change their political and economic outlook.  In a break with tradition, 
Roosevelt believed that traditional forms of monetary policy that American and foreign 
bankers practiced, misused public credit.  Massive foreign loans, not stock market 
speculation, were the reasons for the emergence of the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great 
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Depression.133  He believed that the only way to restore confidence in American financial 
institutions and businesses in the public and private sectors was to get people back to 
work.  Wages had to be augmented, and work hours shortened.134  The purchasing power 
of Americans had to be increased, so that the national economy became consumer based or 
oriented.  Stretching American purchasing power also enabled consumers to acquire more 
manufactured goods, because their banknotes had more value in the national economy.  
Further, cut-throat competition among multinational corporations had to be curtailed, 
because as the prices of manufactured goods decreased, wages and benefits were 
weakened and workers suffered.135 
 Roosevelt’s election victory and Inauguration were watersheds in American history 
as well as a turning point in contemporary politics.  Roosevelt believed in his New Deal for 
all Americans.  Roosevelt would not commit himself to a metallic standard.  He sought to 
inflate the greenback, but he did so because he felt that this would strengthen foreign trade.  
Roosevelt sought to work with foreign governments, but he would not commit himself to 
Hoover’s policies as a President-Elect.  Moreover, Roosevelt believed in a substantial 
amount of government planning and intervention for the national economy.  By contrast, 
Hoover argued for self-help and self-reliance.  While Hoover did not evolve his social 
policies as the Depression kicked into high gear, Roosevelt focused on ordinary Americans 
and was determined to fight for their financial, social and political rights.
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CHAPTER 6:  ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
PASSAGE OF THE AAA AND THE NIRA DUIRNG THE ONE HUNDRED DAYS 
 
In March of 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed the Oval Office, and he was 
prepared for the crisis that befell him.  The national economy was in turmoil, and the 
industrial sectors of the United States experienced stagnant growth.1  Roosevelt remained 
optimistic.  He realized that American citizens should not fear for the future but must 
embrace it.  As indicated earlier, the nation faced difficult economic and industrial 
conditions.  But could Roosevelt deliver?  Could he turn the nation’s economic troubles 
around for the betterment of American and global citizens?  Many citizens who had become 
destitute, because of the Crash of 1929 and experienced deprivation looked to the new 
president for answers.  It did not take long for Roosevelt to respond, and he responded in a 
positive way.  Throughout Roosevelt’s first One Hundred Days, he was a man with a 
purpose.2  He handled the Bank Crisis and passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the 
National Industrial Recovery Act.  This chapter seeks to examine these important laws and 
illustrate how they transformed the United States into a powerful nation. 
The chapter will analyze two specific laws:  the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the 
National Industrial Recovery Act.  I will discuss at length the components of both laws and 
how they altered the American landscape.  This chapter will not examine the congressional 
hearings that paved the way for both laws, but will argue that each act was devised to 
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address an economic emergency in the farm and industrial sectors in the United States.3  
Neither law was perfect, but they were unprecedented in their approach to address the 
complex problems of a modern capitalist economy.   
Americans lacked confidence in the political process as the bank crisis loomed 
following the Great Crash of 1929.  Roosevelt understood that he had to provide Americans 
with answers to their financial problems, and resolving the bank crisis was the first step in 
that direction.4  This led Roosevelt to speak early on to the American people and let them 
know that he had not forgotten about the common man.  President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt gave his famous radio address on March 12, 1933, at 10 pm.5  He explained that 
the bank crisis started, because of a lack of confidence in the financial sector and the 
absence of liquidity.6  These fears of bank failures led ordinary Americans to withdraw gold 
and currency from banks and secure it in their homes.7  Roosevelt contended that many 
governors had established bank holidays, but it had become necessary to issue a national 
bank holiday so that the liquidity of banks, in terms of their reserve requirements, could be 
tested and the public reassured.8  Roosevelt argued that there was bipartisan support for 
the bank holiday.  Once it ended, there would be business as usual at all American banks.  
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Moreover, Roosevelt asserted that this extraordinary measure was a necessary step to put 
American banks on sound financial ground.   
With this in mind, Congress enacted new two laws, the Emergency Banking Act and 
the Bank Conservation Act, to give Federal Reserve banks and their counterparts the 
opportunity to issue currency after the acceptance of collateral and other financial assets 
from consumers and to reopen banks throughout the United States.9  State and national 
banks would reopen after the Federal government conducted stress tests to determine 
their assets and other monetary resources.10  As part of the process, the modern dollar 
came into existence.  With these new laws, the dollar became legal tender in the United 
States and in global system.  Roosevelt continued to stress that banks would reopen 
following the bank holiday, but all banks would not open for business at the same time.  He 
wanted to ensure that when the banks opened, they would be economically solvent.  Some 
banks reopened in a later period, after they had been reorganized and more stress tests 
had been performed.11  If Americans were still uncertain about the bank situation in the 
United States, then they could withdraw their currency or gold: and banks would have the 
financial capacity to meet their needs.  Roosevelt stressed that banks would be ready 
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following the bank holiday and that Americans should be reassured that their hard-earned 
money would be safe, whatever decision that they made.12   
Additionally, on March 10, 1933, Roosevelt issued executive order 6073, which 
enabled banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System and independent 
institutions to re-open and conduct business transactions.13  The executive order allowed 
banks to open for business, but corporate bank officials could not conduct transactions that 
allowed gold to change hands.  Banks no longer had the capacity to trade gold or exchange 
dollars for gold.14  This shift was an important step toward the devaluation of the dollar, 
because the United States no longer used the gold standard under which specie could flow 
in and out of the country on a regular basis based upon the volume of banknotes in 
circulation.15  Paper currency and gold were no longer linked, and members of U.S. banks 
had to operate under these new conditions.  Further, the Federal Reserve System was given 
a greater role as a bank regulator, and American banks had to follow the stipulations of the 
executive order, which was enforced by the Federal Reserve System.16       
With his executive orders, first fireside chat, and other communications, Roosevelt 
reassured the American people that the Great Depression could be handled.17  Public 
                                                           
12 Franklin Delano Roosevelt:  “Message to Congress on Resumption of Banking,” March 9,1933.  Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14474.  
(accessed March 24, 2013). 
13 Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Executive Order 6073—Reopening Banks,” March 10, 1933.  Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14507.  
14 Franklin Delano Roosevelt:  “Executive Order 6073—Reopening Banks,” March 10, 1933.  Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14507.  
(accessed March 24, 2013).  
15 Barrie A. Wigmore, “Was the Bank Holiday of 1933 Caused by a Run on the Dollar,” 743-744. 
16 “The Structure of the Federal Reserve System,” The Federal Reserve System, 
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org. (accessed March 27, 2015); “Banking Regulation,” The Federal Reserve 
System, http://www.federalreserveeducation.org. (accessed March 27, 2015). 
17 “New Deal Is Host To A Housewife, 29,” New York Times, September 2, 1936. 
190 
 
 
 
confidence in the Presidency was restored.18   Citizens began to write Roosevelt to offer 
their support and sometimes to question his political motivations.  The Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential library preserved some 15 million letters from constituents and 
millions more are on file at the National Archives.19  These letters provide some measure of 
the president’s effectiveness at getting his message across about the New Deal.  Many 
Americans were listening to the President give speeches via the radio.  At the beginning of 
Roosevelt‘s Presidency, 62 percent of households had a radio:  and this number increased 
to 90 percent by the end of his Presidency.  With technology, Roosevelt spoke to Americans 
in their living rooms and provided them with useful information about public policy 
initiatives.20   
Roosevelt’s first fireside chat comforted Americans regarding the bank crisis.  Runs 
on banks persuaded many Americans to have assets at home for tough times.  Viola 
Hazelberger from Minneapolis, Minnesota, wrote that, after hearing Roosevelt’s address on 
the radio, she decided not to withdraw her funds from the bank.21  Roosevelt had earned 
her confidence even though she was not certain that her money was still safe in the bank.  
In addition, she mentioned that, as a high school student, she was concerned with the 
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national economy, because she expected to join the ranks of workers.  Like other 
Americans, she found the president’s message reassuring.22 
For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, ordinary Americans believed that their 
money was safer in their hands and not anyone else’s.23  Given the instability of banks, this 
was not unreasonable.  There was a lack of trust and confidence in bankers and 
policymakers.  By the 1920s, many Americans had turned to banks to save and manage 
their assets.  The banking crisis of the 1930s, however, seemed to confirm their earlier 
fears.  The changing political and economic environment of the emerging New Deal altered 
these perceptions.24  Political columnist Jonathan Alter contended that, after March 10, 
1933, thousands of ordinary Americans had returned their banknotes and specie to banks.  
More than 300 million dollars in gold and gold certificates were now deposited in banks for 
safekeeping.25  Frances I. Hundley, from Brooklyn, New York, wrote to President Roosevelt 
on March 21, 1933.26  He mentioned that everyday Americans were with Roosevelt and his 
political and economic reforms, but the struggle to have his ideas placed on the policy 
agenda would be difficult.  Other elected officials may not necessarily agree with him, and 
there would be many struggles ahead.  Hundley wrote that Roosevelt should be able to 
weather this political storm, because of the enormous support of the American people.27 
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 Political leaders, such as the Justice of the New York Supreme Court Frank J. Cregg, 
also addressed letters to President Roosevelt.  In an effort to hear Roosevelt’s views about 
the Bank Crisis and the Great Depression, Justice Cregg mentioned that he happened to 
listen to Roosevelt’s fire fireside chat to the American people.  He and his colleagues 
wondered if Roosevelt would be able to instill confidence in the American people, 
especially after the Crash.  Cregg remained unsure as to what the American response to 
Roosevelt would be, but he was satisfied with the speech, which he viewed as masterful, 
worthwhile, and insightful.  Cregg asked whether the President would “make good” on his 
political and economic claims or would he disappoint the American people?  In the past, he 
wrote, Americans had listened to their presidents and found that the people’s interests 
were not always taken into consideration.  Roosevelt’s speech had mesmerized the 
American people, because they had been unaccustomed to a president who spoke directly 
to them and not over their heads.  Cregg affirmed that, after the speech, he and his 
colleagues argued that “we were saved!”28  Roosevelt had convinced them that he would 
lead them out of the crisis. 
Many corporate executives and professionals from the business community were 
satisfied with Roosevelt and his plans toward ending the bank crisis.  Some business 
executives even wrote to Roosevelt to congratulate him on his bank holiday speech.  For 
example, J.E. Fehsenfeld from Indianapolis wrote to Roosevelt on March 15, 1933.29  He 
called Roosevelt’s bank policy “constructive,” and he felt that the speech built up the 
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confidence of the American people.  Fehsenfeld expressed his personal gratitude for the 
President’s actions.  He now believed that the nation was on the right track for political and 
economic success.  The fireside chat changed the psychological response to the crisis, 
because Roosevelt incorporated tangible plans written or expressed in a language that 
citizens could understand.  Public opinion was restored through the successful and 
masterful oratorical skills of Roosevelt.  Similarly, on March 14, 1933, K.R. Kingsbury, who 
was president of Standard Oil Company of California, expressed his gratitude to the 
President.  He respected the ways in which Roosevelt had handled the Bank Crisis and the 
economic crisis.  He had been concerned, initially, regarding Roosevelt, because he was not 
sure if he would be able to earn the confidence of the American people.  But FDR’s speech 
was in step with American views and sentiments.  Kingsbury was now comforted and was 
sure that Roosevelt had sound political solutions to this national and global economic 
crisis. 30   
As part of Roosevelt’s plan, the 1933 Emergency Bank Act helped to resolve the 
bank crisis, because it added two billion in currency to the private sector.31  Historian Eric 
Rauchway has argued that this move ended American dependence on a metallic standard in 
terms of gold and silver bars and coinage until 1934.  The Emergency Bank Act raised the 
prices for manufactured and primary goods, and stabilized wages for lower-to-middle class 
Americans.  Rauchway argued that the Act established a more systematic and reliable 
method toward regulating greenbacks.  Although the United States did not maintain a gold 
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or silver standard from March 1933 to January 1934, the dollar was still an 
internationalized currency, and sustained considerable economic weight and value.32 
Once the banking crisis had been handled, the Roosevelt administration began to 
work on the farm communities and enact reforms to the agricultural sector.  Before the 
emergence of the AAA, farm policies in the United States struggled to return to normalcy 
following the end of the Great War in 1918.  In 1929, Chester Davis, a contemporary 
commentator, wrote, that “Washington, D.C., offered farmers the McNary-Haugen bill, the 
Agricultural Marketing Act33 and the Federal Farm Board.”34  The McNary-Haugen bill was 
devised to stabilize farm prices, so that they could reach parity with pre-war levels.  This 
act promoted more export-led growth in the farming sector through the use of import 
tariffs to prevent dumping and other foreign trade problems.35  President Calvin Coolidge, 
however, vetoed the bill each time that the measure appeared on his desk.  He felt that the 
bill would raise the prices for farm goods, causing a decrease in domestic consumption.36  
The bill did not pass Congress and receive the President’s signature until 1927.37  The 
Agricultural Marketing Act of June 15, 1929, was established to provide farmers with the 
financial capacity to determine the prices of their primary goods through the creation of a 
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Federal Farm Board headed by Alexander Legge.38  Farmers were given more control over 
prices, and price supports were established in cases when the surpluses of primary goods 
increased at an exponential rate.39   
These two policies enabled farmers to obtain new loans and use cooperative 
associations to market their agricultural goods.  Although these measures were not wholly 
satisfactory, they were important steps.  Farmers began to view the government as a means 
to maintaining fair prices for their crops.  These economic measures failed, however, 
because farmers received no guarantees that, if they planted smaller amounts of crops, 
then they would receive adequate compensation in terms of improved prices and subsidies.  
Farmers wanted to produce agricultural goods; they did not want to curtail the production 
process.  The Board was designed to reduce the agricultural surplus, but the system 
became unworkable.  Farmers were not given reassurances, and they became disenchanted 
with the system. 40 
Before Henry A. Wallace became the Agriculture Secretary under Roosevelt, he 
espoused the views of the Montana Farm economist Milburn L. Wilson.  Both men 
recommended cuts to farm production and the emergence of a processing tax for the 
purposes of paying farmers who produced a limited supply of crops.41  These principles, 
which were later incorporated into the AAA, were not new when Roosevelt came to office.  
They had been discussed since the late 1920s.  Historian Gilbert Fite contends, however, 
that the most significant principle of the AAA was the acreage reduction contracts that paid 
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farmers to produce smaller amounts of primary goods.42  Production was to balance 
consumption or to reach parity between the two variables. 
At the beginning of the farm debates and discussions from 1932 to 1933, Agriculture 
Secretaries William M. Jardine and Arthur M. Hyde attempted to persuade farmers to cut 
crop production, but they failed miserably.  Farmers actually increased production to the 
detriment of the agricultural industry.  Farm prices were not sustained.  Rather, they 
dropped in value.  Because of these practices, some farmers faced bankruptcy and 
deprivation.  They could not make ends meet, because the increased acreage under 
production caused the prices of their goods to decrease exponentially.43 
As the AAA was debated in Congress, many farmers expressed their complete 
confidence in the Agriculture Secretary Wallace.  His father, Henry C. Wallace, had been 
well-respected in his role as Agriculture Secretary during the 1920s.  Henry A. Wallace 
hoped to follow in his father’s footsteps.  Initially, farmers were vocal in declaring their 
support for both Wallaces.  They were determined to cut the production of American crops 
to stabilize prices.  Fite quoted, “a North Dakota farmer wrote that he thought that the 
production of cotton, corn, and wheat should be reduced 50 percent, and that the president 
should have the power to obtain the supplies or goods necessary to make the plan work.”44 
Some farmers, however, did not favor parity prices.  They wanted the prices for 
their crops to be determined on a cost-of-production basis.  The Farmers’ Union, the Farm 
Holiday Association and the Missouri Farmers’ Association expressed their dissenting 
views.  These three organizations disagreed with Wallace, but they understood that some 
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legislation was necessary to regulate and support the farming industry.  Wallace, however, 
did garner the support of Milo Reno of the Farm Holiday Association and William A. Hirth, 
head of the Missouri Farmers Association.45   
At the Senate Agriculture Committee, Wallace advocated the proposed parity price 
plan and the acreage reduction policy, while president of the Farmers’ Union Simpson 
expressed his support for the cost-of-production plan.46  Simpson had enormous support 
from farmers as well, because his plan was easy to understand and promoted economic 
justice for farmers.  Thus, farmers asserted that: 
Producers of food and fiber should not be expected to take less than what it cost to 
produce a commodity.  Farmers’ Union officials recommended that the plan be put 
in effect by having the federal government license buyers of agricultural products 
and making it illegal to pay less than the established minimum price.  As a method of 
raising farm prices, this seemed like the epitome of simplicity and directness.47      
Because of the seriousness of these two proposals, Wallace and Roosevelt were 
flooded with letters from American farmers.  Some farmers expressed support for both 
approaches in their letters, while others were more militant in their demands for economic 
justice and fair pricing for their commodities.  Members of the Farmers’ Union and the 
Farm Holiday Association believed that the members of the Roosevelt administration were 
making decisions that benefited the farming industry.  By 1933, 203,000 farmers and their 
families were met with crisis conditions, because the prices for commodities such as cotton 
and wheat had declined precipitously.  Farmers faced desperate conditions as a bundle of 
cotton was worth five cents, while wheat was valued at twenty-five cents a bushel, 
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especially in Oklahoma.48  Farmers began to look toward the White House and Congress for 
direction, and they found that this new president listened to their concerns.   
One problem that threatened farmers was that, if they did not produce surplus 
crops, then domestic consumption habits were affected negatively.49  If farmers did not 
produce, would Americans living in the major cities suffer from deprivation?  Would retail 
store shelves remain empty?  Would commodities become too expensive, because of a lack 
of supply?50  Moreover, controlling production worried farmers, because they did not have 
the capacity to regulate the weather or produce the right conditions.51  American farmers 
argued that they needed God on their side to make sound farm and weather predictions, 
and create a viable farm policy for the United States.52  Nothing in the farming industry was 
crafted in stone.  At the same time, as Fite reports, a “Texas farmer wrote that destruction 
of crops was contrary to nature and common sense; it was illogical, absurd and 
ridiculous.”53   
Another problem with getting farmers to support the AAA was its unequal reach. 
Farmers argued that only large land owners had the financial resources to let their lands lie 
fallow and generate a profit from producing less.  Farmers did not generate the same 
amount of money from crop sales, but the size and scope of production mattered.  Farmers 
were different and maintained distinct farming techniques.  Variations in crop, region, 
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acreage, and technique meant income levels for farmers were different.  Farmers, who 
made less money in crop sales, argued that they needed to produce more crops to improve 
upon their economic stations in life.  Rich farmers could afford to let some lands lie fallow, 
because they possessed more resources.  The more property that a farmer had, the less 
likely he would lose revenue from selling a smaller amount of crops.  Roosevelt and 
Wallace may have understood this dilemma and attempted to devise proposals to rectify 
the bill’s inequality.  But were they successful before the emergence of the AAA?  Many 
farmers during the Roosevelt administration felt that their economic lives were at stake, 
and they wanted to participate in the decision-making process. 
During Roosevelt’s first one hundred days, two major pieces of legislation, which 
were to change farming communities and industrial sectors in the United States, were 
passed.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) were prominent laws that enabled the Roosevelt administration respond to the 
severe economic collapse in the United States.54  Although they were temporary measures, 
the recovery acts were enacted, because the country faced deteriorating economic 
conditions, industrial overproduction of goods55 and falling prices for agricultural and 
industrial products.  The acts targeted the crippled farm and industrial sectors, and led to 
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economic modifications during this critical period.56  On the advice of the Brains Trust, 
Roosevelt signed the bills into law, because he realized, along with the American public a 
government needed to respond to the massive crises.57   
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was an important act, because it addressed the 
farm crisis that had begun during the Hoover administration.  Roosevelt and Secretary of 
Agriculture Wallace worked hand-in-hand to put together this bill.  When the law was 
enacted, it changed the ways in which farmers conducted economic and industrial 
transactions.  They began to use statistical analysis and technology to improve upon crop 
yields, and processing taxes enabled them to determine the prices for farm goods.  Farmers 
attempted to gain greater control over what they produced.  The AAA also established 
production quotas for dairy goods, wheat, corn, cotton, hogs, and rice.  This elevated the 
prices that farmers charged for these items.  Increased prices provided farmers with more 
revenue in the form of subsidies for limiting the supply of these goods in the open market 
place.  Further, this allowed farmers to experience a higher income level for cash crops that 
were exported overseas.58              
With the emergence of the AAA on May 12, 1933, the farming communities began to 
experience some economic changes.59  The AAA established the Agricultural Adjustment 
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Administration to be headed by George Peek, who was to work closely with Henry A. 
Wallace on matters pertaining to the farm communities in the United States.60  In addition, 
the law introduced a processing tax that enabled the federal government to increase the 
amount of loans given to the general public and raise farm prices.   Fewer crops were 
produced on American lands annually.61  The processing tax supplemented the incomes of 
farmers and conditions improved gradually as did their purchasing power.62  The AAA was 
an important law that regulated the farm industry in which hundreds to thousands of 
farmers competed to sell their primary goods.63  It benefited small farmers in the wheat 
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and cotton industries in the South, for example, because they reduced their production and 
received compensation for the crops that they decided not to produce.64         
In May 1933, when the AAA was signed, the farming industry had been experiencing 
a twelve year decline in income.  Farmers continued to produce primary goods on millions 
of acres of land, because this was the only way to supplement their incomes.65  They also 
sought to produce more and sell their goods at acceptable prices.  Yet the retail industry for 
farm goods suffered dramatically from poor sales and falling prices.  Falling prices for 
agricultural goods also occurred because of new technology.  The work of farmers became 
somewhat easier since they had automated some of their tasks to assist them with farm 
production.  The agricultural industry, however, continued to show limited and gradual 
improvement.   
Was the AAA a successful economic program?  The main aspects of the AAA were to 
raise the prices of farm goods and the improvement of the lot of farmers.  Chester C. Davis 
argued that certain provisions of the AAA led to economic growth, but he could not 
discount the fact that the devaluation of the dollar and the establishment of farm credit 
relief were important factors.  Farmers experienced increased purchasing power after the 
passage of the AAA in the sense that the prices of primary goods were strengthened.  Now 
farmers could buy industrial machines necessary for the purpose of making the production 
process easier and they were able to improve and make payments on their debts such as 
taxes and other fixed charges.  New Deal contemporary Chester C. Davis argued that “by 
restoring farm prices more nearly to parity, the AAA helped to restore the rural-urban 
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circulation, enabled a reciprocal interchange to take place once more, and broke the 
economic deadlock.”66  This shift enabled crops to make it to store shelves, but the prices of 
farm goods increased dramatically.  There was, as well, a re-emergence of trade as price 
supports for farm goods enabled other industries to improve their prices.  All consumer 
and farm goods and their prices stabilized.  While before the AAA, the national economy 
was “individualistic, uncontrolled, and laissez-faire” that era was past.  There were more 
government regulations and price supports built into the agriculture sector. 
 The National Industrial Recovery Act was proposed, devised, written and debate in 
the same model as the AAA.  The AAA had focused on the economic interests of farmers, 
while the NIRA sought to establish the financial rules for stimulating the industrial sectors 
of the American economy.67  Both laws contributed to the establishment of standards that 
assisted with price and wage determination, limited work hours, and production 
stipulations.68   The NIRA was written, however, for the purposes of resolving an economic 
emergency in the United States and affected countries in the global system.69  It was 
devised to target the Great Depression in a two-year span.70 
 The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, was at the time believed to be 
the crowning achievement for the Roosevelt Administration.71  It was designed as a 
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stimulus for job growth.  It promoted price stability through the use of industry codes.72  
Workers were to receive better wages, hours and benefits.73  American purchasing power 
was to be enhanced, and child labor eliminated from the workplace.74  Corporate leaders 
saw considerable promise to the NRA.  Marvin N. Olasky argued that even Pierre du Pont, a 
member of General Motors Corporation’s Board of Directors, approved wholeheartedly of 
the emergence of the National Recovery Administration.75  Many corporate executives were 
supportive of this new law, because it clarified their roles in interstate commerce.76  The 
law was the first of its kind, since the War Industries Board, to centrally regulate the 
industrial sectors.  Many wondered if it targeted effectively economic woes.  Many 
Americans were so satisfied with the passage of the NIRA, however, that business owners 
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sought licensing privileges inherent to the Blue Eagle seal, because it added economic and 
financial legitimacy to their corporate operations.77   
 Initially, corporate executives were so supportive of the NIRA that General Hugh 
Samuel Johnson was hired as the chief administrator for the agency.  He prompted over 2.3 
million employers to sign the universal and introductory blanket code of fair competition 
entitled the President’s Re-employment Agreement or PRA.78  The tentative PRA ended 
child labor in the United States, endorsed minimum wages for most Americans, and limited 
work hours for employees in American firms.79  Sixteen million out of twenty-five million 
American workers were affected by the NIRA and the PRA.   Some corporate executives 
worried, however, about the lack of enforcement of the NIRA and the PRA.  Concerned that 
their employers would violate the law, workers wondered if the corporate executives 
would engage in price and production controls, but neglect to hire more workers or 
improve the conditions of their current employees.80  
 When the NIRA was first passed, the Roosevelt administration did not receive much 
negative criticism.  Many newspapers such as the New York Times, the New York Herald 
Tribune, the Chicago Tribune, and the Washington Post did not run or harbor any negative 
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commentary regarding the NIRA.  It was accepted among the public commentators, 
business leaders, and the general public.  Many reporters such as Howard Davis of the 
Herald Tribune, Walter Lippmann and others did not criticize the new law.81  
 Some industrial leaders supported the NIRA, because they sought to change the 
public images of their firms.  It was good for business, especially as the Great Depression 
maintained its tight grip on the national economy.  Corporate executives understood that 
any law that improved employment levels, and gave them some leeway in controlling 
market conditions essentially had the support of the American people, especially if it 
improved the interstate movement of consumer and producer goods.82  The American 
people viewed excessive competition in the private sector as a destructive force.  Chamber 
of Commerce chairman Julius Barnes told industry leaders in the automobile sector in April 
1931 that citizens wanted them to act, because intense competition in the national 
economy had caused a series of industrial problems.83  The complex and competitive 
nature of the industrial sectors was more than just destructive:  it was disheartening.  
Competition to sell goods increased dramatically during the Hoover era, and many 
American corporations lowered the prices for their manufactured goods because of the 
initial overproduction.  The industrial sectors were flooded with manufactured goods.  
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Since the supply had increased, the market was driven by the consumer who negotiated 
with retailers.84  
There was broad acceptance of the National Recovery Administration in 1933, and 
its suspension of anti-trust laws to promote economic recovery.  The public also opposed 
yellow-dog contracts, which should have been eliminated with the passage of the NIRA.85  
Surprisingly, the National Association of Manufacturers President James Edgerton told 
industry leaders and the press that he could accept any initiative that reduced the cut 
throat competition in the private sector that had driven down both prices and employment.   
After 1932, the new Chamber of Commerce president H.I. Harriman and Robert 
Lund of the National Association of Manufacturers had become anti-Hoover and did not 
support his public policies.86  Harriman favored Roosevelt so much that he supported a 
constitutional amendment that provided Roosevelt with more power to control the private 
sector more tightly.87  Like other corporate leaders, he believed that centralized planning 
improved economic conditions.  He was determined to see that changes were made to the 
national economy that promoted a more regulated approach.  Industry leaders appeared 
no longer fearful of government regulations in the private sector.  A Republic Steel 
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representative declared that Americans overall supported government regulations and 
intervention, if it eliminated industrial and worker inequality.  Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company spokesman P.W. Litchfield and Link-Belt Company spokesman George Torrance 
asserted that their company and industrial colleagues favored creating an industrial czar 
who scrutinized prices for their commodities, examined wages and benefits for workers, 
and established production controls in the sector.88 
Industry leaders, further, were supportive of the NIRA and the NRA.  Hugh Samuel 
Johnson, and his NIRA colleagues—Alvin Brown, Robert Lea, Kenneth Simpson, Arthur D. 
Whiteside, and Clarence Williams were pro-business and had been working in the private 
sector before they joined part of the Roosevelt administration.  Corporate leaders were 
ready and prepared for change.  They understood that the laissez-faire economic system 
that promoted intense competition had to be modified.89  Change was seen to be necessary 
for the future and longevity of American corporations.  For example, Harvey Firestone 
approved of an industry code that eliminated price reductions for his products and 
established a method to determine how to tabulate prices for his goods.  Higher prices, it 
was argued, led to higher wages for employees and reduced purchasing power for 
everyday Americans in the consumer-driven national economy.90  The NIRA was so 
important to corporations that public relations spokesmen asked school-age children to 
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accept pledges from their neighbors to purchase products only with the Blue Eagle Seal.91  
These businesses were viewed as legal and approved institutions in the national economy, 
and corporate leaders were determined to win the support of their peers, colleagues and 
the American people.92  
The NIRA had many practical functions.  Each corporation within an American 
industry and trade unions were supposed to work hand-in-hand to carry out the main 
tenets of the NIRA, such as the enforcement of industry codes and the promotion of 
collective bargaining.93  Both industry and trade unions were essential in the code-making 
process, and they were to seek public recognition for their proposals and industry codes.  
President Roosevelt, through executive orders, even had the capacity to create industry 
codes if there was indecision or a stalemate among American corporate leaders and trade 
unions.94   
One of the key premises of the NIRA was to promote economic recovery through 
stronger benefits and better wages.  The law relied on worker representation, trade unions 
or worker representation plans to pressure companies on these issues.  Workers were 
represented by external individuals or groups from the labor movement on the issues of 
wages, benefits, hours and working conditions.  Moreover, work-sharing was an essential 
part of the NRA, so that the weekly hours of workers were limited; and more could be hired 
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to increase employment levels. Thirty-five hour weeks were thus one goal of the NRA.  It 
followed that more people could be hired, and purchasing power improved, despite the 
emergence of higher prices, because more people had income.  Further, the elimination of 
child labor in the American economy meant that more adults were trained and hired as a 
part of the labor force.95  Now children spent more time acquiring a decent education and 
would not have to work.  But did corporations in the United States hired more workers 
with the coming of the NIRA?  Were wages increased?  Hiring more workers increased 
production costs, and many businesses did not support this economic approach.96           
 Policymakers, the media, and everyday citizens viewed the NIRA positively at first, 
but its most salient and significant provisions were not immediately apparent.  The 
provisions of this important law led to a serious debate in the United States, because many 
policymakers assumed that the NIRA was to benefit American workers.  Others, however, 
saw it largely in industrial terms.  NRA regulation would eliminate competition.  The most 
important stipulations of the NIRA were three titles to the NIRA.  It is necessary to 
enumerate what they were in order to evaluate NRA effectiveness.  Title I dealt with the 
industrial recovery and the provisions to bring about economic and industrial change.97  
Title II handled an extensive federal infrastructure for public works, such as construction, 
transportation, and the development of natural resources.98  Title III examined the financial 
aspects of the law.  It established a sinking fund or trust with governmental securities or 
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liberty bonds to pay for the public works operations.  Title III also dealt with 
appropriations, such as bonds and taxation.  It enabled policymakers to finance the 
responsibilities listed in Tile I and Title II of the NIRA.99 
Title I, Section (I) of the NIRA was composed of a statement of purpose and the 
scope of the law.  It declared that there existed an economic emergency in which 
unemployment levels were elevated and industries were disorganized, affecting interstate 
commerce and foreign trade.100  The law aimed to eliminate trade restrictions that affected 
interstate commerce and promote the free-flow of global trade.  Corporations were to be 
given an equal opportunity to succeed and to improve upon their economic situation with 
an increase in purchasing power and the emergence of a consumer-based economic 
structure.101   The national economy was to become an efficient body capable of using its 
resources to promote growth and expansion.102   
Section 2(a) established the NRA or the National Recovery Administration under the 
jurisdiction of the Executive branch, with the presidency given the ultimate decision-
making powers for this agency.103  Once the NRA was created, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt selected General Hugh Samuel Johnson to serve as the chief administrator.104  
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Deputy administrators were established to handle the discussions of the codes of fair 
competition and to negotiate with members of American corporations in various 
industries.  Normally, members of the NRA boards were individuals from the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors, who understood the business operations of American 
corporations.105  They maneuvered in the negotiation process and devised sound industrial 
codes of fair competition.    
Within Section 2(a), advisory committees were established in an effort to protect 
the economic and labor interests of consumers, workers, and corporate executives.  At 
times, their interests were divergent; but the NRA was designed with the intent to protect 
the interests of all parties.  Next, staff divisions were created to work with the decision-
making processes of the chief administrator and deputy administrators.  It was the 
responsibility of the staff divisions to provide the chief administrators with the necessary 
information to propagate the industrial codes and they worked with industry leaders in the 
negotiation process. 106    
In addition, Section 2(a) gave the executive branch the power to hire the 
appropriate public officials to work within the NRA and coordinate their efforts with local 
and state authorities.  Policymakers were to be compensated for their services, and their 
salaries were to be determined by the president and Congressional members.  Section 2(b) 
equipped the presidency with the capacity to establish the functions of the NRA.  He had 
the ability to appoint personnel to the NRA, determine their duties, and delegate the 
governmental authority within this agency.  All power was vested in the Executive branch 
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for the purposes of ensuring that the provisions of the NIRA were carried out.  Section 2(c) 
examined the length of the NIRA.  The law was to cease to exist after a two-year period, but 
the NIRA could be renewed if the economic and industrial emergencies were not 
rectified.107 
Section 3(a) established the codes of fair competition.108  The Executive branch had 
the capacity to approve codes that did not promote monopolies or hurt small businesses.  
The codes were designed to improve wages, limit weekly work hours, and re-establish 
domestic consumption.109  Businesses that had acceptable codes were viewed as licensed 
entities and received the approval of the federal government to conduct themselves in the 
domestic and global economies.110  Corporations were not to establish discriminatory 
practices or damage the business operations of small businesses through collusion.111  If 
codes of fair competition were approved, then industries were ideally poised to benefit 
workers in terms of their welfare, health, and safety.  Power was vested in the Executive 
branch to prescribe and alter the codes in an effort to benefit and protect “consumers, 
competitors, employees, and others.”112  
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In The National Recovery Administration, Edward S. Mason argued that code-making 
was essentially put into the hands of the central NRA office.  It was the chief code-making 
agency.  The NRA looked after the concerns and needs of the public and private sectors.  On 
the other hand, Mason contended that the NRA acted in a pro-business manner and sought 
to appease corporate executives during the code-making process.113  Mason, further, 
asserted that the primary function of the NRA was to reform the industrial sector, but 
members of the NRA often compromised with industry leaders in order to accomplish this 
task.  In terms of reform and recovery, its designers believed, the way to improve upon 
industrial conditions was to strengthen wages.  It became the main preoccupation of NRA 
officials to support the concerns of business leaders.  If NRA officials had not compromised 
on the various codes of fair competition, then wages would have remained stagnant.  Codes 
may not have been approved in the first place.  Mason attributed wage increases after July 
1933 to the compromises that had been made between industry leaders and the NRA 
officials in the negotiation process.114  In the code-making process after July 1933, however, 
NRA officials spent little time examining the public interest.  Industrial recovery was the 
focus. 
Mason cited a book entitled, NRA and the Trade Practice Problem, in an effort to 
support his claims.  Leverett S. Lyons had argued that the preparation of the codes of fair 
competition and the defining features of the codes as well as the meaning of “unfair 
competition” became “distorted” during the negotiation process between the NRA officials 
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and corporate executives.115  The process of establishing the codes of fair competition and 
determining the public interest was lost.  Mason argued that problems with monopoly and 
oligopoly also were ignored during the process of creating the codes of fair competition.  
Lastly, since the codes of fair competition were voluntary, there was a problem with NRA 
enforcement as well as the lack of any enforcement agency for the purposes of adjudging 
violations to the codes or collective bargaining provisions.116  Violations of the codes were 
civil offenses, but evidence that the codes were ignored was not difficult to come by.         
Section 3(b) dealt with the enforcement of the codes of fair competition in the sense 
that there should be no violations of these standards.  The codes of fair competition were to 
avoid affecting negatively interstate commerce and foreign trade.  Economic transactions 
were to remain fair, and violators had to be sanctioned.  Section 3(c) vested enforcement 
powers in the federal judiciary if there were deviations from the standards or codes of fair 
competition.  Section 3(d) provided the president with powers to establish new codes of 
fair competition if there was a complaint within a certain industry that had to be addressed 
or if an industry failed to create an industry code.117  Codes could be used to better 
economic conditions depending upon the types of industry, and these codes were to have 
the force of law behind them.118 
Section 3(e) was an important provision, because it dealt with the codes and how 
they were used in an international setting.  If an American corporation had a code of fair 
competition to regulate its operations and also conducted business overseas, where foreign 
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competitors’ operations were a detriment to its code, then the United States’ Tariff 
Commission could conduct a federal investigation.119  In specific cases, the policymakers 
could allow the import entry to the United States:  but the foreign corporation had to pay 
extra expenses in an effort to comply with United States’ economic and industrial policy.  
Moreover, the Tariff Commission published studies annually that dealt with how goods 
were priced domestically and internationally.120    The Roosevelt administration wanted to 
ensure that American goods were priced competitively and that domestic prices did not 
destroy the relationships that businesses maintained nationwide and internationally.  
Lastly, Section 3(f) examined the various penalties for violating the codes of fair 
competition.121  
For workers, and the labor movement, section 7(a) was one of the most salient 
provisions of the NIRA.  It established the right to bargain collectively in the United 
States.122  It became the necessity of employers to eliminate yellow dog contacts and to 
enable employees to seek representation outside of their firms.123  Workers were given the 
capacity to organize and to fight for higher wages, limited work hours, and company 
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benefits for themselves and their families.124  Pre-existing trade unions now achieved 
economic and industrial legitimacy.   Moreover, some corporations attempted to promote 
the rise of company unions to negotiate reforms with their employees.  Company unions 
did have support from corporate management but they were wholly different from 
employee representatives that were selected by American workers.  Section 7(c) 
established even more rights for workers in the sense that the president devised codes of 
fair competition to improve the collective bargaining tactics of workers, if the codes did not 
exist.125  Pre-existing codes were strengthened, while if codes did not benefit workers, they 
were re-established and given weight by the Federal government. 
Section 9(a) was somewhat controversial in the sense that it established a czar for 
the petroleum industry and increased the tax base.126  During the Senate Finance 
committee hearings on the NIRA, there were many witnesses from the oil industry and the 
federal government, such as Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, who argued in favor 
of an oil czar for regulation purposes.127  Some witnesses, however, contended that the oil 
industry was already over-regulated and did not require new rules or stipulations to better 
the system.  Others affirmed the need for change, because they felt that the oil prices were 
too low.  Many believed that the domestic oil supply was too extensive and the surplus 
artificially depressed prices.  If the supply was reduced, then the price and demand for oil 
normally increased, and petroleum companies improved upon their profitability, wages, 
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and benefits.  Leaders of the Petroleum industry did not want to increase taxation that 
affected their business operations, because it increased oil prices in domestic and foreign 
markets.  Within the oil industry, anti-trust laws did apply.  Holding companies were 
barred from establishing monopolies and had to charge a fair and competitive price for oil 
to vendors in the petroleum industry.  Finally, storage levels for the oil industry were 
established, because it affected transportation costs and provided for limited increases in 
the final price for oil for domestic consumption purposes.128   
Title II, sections 201(a)-204(g) and 205(a)-207(c), dealt with the emergence of the 
Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works.129  The Executive branch was vested 
with the power to hire and fire personnel, and to create the agency for the purposes of road 
and building construction and the preservation of natural resources.130  Congress 
appropriated $400,000,000 for public works projects.  The agency was supposed to reduce 
unemployment rates through the creation of construction projects throughout the 
country.131  The Public Works agency supported projects in United States’ territories such 
as Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.  Finally, the NIRA created a sinking 
fund or trust, and re-established Liberty bonds to finance its operations.  Thus, the public 
debt was used along with taxation to pay for the various expenditures of the NRA.132  
After the passage of the NIRA on June 16, 1933, many policymakers and analysts 
wondered if the measure was the appropriate remedy for the industrial and economic 
emergency that had taken place.  John Dickinson wrote an article for the Columbia Law 
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Review in which he questioned the provisions of the NIRA to discover whether the law was 
beneficial to the general populace.  He argued that one of the main premises of the law was 
to regulate the industrial sector in an effort to promote economic expansion and growth.133  
Industrial competition was not eliminated completely from the private sector, but the 
system had some labor sanctions in place to improve the living conditions of low-to-middle 
class American citizens.  It was the competitive nature of corporations that drove wages 
down, increased work hours, and eliminated employee benefits.  Workers were fighting for 
pre-existing jobs during the early stages of the Great Depression, and it contributed to the 
undercutting of labor skills and wages.134  Standards of living, thus, declined immensely as 
unemployed Americans competed for jobs in the private sector.  It was the competitiveness 
of the market that inhibited worker development and lowered the price levels for goods 
without increasing purchasing power.  Dickinson stated that: 
The tests of unwholesome competition there indicated are that it is competition 
which is unfair, or which interferes with the full utilization of productive capacity; 
or decreases purchasing power and thereby restricts the consumption of the 
national product, or promotes unemployment or lowers labor standards.135                  
One problem with the NIRA was that there were few penalties for violating anti-
trust laws and little enforcement.  The use of the codes was voluntary.136  The law, instead, 
relied on “interested parties” who might be persuaded to curtail unfair competition and the 
market dominance of monopolies.  Consequently, workers who depended upon the NIRA 
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used strikes to push for trade unions and collective bargaining, because of the lack of 
enforcement powers inherent in the NRA.137  Lewis L. Lorwin asserted that “the Recovery 
Act was primarily a permissive, rather than a mandatory, statute.”  Enforcement was 
problematic.138  This was particularly true for the collective bargaining provisions of the 
act.  Scholars such as George W. Robbins argued that the codes of fair competition that had 
been devised did not contain provisions that prevented the emergence of unfair trade and 
labor practices.139  
In Labor and the New Deal, Emanuel Stein, Carl Raushenbush and Lois MacDonald 
argued that the NRA believed that it was the duty of industries to sanction the offenders.140  
The administration itself was not in charge of the enforcement of the law provisions.   The 
scholars contend that, in the 1930s, there were few labor laws on the books in the United 
States, and federal mediation of labor disputes was fairly at a minimum even during World 
War I.141  This hampered the enforcement capacity of policymakers and inhibited the 
federal judiciary from policing the NIRA, especially in labor conflicts.  If there had been 
enormous legal precedence for the regulation of manufacturing sectors and federally 
supervised labor elections, then the NIRA industry code sections might not have been 
invalidated in 1935.   
The problems that the NRA faced were that there was not much legal precedence 
that the federal judiciary could follow to enforce this law.  Remember, the War Industries 
Board had been the first agency to regulate industry during World War I.  But during the 
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interwar period, however, policymakers could not rely on pre-existing laws to enforce the 
NRA codes and guidelines.  The major difference between the NRA and the WIB, moreover, 
was that the WIB was designed to provide American troops with the necessary supplies to 
wage war, and had the sanction of defense and security needs.  The New Deal state sought 
to use “the moral equivalent of war” to sanction the NRA, but the economic crisis was not a 
war in the tradition sense.142  Fighting unemployment was seen as patriotism.  Lastly, the 
emergence of federal court cases that was sought to determine the constitutionality of the 
NIRA prevented policymakers from enforcing this law.143 
Because the codes were voluntary, if businesses decided to adopt the codes, then 
corporate executives were at liberty to improve or neglect to change the lot of their 
workers.144  Their business operations might have to change, and it may have been 
detrimental to company earnings.  Intensive labor competition that had produced long 
work hours, insufficient wages, company unions and a lack of employee benefits had to be 
addressed.  Corporations were sanctioned only punitively by the NRA if their codes were 
inadequate or if they violated the health and safety of employees.  Labor unions, however, 
were more contested ground.  Corporations may have been intimidated by the alleged legal 
authority of the Executive branch and the NRA, but did not take up union negotiations.145  
      In The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, labor 
leader John L. Lewis argued that trade unionism was promoted by the provisions of the 
NIRA, especially Section 7(a).  He believed that the NIRA was comparable to the 
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Emancipation Proclamation, and it was considered as the Magna Carta of labor in terms of 
its political weight in the United States and the applicability of the law to industrial 
conditions.146  He affirmed that there had been an economic emergency in the United States 
that had to be addressed and that Roosevelt’s NIRA was the step in the right direction for 
workers.  Further, Section 7(a) had been originally a part of the Davis-Kelly, or Coal 
Stabilization bill, in which anti-trust laws were nullified in the bituminous coal mining 
industry so that mine workers could bargain collectively with their employers.147  Although 
the Coal Stabilization bill was never passed, policymakers used that proposal as a model for 
the NIRA.148  This gave John L. Lewis an almost proprietary interest in organizing others 
under the NRA.   
After the passage of the NIRA, Lewis like John Dickinson, contended that the act had 
not been enforced nor had the public sector established formal sanctions.  Excessive work 
hours remained; the codes of fair competition and price and production controls had been 
ignored, and wages had not increased.149  Lewis argued that employers were ignoring the 
entire Section 7 of the NIRA and did not negotiate with their employees to improve work 
conditions and benefits.  In addition, he wrote that section 7(a) was a provision that 
policymakers assumed corporate executives would follow.  It was a voluntary measure, but 
it was the moral responsibility of the public and private sectors to adhere to its rules and 
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regulations.  Refusal to adhere to the provisions of the NIRA was detrimental to the labor 
market and to society.  Lewis argued that: 
Delay in the enforcement of these provisions of the law also leads to controversy, 
strikes, and serious dislocations, and to the conclusion among the workers of the 
country that cooperation under the Act can be secured only through fighting for 
it.150               
Moreover, workers had to fight for the enforcement of the provisions of the NIRA, 
especially Section 7(a).  Lewis argued that the NIRA did not place any mandatory 
obligations on the NRA on employers to follow the spirit and direction of the law.  Thus, 
there were two competing arguments with the coming of the NIRA.  Some policymakers 
and scholars argue that section 7(a) was not enforced151 while others contend that the 
NIRA was good for American businesses and should be followed.   
Similarly, labor economists Lois MacDonald, Gladys L. Palmer and Theresa Wolfson 
affirmed that policymakers and corporate executives misunderstood and ignored section 
7(a).  They mainly promoted the status-quo in terms of enforcement.152  Yellow dog 
contracts were technically prohibited as they were under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but the 
closed shop was not mandatory.153  The NRA was to establish collective bargaining in the 
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workplace, but employees did not have to belong to a trade union or be represented by a 
union official.154   
The federal government attempted to remain neutral regarding Section 7(a), but 
Roosevelt and Johnson may have worried about the impact of collective bargaining, such as 
strikes and labor conflict.  If policymakers and corporations agreed with the provisions of 
the NIRA, Lewis argued, then the incidence of strikes, bottlenecks or other forms of 
industrial syndicalism were limited or curtailed completely.  General Johnson believed in 
the principles behind the NIRA, but he did not agree with workers who promoted strikes to 
“force the hands “of corporate executives.  Moreover, General Johnson contended that, with 
the passage of the NIRA, strikes in the United States decreased and collective bargaining 
enabled workers to fight professionally and legitimately for their rights and work 
benefits.155  He turned out to be only partially right. 
 Once the NIRA had been passed, its enforcement became a problem.  Many had 
questions as to who could bring a case to court if there were some violations of the NIRA 
provisions.  The question was answered in the sense that it was decided that if anyone’s 
rights were infringed upon, then they had the capacity to sue in court for damages.156 
However, only individuals, who were “directly and seriously” affected by violations of the 
NIRA, could seek remedies in the court of law.  For example, if a person’s collective 
bargaining rights had been infringed upon, then he or she could sue in court to seek justice.  
Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission could sue in court if there were some violations 
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of the codes of fair competition or certain types of unfair trade practices came to the 
forefront.157   
Federal district attorneys also could file a lawsuit against violators of the NIRA.  
Before the end of 1933, however, they did not exercise their rights to sue in court.  The 
Federal Trade Commission and federal district attorneys also could file a lawsuit with the 
various Circuit Courts of Appeals.  When a suit could be brought to federal court was 
somewhat tricky, because initially administrators and policymakers were uncertain if an 
individual (s) had to violate the law first to make the lawsuit necessary.  Would they have 
to incriminate themselves in order to test the constitutionality of the NIRA?  In addition, 
how grave did the infringement of the law have to be before the federal judiciary 
considered that the law had been violated or breached?     
 Even with all of these criticisms, Lewis and other labor leaders believed that the 
National Recovery Administration was the only government agency that could save the 
labor market and the economy.  The NRA could be modified, and Lewis offered some 
suggestions that could be put in place to better the economic environment and promote 
more cooperation between workers and management.  He argued for “a new definite policy 
of guidance of industry to which all codes should be required to conform.  In his mindset, 
this policy should be broader than that now existing, and should include not only minimum 
wage rates and maximum hours, but also definite price and production objectives.”158   
In an article published by The American Economic Review, Joseph H. Willits and John 
Dickinson contended that times had changed and that the American economy was evolving.   
The NIRA was needed to rectify these new economic conditions.  Fifty years before, most 
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farmers produced solely for subsistence purposes while American corporations created 
manufactured goods for domestic consumption.159  After the late 1920s, the American 
economy had changed into one that was consumer-oriented.  People were purchasing 
goods in the national markets and required purchasing power that they did not receive 
from their firms.  Wages had been stagnant and the American worker could not make ends 
meet.160  But in some cities such as Chicago, with the NIRA, wages and employment began 
to improve.161     
The global economy was changing, and the United States experienced the negative 
effects of these modifications.  Willits and Dickinson elaborated further that: 
Those areas of economic activity lying outside the organized system formed what 
may be compared to a cushion which operates to absorb much of the shock of the 
repercussions within the system.  In idle times, labor was absorbed into those 
outlying activities and in boom times, the farms and local workshops increased their 
output.  Today all our economic activity is geared into one system with vastly 
increased rigidity and with increased menace to the stability of the system.162  
Declining production in the manufacturing sector during the Great Depression was 
one sign of changing conditions.  Willits and Dickinson argued that, if this issue could be 
resolved, then domestic consumption could increase.163  If the supply of American goods 
increased, then American citizens could afford to purchase more products in the national 
economy.   Lastly, both Willits and Dickinson affirmed that: 
the proper regulation of competitive practices, especially practices relating to secret 
prices, price discrimination, discounts, and other types of discrimination, will do 
much towards eliminating forces and tendencies which in normal times, as in times 
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of depression, tend to drag down and depress industry, lower the price of raw 
materials, and drive down labor standards.164                     
Arthur Robert Burns in the Political Science Quarterly concurred with Willits and 
Dickinson that one reason for the emergence of the Great Depression was that there was 
some corporate competition in which American workers were paid nominal wages.165  
These monopoly-determined wages reduced their spending power and prevented 
increases in consumer consumption.  Burns believed that corporate executives understood 
this issue and felt that with controls on production, higher prices became the norm in the 
American marketplace.  However, this idea is somewhat contradictive, because controlling 
prices of American goods lowered their worth, while producing less raised prices.   
By contrast, the Roosevelt administration contended that competitive economics no 
longer worked in the United States and that increasing wages and hiring more workers 
were the only ways to strengthen the national economy.166  Increasing wages for workers 
augmented consumption levels, and it enabled the national economy to become consumer-
oriented or based.167  The NRA was designed to address this practice of maintaining low 
wages and prices.  It did not want American corporations to produce below cost.  One 
hundred and twenty-five codes approved by the NRA maintained provisions that 
prohibited establishing prices below the cost of production.168  One half of the codes of fair 
competition that had been approved contained stipulations that sustained minimum 
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pricing standards.  It was important for businesses to set their prices and maintain their 
profitability.  It enabled them to move forward and achieve economic success.  American 
corporations within each industry obtained codes for pricing purposes, but uniform pricing 
did not occur.  The prices for consumer goods differed, but efforts had to be made to 
improve the financial status of these corporations.169 
There were about 180 codes that contained provisions regarding open price 
policies.  Arthur Burns implied that American products were not to be sold below the cost 
provided by the seller.  All pricing in these codes had to be listed, and “discounts and 
special charges” had to become transparent.  Transparency was an important part of these 
codes.  All American corporations were to reveal the selling prices for their products and 
changes to those prices had to be listed as well.  As Burns wrote that “in 72 of these 80 
codes it is provided that a firm notifying a change of price may not change its actual price 
until the lapse of a period varying from twenty-four hours to twenty days after the notice of 
the change has been lodged.”170  Once modifications had been made to the codes in terms of 
the wholesale or retail prices, this information had to be circulated among corporations; 
and the public had to be made aware of those changes as well.  Notification of price changes 
was important, because it was supposed to prevent price cutting policies that had become 
the mainstay of the national economy before the New Deal. 
Thus, Burns argued that there was an “increase in output and payroll accompanied 
by an increase in prices with the major rise again occurring between March and July 1933 
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when wholesale prices rose 15 percent.  By December 1933, the increase was still only 18 
percent over the level in March 1933.”171  In addition, after the passage of the NIRA, 
American businesses became profitable again.  In 1933, 1,475 corporations specializing in 
manufacturing and commerce garnered more than 660 million dollars while, in 1932, they 
had only earned 97 million dollars.172  But could these improvements in the national 
economy be attributed to the emergence of the NIRA and the various codes of fair 
competition?  
Did the NIRA work for corporate executives and American workers?  Did they 
benefit from this important law?  In 1936, Ruth Reticker contended that six months after 
the law had been passed, 190 industries that consisted of 12.25 million employees were 
brought under the industry codes that had been approved by President Roosevelt and 
industry leaders from the various manufacturing sectors in the United States.173  
Additionally, in 1934, 200 codes had been postulated that affected 10 million more 
American workers.174    Three hundred and four codes addressed weekly work hours, and a 
majority of them recommended that employees work only for six out of the seven days per 
week.  Most of the codes stipulated that employees were to work only an eight hour day 
and forty hours per week.  This further limited weekly work days to five, because 
employees were working eight hour shifts.  However, 33 codes allowed employees to work 
each week for an unlimited amount of time.  Over three million workers were affected by 
the thirty-three codes and it lessened the unemployment figures.   Overtime hours and pay 
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were spelled out in fifty-two codes.175  After working a forty hour week, employees were 
entitled to receive overtime pay, if they decided to work some additional hours.  White 
collar workers were treated a little differently.  Seventeen codes allowed white collar 
workers to labor for forty hours per week.  Some of the finance codes allowed white collar 
workers to labor for more than forty hours per week.   
A majority of the codes offered minimum wage standards with wage differentials.  
Differentials enabled employers to pay workers at different rates based upon seniority or 
other human resources statistics.  Over fourteen percent of workers were covered by codes 
that offered wages that were listed at forty cents per hour.  Some workers, such as women, 
apprentices, office boys and girls, the handicapped and junior employees were exempt 
from minimum wage standards.  One hundred and thirty-seven codes allowed employees 
to pay female employees less for jobs that were “light and repetitive.”  Equal pay clauses 
were incorporated in all but four codes, because if women were employed and performed 
similar work as their male counterparts, then they were to be paid equally for their labor.  
In terms of apprentices, they were paid less than male workers with seniority.  Two 
hundred and nine codes addressed this issue, and they were paid eighty percent of the 
minimum wage for all other American workers. 
In 1933, President Roosevelt signed into law the Agricultural Adjustment Act and 
the National Industrial Recovery Act.  Both laws were enacted to handle an economic 
emergency in the United States.  But were the laws enforceable?  Did business leaders 
follow the guidelines and stipulations of both laws?  Even with a lack of enforcement 
powers inherent in the National Recovery Administration, hundreds of industrial codes had 
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been established.  Millions of American workers were affected by the provisions of both 
laws.  Moreover, the NIRA was a step in the right direction for American workers and was 
the central method for reforming the American industrial sectors, while the AAA improved 
the lot of farmers in the United States.  Scholars and policymakers may never know if the 
NIRA benefited American workers, because the law was declared unconstitutional in 1935.  
The AAA had a different ending.   
Although the AAA was voided in January of 1936, the law was reworked and 
reenacted.  Throughout contemporary American history, the AAA has been renewed on 
many different occasions and continues to help farmers thrive in an otherwise competitive 
environment.  Another question that requires a response is whether there were any 
alternatives to the NIRA and the AAA that could have been more enforceable in the United 
States.  Americans may never know but with the passage of the AAA and NIRA, Americans 
became accustomed to an expanded federal government that worked to improve upon the 
financial conditions of workers in the private sector.  Workers in the United States could 
now count on the federal government to step in during periods of political, economic or 
social instability.  This new precedent has been continued and Americans on a daily basis 
have learned to write to their policymakers to have their interests and issues brought to 
the forefront and addressed in a positive way.  Roosevelt started this political innovation, 
because he spoke directly to the American people and these steps have been continued by 
U.S. policymakers into the present. 
 
 
232 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7:  CREATING THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION AND THE CODES 
OF FAIR COMPETITION:  THE PETROLEUM AND AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRIES 
 
The National Recovery Administration was an agency that worked with businesses 
to regulate the national economy and establish industrial reforms.  As an Executive branch 
agency, it had national jurisdiction to devise business solutions.  The NRA and code-making 
moved hand-in-hand in the 1930s.  It became the responsibility of the NRA and its 
representatives from American industrial sectors1 to establish the codes of fair 
competition.  The NRA negotiated with American corporate executives from the industries, 
and they were supposed to work together to create fair codes to target wages and the 
prices of commodities that could be used industry-wide.2  There were criticisms of the 
NIRA, such as the overregulation of business sectors and the use of codes, but it was the 
first step toward economic growth and transparency among the private and public sectors 
in the United States.3  Whether or not the NRA and the code authorities improved economic 
conditions, the law was targeted to address an economic emergency that was complex and 
difficult to resolve.  In the following pages, I examine the organizational structure of the 
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NRA and discover how the different provisions of the law and the National Recovery 
Administration created the codes of fair competition.  I discuss the origins of the petroleum 
and automobile codes and the debates among policymakers and corporate leaders during 
these processes.  The chapter illustrates how the Roosevelt administration attempted to 
maneuver in two key industrial sectors of the national economy in an effort to improve 
workers’ benefits, wages, and conditions as well as to address the economic crisis.  
Although policymakers were not always successful, Roosevelt thought that the emergence 
of the NRA fair codes of competition was a step in the right direction to promote more 
stability in the labor markets and in industry.  
With the enactment of the NIRA on June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt made it his 
responsibility to establish Executive branch agencies for the propagation of the codes of 
fair competition.4  In The ABC of the NRA, Charles L. Dearing and others, argued that the 
NRA was without precedence.5  There had never been any governmental agencies quite like 
it.  But the NRA supporters maintained that it was the agency’s purpose to produce and 
enforce codes, but there were other responsibilities that were just as important, such as the 
NRA’s re-employment agenda. 
First of all, Roosevelt created the office of the NRA administrator, whose 
responsibilities consisted of selecting its government employees at the lower levels of the 
NRA, holding preliminary hearings and negotiations, and performing day-to-day 
supervision.6  In December, 30, 1933, Roosevelt gave the chief administrator the power to 
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approve codes, with the exception of essential industries, and to approve all changes to the 
existing codes.7  A Special Industrial Recovery Board was established.8  It included as its 
members the Secretary of Commerce, who served as the chairman; the Attorney General; 
the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Labor; the 
Director of the Budget; the Administrator for Industrial Recovery, and the Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission.9  This organization was abolished in December 1933.   
After the National Recovery Administration was created, the chief administrator to 
the NRA, General Hugh Samuel Johnson, established different industry advisory boards and 
sub-divisions that specialized in the technical aspects within the industries.10  These sub-
agencies were responsible for making the codes and sanctioning the behavior of 
corporations that violated the codes.  Within each division, there were deputy 
administrators who were always in contact with the chief administrator.  They had the 
responsibility to use their contacts with the chief administrator to negotiate with industry 
leaders.11 
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Former New Deal policymaker Charles L. Dearing argued that two NRA entities that 
proved to have staying power were the Legal Division and the Research and Planning 
Division.  The Legal Division examined newly devised codes to ensure that they were in 
compliance with federal, state, and local regulations.  The Research and Planning Division 
had duties that required cooperation with the Legal Division.12  It worked with industry 
leaders to gather information about industries in the United States.  This information was 
used in devising the numerous codes that affected the private sector.  The Research and 
Planning Division was headed by Dr. Alexander Sachs, who convinced Roosevelt that a 
division should be established to handle financial, economic, and industrial reports 
necessary for recovery.13  Both divisions provided lots of legal and government advice to 
the upper echelon of the NRA.  They did not just provide technical assistance, but most of 
the information about the codes and industries came from these two NRA entities.   
Within the NRA, there were three advisory boards:  the Industrial Advisory Board, 
the Labor Advisory Board and the Consumers’ Advisory Board.14  The Industrial Advisory 
Board included members who were selected by the Commerce Secretary, whose 
membership was subject to rotation.15  This board was to express the interests of the 
business community but also labor unions.16  Members of this board were appointed to 
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ensure that, during the code negotiation process, business interests were promoted and 
placed at the forefront.  Moreover, this entity was responsible for selecting appointees who 
served in negotiations during the decision-making process.  Initially, members of the 
Industrial Advisory Board earned tenure and other job security benefits.  Over time, these 
appointments were rotated, providing all of its members with opportunities to implement 
policy.   Members were employed at will.  They were subject to firing if they did not serve 
professionally in their roles with the federal government.  Moreover, if the codes of fair 
competition were not devised and improved in a timely manner, then their actions were 
subjected to scrutiny.17  
The Labor Advisory Board had its members selected by the Labor Secretary.  They 
handled the labor policy during the code-negotiating process.18  Dr. Leo Wolman was the 
chief administrator of this board.19  Wolman had been an educator and labor analyst for 
more than twenty-five years.  He had been employed as an union representative and 
worked for many federal governmental agencies such as the National Bureau of Economic 
Research and the Social Science Research Council.  He worked with laborers to ensure that 
wages, benefits, and working conditions were satisfactory, and that the interests of the 
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American worker were promoted.20  This board worked with labor unions to compile 
information about the labor situation in American firms and used this data to create the 
industry codes.21  Its members were present at the NRA hearings, and they made sure that 
workers’ rights were brought to the attention of the chief administrator.  The interests of 
workers such as wages, benefits, and working conditions, they argued, must be protected.22   
The last entity was the Consumers’ Advisory Board.23  Members to this board were 
appointed by the chief administrator and President Roosevelt.24  This board handled price 
stability issues for American consumers during the hearings, and made sure that their 
interests were recognized.25  It was not connected to any particular government agency.26  
It maintained the interests of the public and made sure that each code did not contain any 
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special breaks or privileges.  Some scholars argued that this entity was feeble and lacked 
enforcement powers.27 
Members of these three boards were not paid by the NRA to conduct hearings and 
negotiate in the code-making meetings.  Board members did not meet routinely.  All work 
efforts were completed in committees, and members prepared the data that was used in 
the creation of industry codes.28  Within each board, moreover, there existed a formal office 
and a staff of researchers that worked directly within the NRA.  They maintained regular 
work hours within the NRA, and they served as resident members for this agency.  They 
worked with special advisors and visiting staff during the negotiation process.   
The NRA worked with other government agencies indirectly, such as the National 
Labor Board, the Central Statistical Board, and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.  
Most significantly, the National Labor Board, through its actions, played a prominent role in 
the propagation of codes of fair competition.  Senator Robert E. Wagner served as the 
chairman of the labor board.29  Established in August 1933, it settled disputes that arose 
with the emergence of the President’s Re-employment Agreement and in conjunction with 
the National Recovery Administration.30  After December 1933, the NLB’s powers were 
expanded to include the dispute resolution that proved necessary, due to unfair codes, or 
issues of workers’ rights.  The NLB was the last line of defense for workers, because the 
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agency made sure that all avenues had been extinguished before it took cases involving 
labor disputes.  This agency could only sanction offenders by removing their Blue Eagle 
designation.31  
The codes of competition were central to the operation of the NRA.  The code-
making process moved from the establishment of ideas and tentative proposals to the final 
approval of a code.  The decision-making process within the NRA revealed its 
organizational structure.  Charles L. Dearing and A. Heath Onthank, who served in the NRA, 
both addressed this important topic.  They illustrated vividly the steps that policymakers 
had to follow in order to have a code approved by the presidency.32 
Each code that was created by industry leaders and approved by the presidency had 
certain uniform provisions.33  These included guidelines for production, process, wages and 
hours, and an administrative board.  The codes also contained within their stipulations’ 
information from Section 7(a) that dealt with collective bargaining.  At any time, during or 
after the code had been approved, the presidency maintained the capacity to abolish any 
code, or modify it in any way.  An administrative board for each code was established 
within the industry with representatives that had as their obligation to interpret and 
implement the code.  Moreover, each code had to contain provisions against unfair trading 
practices.  As Roosevelt advisor Adolf Berle wrote “the abuses of the past, the chiseling, cut-
throat competition, dishonest practices of all sorts, will be eradicated.”34   
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In the beginning of the process, a trade association had to apply to the presidency 
for the creation and approval of a code.  An industry code contained all of the rules and 
guidelines that corporations had to follow or they could lose their Blue Eagle status.  Most 
codes had the approval of a majority of the industry.  This meant that most members 
agreed with the stipulations of the code.  All agreed to follow the rules.  Because cut-throat 
competition could have proved detrimental to the national economy, and workers did not 
benefit from the financial and labor practices that management put forth, the code had to 
be cooperatively developed.35   
Once a code had been created, a committee from an industry traveled to 
Washington, D.C., to seek approval from the NRA and the presidency.  Thus, the code was 
submitted to the Control Division of the NRA in Washington, D.C.36  Application forms were 
completed and returned to the Control Division for review and approval.  There were three 
documents that were included in the submission:  the constitution and bylaws, a letter by 
industry leaders providing a statement of purpose, and evidence that the trade association 
represented a majority of the interests of the industry.  The trade association that released 
the code had to represent at least seventy-five percent of the industry in terms of market 
share, so that it appeared that they had the interests of the majority of the industry at heart.  
Thus, the codes of fair competition that were presented to the NRA had to have the support 
of a majority of the industry leaders.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1935; General Files of the Consumers Advisory Board—Miscellaneous Publications, 1934-1935; National Recovery 
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These industrial and corporate executives sought its approval in their manufacturing 
sectors.37   
After the passage of the NIRA, the first codes that were approved by the president 
became templates for subsequent efforts.  Code-writing was uncharted territory.  Thus, the 
NRA hired code advisors who discussed the plausible provisions that all industries 
understood.  Some codes were well-conceived and consisted of several hundreds of pages’ 
worth of stipulations.  Further, efforts were made to have codes that were written clearly, 
so that industry leaders could conform to the rules and regulations.  All together, there 
have been submitted “987 codes representing national trade associations and about 3,000 
codes representing regional, state, and local associations.”38 
Once the codes, constitutions, and bylaws and other information had been 
submitted to the NRA, the documents were registered, categorized by industrial sectors, 
and distributed to the offices so that they could be discussed, debated, researched and 
analyzed.  The Control Division then informed the deputy administrator about the 
submission.  Within the deputy administrator’s office, the codes were distributed to 
assisting staff members.  They were given portions of the codes for research purposes, 
depending upon the expertise of that agent.  Hence, if a code was produced for the paper 
industry, then an assistant in charge of wooden products examined that code.  Mandatory 
codes were looked at first to ensure that they complied with NRA regulations.  Once this 
had occurred, a committee consisting of the three advisory board members, members from 
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the Legal and Research and Planning Divisions, the deputy administrator, and his assistants 
was convened.39   
At this meeting, a representative from the deputy administrator’s office served as 
the chairman.  The codes were then revised.  New events that affected the codes led to 
alterations in some form:  omissions and revisions were taken into consideration.  Illegal 
stipulations were eliminated from the code proposals.  Before a code was viewed as 
satisfactory, many meetings had been convened and conducted.  It sometimes took days or 
even weeks before approval at the preliminary stage occurred.  The NRA made enormous 
efforts to ensure that all codes were constitutional and had a basis in law, which proved to 
be important in initial court tests.  Once this occurred, a public hearing with the Control 
Division took place.40   
Public hearings were important.  Participants from trade and labor unions 
expressed their viewpoints about the codes and sought to modify code provisions.41  The 
preliminary codes were examined further by industry leaders, the Deputy administrator 
and his staff, and members of the advisory boards.  At these meetings, trade associations 
that represented a certain industry stated their case.  Participants examined the pros and 
cons of each stipulation or provision of the codes.  Trade associations, further analyzed and 
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contested the aspects and effects of the codes, should they be approved by the president 
and became the law of the land.42   
Members of the Consumers Advisory Board were present at each hearing to ensure 
that industry leaders provided the NRA with information about pricing and production 
costs.  This prevented the emergence of price increases under each proposed code.43  
Normally, public hearings lasted from one half of a day to four days.  A public hearing often 
lasted well into the early morning hours, because all interests were given a chance to state 
their case and claims.  However, economist Adolf Berle argued that the public hearings 
were not “court procedures.”  They were mainly meetings of industry leaders and the 
members of the NRA divisions.  Public hearings did carry enormous legal weight.  The 
president did not approve any of the codes or their proposals unless they had been 
navigated throughout the negotiation process.44  
Next were the post-hearing conferences.  They consisted of a series of meetings with 
the steering committee representing the industry to iron out problems that had not been 
handled in the public hearings.  At this time, the codes were prepared for approval.  At 
these conferences, the final remarks about the codes were given.  Once the codes received 
the acceptance of the industries, trade unions, the general public as represented at the 
hearings, and the federal government, the codes were sent to Roosevelt for his signature.  
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The president received “the chief and deputy administrators’ reports, a transcript from the 
public hearings on the codes, statistical information from the Research and Planning 
division, and a statement of the codes’ formalizing procedures.”45  Once the president 
received this information, he could approve the code or reject it.  If the code was rejected, it 
could be revised and resubmitted.46   
Moreover, the codes could be approved with conditions that must be followed.  With 
Roosevelt’s signature, the codes were sent to the State Department for filing purposes.  
Even though the president signed off on the codes, this did not mean that the industry 
codes were not modified further.  Codes were subjected to change through the enactment 
of amendments, if the need arose.  It meant that the codes never became outmoded.  They 
were subject to amendments that modified the stipulations or provisions of the codes.   
Finally, once the codes were approved, American companies that complied with the 
codes were given the Blue Eagle Seal, which was a form of economic and legal licensing.47  
The industrial codes became law.   Corporations, even if they did not sign the codes, were 
required to adhere to their guidelines.48  In public speeches, General Hugh Samuel Johnson 
argued that, if corporations did not comply with industry codes, he could take away their 
Blue Eagle Seal.49  Using public opinion by endorsing business practices with the Blue Eagle 
became an important mechanism of persuasion. 
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A prominent example of the NRA code-making process at work was the making of 
the automobile code for the Big Three Automobile companies and the petroleum code that 
affected the southwestern states that maintained many drill sites.  These codes show how 
the NRA affected their labor and financial actions and decisions.  The petroleum code and 
the automobile code were, in addition, interconnected.  Each industry was dependent upon 
the other.  It is necessary to illustrate the code-making process by examining the 
interconnections between the oil industry, General Motors Corporation, and Ford Motor 
Company.  The auto industry, however, was concerned with the repercussions of section 
7(a) and the introduction of collective bargaining.  The petroleum sector focused on 
production and price controls.50  Even though the industries were interrelated, they 
emphasized different issues during the code negotiation process.  
The petroleum code limited the oil production and the distribution of petroleum in 
the United States.  Nationwide oil shipments were limited in an effort to decrease supply 
and augment the prices for this commodity.51  The oil prices were not supposed to fall 
below the costs of production in order to protect the purchasing power of those who 
worked in the industry and the profitability of oil corporations.  The oil industry, along with 
the other industrial sectors, was similarly protected from foreign products that may have 
been cheaper or more cost-effective.  Tariffs on imports, and the implementation of quotas 
that targeted supply levels increased American purchasing power.  The oil industry and the 
Big Three, especially the Ford Motor Company under Henry Ford, protested vehemently 
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against the establishment of this tax on imports and believed that it led to noxious business 
practices. 
 The oil industry during the early 1930s suffered from poor economic and labor 
practices.  The oil reserves in the private sector increased at an exponential rate, causing a 
contraction of oil prices.  Technological innovations had made it easier to acquire greater 
oil reserves, and there was the collapse of proration schema that had been used to create a 
fair pricing system.52    Moreover, scholars, such as historian Norman Nordhauser, have 
shown that only since the Hoover administration did the petroleum companies maintain 
statistics and other forms of data regarding production.  This information was needed 
before new regulations were established.53  Political scientist Donald Brand affirmed that 
there had been a glut in oil reserves in the United States, especially after more petroleum 
was discovered in East Texas in 1930.54  This influx of supply added to the preexisting oil 
fields throughout Texas, Oklahoma, and California.55  All in all, oil prices in the United 
States had decreased, causing petroleum manufacturers to lose money, because of a lack of 
demand and excess supply.56   
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Within the petroleum industry, corporate executives continued to argue over 
production levels, especially in states located along the Southwest and South.  There was an 
enormous debate between those who favored high production levels and those who 
supported conservation, and thus higher prices, with decreased supply levels.  Many 
industrial leaders and policymakers viewed depressed prices or surplus production as a 
detriment to that industrial sector, because it led to cut-throat competition and waste.57   
On March 7, 1933, James A. Moffett of the Executive Committee of the American 
Petroleum Institute or (API) favored a reduction in the level of oil production to only two 
million barrels daily, which would have cut levels by a half-million barrels per day.58  
Moffett contended that the petroleum industry was in peril, because of high production 
levels and depressed oil and gasoline prices.  Only Roosevelt could save the industry, it was 
believed, because enforcement of conservation laws was lax, and petroleum companies 
were ignoring production schema.  If production levels were decreased based upon local 
and state demand levels, then prices would become somewhat elevated; and businesses in 
this industry would have seen higher profits.  The NRA could, thus, provide regulation to 
ensure the oil industry’s stability.59   
 On March 27, 1933, there was a conference for the petroleum industry to devise a 
tentative plan before the Official Governors Conferences that was held to be on the next 
day.  The American Petroleum Institute’s plan, that focused on production controls was not 
passed or enacted.  The independent oil producers, such as John B. Elliott of the 
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Independent Petroleum Association of California, Jubal R. Parten of the Independent 
Petroleum Association of Texas, William M. Keck of Superior Oil of California, H.H. 
Champlin of Champlin Oil, E.B. Howard, an Oklahoma producer, and J. Edward Jones of New 
York, were not supportive of the API’s plan.60  
 The following day, a committee of fifteen was established.  It consisted of governors’ 
delegates, representatives of the larger oil companies, and the Independents.  To counter 
the committee of fifteen, Jack Blalock and Jubal R. Parten formed the Independent 
Petroleum Association Opposed to Monopoly.  Members of this group controlled 
approximately five to ten percent of the industry’s market share.  Both groups believed that 
it was imperative that they work together to reform the industry or at least develop 
solutions to the industry’s problems, but their methods were wholly distinct.  The 
Committee of fifteen pressed for production controls and reform, while, initially, the 
Independents were somewhat reluctant to make changes to domestic production levels.61          
Policymakers had to deal with the issue of supply and whether it was appropriate to 
reduce the production and shipment of petroleum goods in the United States.62  
Competition among the Independents and industry leaders in the petroleum industry was 
intense.  Each company sought to out-produce the other in efforts to take advantage of the 
national allocation of their commodities.  Petroleum companies in the southwest of the 
United States had to sell a large quantity of their products, because they offered too many 
incentives, such as rebates, coupons and special offers that reduced the oil prices in the 
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private sector.  Most industry leaders, however, feared production controls in the 
petroleum sector while the Independents favored government regulations and 
intervention.    
The Independent petroleum merchants were more than willing to give up some of 
their autonomy in an effort to have more production controls.  They did not approve of an 
unregulated industrial sector, as competition from larger companies undermined their 
plans.  The Independents, who were represented by the Independent Producers 
Association of America (IPA), wanted to promote stability in the petroleum sector.63  If this 
meant curtailing some of their autonomous business practices, then they were more than 
willing and capable.64  The Independents had grown accustomed to state regulations, and 
they understood that the next step—national intervention--would stabilize the oil reserves 
in the national economy.  Interstate commerce in oil was somewhat difficult to police and 
to sanction behavior when violations did occur.  Moreover, there were many wells in the 
United States that led to problems of excess supply.  For example, Texas contained 15,000 
wells, and policymakers believed that it would have taken a numerous amount of state 
officials to bring the production crisis and the resultant situation under control.65  Also, 
Russell Brown who served as general counsel for the IPA was concerned with illegal 
shipments of oil in the United States; because this had the ability to depress the petroleum 
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market, promote excess oil supplies nationwide, and reduce the profitability of smaller 
companies in the petroleum sector.66       
In an effort to handle the crisis in oil, policymakers introduced the Marland-Capper 
Bill in the spring of 1933 that was intended to regulate the petroleum industry and its 
production process.67  It was introduced by Congressman Ernest W. Marland and Senator 
Arthur Capper on May 19, 1933.68  Ernest W. Marland was the director of the API and a 
member of the oil industry, while Senator Arthur Capper was a petroleum industry 
consultant and policymaker.  The bill would have established national production quotas, 
and placed limits on oil importation, and raised prices for petroleum products.  The bill, 
some petroleum sector leaders argued, would have overregulated the oil industry, because 
the power to regulate oil was given to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes.  The 
production quotas devised by the Federal government thus would have been legally 
binding.  If petroleum companies had disobeyed the laws, then the companies would have 
faced federal fines and penalties.   
Petroleum industry leaders were divided over this proposal.  Although many felt 
that regulations were needed, opposition from oil companies may have been the central 
reason why the bill failed in Congress.69  With the introduction of the NIRA, policymakers 
and oil men supported this law over Marland-Capper.  They were more willing to follow the 
letter of the law under the NIRA, because they believed that systematic production and 
price controls were necessary to handle excess supply issues and increase profitability.   
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With the introduction of the NIRA, policymakers and oil men abandoned the 
Marland-Capper bill.  They were more willing to follow the letter of the law under the NIRA, 
because of the need to regulate production and control prices.70  During this period, the 
NRA industry board was established to police the oil industry.  Many independent oil 
producers that had favored Marland-Capper argued that the industry needed regulations 
and sanctions.  The NRA’s code-making machinery was only a step in the right direction.  
Normally, it was the independent producers that favored government intervention while 
the multinational corporations were against the NRA.  Larger companies and smaller 
refineries were not intent to adhere to state regulations and laws to control the shipment of 
oil products throughout the United States.  Small refineries in the Southwest and Southern 
California and East Texas may not have been in favor of the NRA and its code-making 
authority.  The Independent group, Association Opposed to Monopoly, believed that 
overproduction was not problematic in the petroleum industry, but the emergence of 
monopolies in any industry was not conducive to a strong national economy.71  The 
organization argued for strong anti-trust laws that protected the small producers and 
industry leaders.   
In June 1933, after the passage of the NRA, one hundred industry leaders for the 
petroleum industry met in Chicago to devise the NRA oil code.72  At the conference, the 
members of the oil industry lessened their opposition to overall government controls; but 
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negotiators on both sides of the table failed to establish production levels for their industry.  
Wirt Franklin from the Independent Petroleum Association argued for price adjustment 
strategies and unilateral production and shipment levels.  He was supported by Harry 
Sinclair, E.B. Reeser of the Barnsdall Corporation, and Judge Amos Beaty of Phillips 
Petroleum.  Other Petroleum industry leaders such as Judge C.B. Ames, chairman of the 
Board of Texaco, worried that price controls may affect negatively profit capabilities.  
Production controls may have increased oil prices and led to the strengthening of prices 
among their companies.  With price quotas, further regulations became unnecessary.  
However, R.G.A. van der Woude, president of Shell Petroleum Corporation, argued that 
price and production controls favored the consumer.  They were detrimental to the 
industry, because prices would become fixed and cost ineffective.  He believed that 
industry leaders would lose money, because prices would be frozen at a certain level.73   
Price and production controls would have limited the ability of oil companies in the 
United States from adjusting the prices of their commodities.74  This economic strategy was 
proposed during the initial stages of the debate and discussion regarding the oil code.75  If 
the federal government regulated the prices of oil products, then the petroleum industry 
might lose control over the determination of the prices for their products.  Corporate 
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executives would have become dependent upon the authority of government officials.76   
Corporations were able to work on their day-to-day operations, but the absence of price 
and production controls might have prevented American corporations from establishing 
middle to long-term strategies without the assistance and guidance of federal, state and 
local officials.  This was a problem for oil industry executives, but big businesses benefited 
the most from the implementation of the NIRA.77  Big business profited from the NIRA 
because they had a greater ability to control production and oil shipments nationwide.  
They may have also had more oil contracts for shipments to filling stations in the United 
States and may have had a monopoly within the petroleum sector.  Some big businesses 
also were frowned upon because on occasion, they made illegal shipments of petroleum 
that were above oil transportation limits and standards.  
At the conference, policymakers and industry leaders created the Chicago Code, 
which established a domestic committee of fifty-four industry leaders to gather petroleum 
statistics, and other information, so that production levels could be charted and sound 
policies devised.78  Industry leaders understood their market demand within the petroleum 
sector, and this information assisted in developing petroleum controls.  On June 26, 1933, 
the board of directors of the API approved the Chicago Code at a meeting in New York City’s 
Roosevelt Hotel.79      
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The debate between the NRA officials, independent refiners and major companies at 
the NRA code conference was over price and production controls.  During the negotiation 
process, a price adjustment code was established by the Independents; but leaders from 
the American Petroleum Institute had approved the Chicago code.  The Chicago code 
stipulated that multinational corporations and big oil associations could disapprove of 
price stabilization measures at future hearings.80  The Independents favored the Interior 
Department’s role in the decision-making processes for the petroleum industry and felt 
that Secretary Harold Ickes should serve as an industrial oil czar.81  Gulf Oil, Dutch Shell, 
Standard Oil of Indiana, and Standard Oil of New Jersey were against the price control 
provisions of the oil code.  Both sides debated these two codes, because there was some 
speculation that supply levels would be reduced with production controls, and petroleum 
would become too expensive.82  Both sides speculated about whether cheap sources of oil 
would decline or become non-existent.   
Many believed that the large oil producers benefited from the production controls, 
because they generated more revenue from the higher prices and had the capacity to store 
more oil for future needs.  When the public hearings were held in July 1933, there was 
much disagreement over what the oil provisions should contain.  At the public hearings, the 
Association Opposed to Monopoly and the Independents fought over the issue of price 
regulations.  The Association Opposed to Monopoly proposed stronger anti-trust laws even 
though Independents and major companies were in favor of production controls and price 
regulation.  Both sides from the petroleum industry leaders were concerned about 
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government regulations and interference; and felt that they would lose control of their 
business practices.83  The federal and state entities, it would become clear, had to work 
together to develop a common ground for which all industry leaders could adhere.84  
The conflict between both industry groups became so acute that General Hugh S. 
Johnson decided to bypass them by proposing and writing an oil code himself.85  He sought 
to write a code that could be approved by industry leaders, not just the various 
organizations.  He presented this proposal at the Washington, D.C., conference on July 31, 
1933.  General Johnson wanted the cooperation of major companies, such as Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, Sun Oil and members of the API.  His code reflected the interests of major 
multinational corporations in the establishment of production controls.  Many small 
companies argued that the production controls led to their bankruptcy, but it did not 
matter to General Johnson, who contended that members of the oil industry had to make 
sacrifices and establish austerity programs.  The only provision of his code that benefited 
small refiners was their ability to go before a local board to press for changes if the 
production controls proved detrimental to their business operations.86   
A federal board would establish state production levels based upon national 
statistics, and oil men could negotiate their production levels with government officials.87  
Johnson disapproved of price controls inherent in the Chicago code.  He accepted instead 
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the position of the major companies that opposed this provision.88  Johnson believed that 
maximum price adjustments were necessary to prevent an exponential increase in the 
demand and prices for oil commodities.  On the whole, however, he believed that minimum 
standards were not essential to the oil industry. 89   
Because of the oil code impasse, Secretary Harold Ickes from the Interior 
Department stepped in and devised a code that contained price controls.90  He hoped to 
negotiate between the two sides and reach a definite conclusion.  Johnson did not take 
Ickes’ intervention well.  He decided to rework his proposal and included a slight price 
adjustment scheme in his new code.  As he wrote, “a ratio of 18.5 to 1 between gasoline and 
crude petroleum prices was proposed and equally important, the president was given 
discretionary power to fix the minimum wholesale price for gasoline.”91  The new proposed 
code caused even more controversy, because the opponents argued that lower petroleum 
and gasoline prices destroyed profits and the industry as a whole.92 
In mid-August 1933, both General Johnson and Ickes presented their proposals to 
President Roosevelt at the White House.  Both sides of the negotiations became 
increasingly belligerent.  Johnson’s code was accepted by the majority of the oil industry, 
even though both sides were dissatisfied.  Still, the Texas Railroad Commission wanted to 
maintain their immense powers over production controls.  They were not inclined to have 
a separate federal agency dictate to them how they should exercise their authority over the 
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oil production decision-making process in their state.  Roosevelt listened to their protests, 
and they retained their power.  However, the new code did not have any anti-trust 
stipulations that small producers and the Association Opposed to Monopoly had 
demanded.93   
In the end, both the small refiners and the Association Opposed to Monopoly 
refused to sign onto the final code.   Thus, the oil code was not a triumph for the Roosevelt 
administration.  The code did, however, win some approval from Gulf, Shell Union, 
Standard of Indiana, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, Sun Oil, Atlantic Refining, Mid-
Continent, Ohio Oil, Magnolia and General Petroleum.94  The petroleum industry remained 
divided.  The oil code was not popular, but served as a compromise between the parties 
represented at the hearings and conferences.   
On August 19, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the Petroleum code.  It contained 
many provisions that regulated the oil industry and promised to stabilize production and 
prices.95  On August 29, 1933, President Roosevelt appointed Harold Ickes, the Secretary of 
the Interior, as the chief administrator for policing and managing the petroleum code.96  
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This was important, because General Johnson was not given this responsibility.  His role in 
negotiating the code and his support of certain factions undermined the president’s ability 
to lead the NRA in regulating the petroleum industry.  Although Roosevelt selected the 
Department of the Interior to administer to the petroleum industry, Johnson did not argue.  
Historically, the Department of the Interior controlled federal oil reserves and this 
provided Roosevelt with legal precedent to make this decision.  Additionally, precedence 
had given control over oil to the Interior Secretary.  The Petroleum Administration Board 
(PAB) was established under the umbrella of the Interior Department, and Roosevelt 
selected industry leaders to form a fifteen member Planning and Coordination Committee 
(P&CC) to represent the American firms in the petroleum industry.97  Even with the signing 
of the petroleum code, there were still some oil proponents and opponents to price and 
production controls.  Ickes had to continuously deal with this issue for and against whether 
price or production controls were satisfactory and beneficial to the oil sector. 
 The petroleum code established maximum weekly work hours of no more than 
forty for employees involved in oil drilling, production, refinery and pipe-line operators.98  
The remaining employees, with the exception of executives, supervisors, and their staff 
members and pumpers on stripper wells, could work no more than “seventy-two hours in 
any 14 consecutive days or no more than sixteen hours in any two consecutive days.”  
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Depending upon the region in which employees lived, minimum wages were established 
between forty-five to fifty-two cents per hour for most workers.99  Refinery and pipeline 
workers were to be paid, depending upon the states in which they lived in the amounts 
between forty-two to forty-seven cents per hour.  All in all, most employees could earn 
about 12.50 to 15.00 dollars per week depending upon their location.100  Next, child labor 
was prohibited.  Any adolescent under the age of sixteen could not become employed in the 
petroleum industry.101   
Article III, section (1) of the petroleum code was another important provision, 
because it placed limits on production supplies.  This stipulation had been a serious issue 
among industry leaders and the Senate during the negotiation process for the NIRA.102  
Only 100,000 barrels of oil could be produced daily.  Approval from the president was 
required for all estimates of production figures and the distribution or allocation of 
petroleum products throughout the country.  Limits were placed on the shipment of 
petroleum products as well.  The Petroleum code established quotas for each state that 
were to be administered by government officials, and agencies were to be created when 
executive staff members were not present.  With production and shipment levels, the base 
price for gasoline was to be established through executive agencies.  The production and 
shipment quotas, along with the creation of a base price for gasoline, were important 
provisions, because many industry leaders and Congressional members believed that the 
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emergency crisis of the petroleum industry was due to cut-throat pricing and 
overproduction.103  Rebates and other incentives in transactions were prohibited, because 
they led to unfair competition among refiners and filling stations.104   
Members of the petroleum industry did not want regulations, but stipulations in the 
petroleum code were needed by an industry in crisis.  The Petroleum code was not written 
to regulate trade unionism and collective bargaining, but to address the issues of 
production and price stability.  In this code, gas and service stations were regulated; and 
employees could only work limited hours at those establishments.  Gas station owners and 
employees were subjected to minimum wage standards, which were put in place to 
improve the standards of living and purchasing power of all Americans.105   
With the passage of the oil code, the NRA created the Planning and Coordination 
Committee that established eight subcommittees, such as the statistical, production, 
refinery, marketing, accounting, labor, adjustment and transportation committees for the 
petroleum industry.  These committees were organized to work with the petroleum 
industry to ensure their compliance with the oil code.  They were given the responsibility 
to work on the planning aspects of the oil industry and promote fair practices.  This 
ensured that all members of the petroleum industry could profit and earn revenue from 
                                                           
103 Special, “Crude Oil Output at Record in 1934,” New York Times, February 22, 1935. This article acknowledges 
that, although the petroleum code enumerated production levels, over 3,700 wells in Texas drilled a substantial 
amount of oil.  The production controls may not have worked; Special, “Oil Industry Achieving Stability, Says Ickes, 
Reviewing Progress in Year’s Federal Rule,” New York Times, July 11, 1934. 
104 Special, “Ickes Sets Price of Oil at $1.11,” New York Times, October 17, 1933.  Victor H. Scales, “Oil Industry 
Faces Hopeful New Year,” New York Times, January 7, 1934. 
105 Box # 6, Accession # 52, NRA Literature, Bills, Codes, The Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, 
From the Collection of the Henry Ford, Benson Ford Research Center, The Henry Ford. 
261 
 
 
 
NRA guidelines that had been seen as a necessary part of rectifying the economic 
emergencies from the Great Depression.106 
As the code negotiations in the Petroleum industries were taking place, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt gave a radio address on July 24, 1933, at the White House.107  He argued 
that industry leaders and policymakers were working together initially to combat the 
credit crunch that occurred from the Banking Crisis.  These same individuals were 
establishing the codes of fair competition to reform the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors.  Credit had become sound, and policymakers worked on improving employment 
conditions in the industrial sector.  Roosevelt contended that ninety percent of monetary 
resources had been returned to American citizens, who maintained saving and checking 
accounts.  This was an important step in the right direction for economic solvency.  It was 
essential to improve the purchasing power of all American workers in the marketplaces of 
the United States.  It enabled Americans to acquire consumer goods and participate in the 
national economy, because of the restoration of high levels of disposable income.   
In his radio address, Roosevelt also mentioned that more than three hundred 
thousand American men had been put to work following the adoption of the NIRA and the 
AAA.  Further, more than three billion dollars had been earned in wages by those who had 
been put back to work.  The wages earned by the principal breadwinners contributed to the 
federal government’s revenue and taxation and grants could be used for public workers.  
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This would lead to a business cycle in which wages could be reallocated from the private to 
public sectors. 
Arguing that for many years, Americans had to worry about prices for consumer and 
primary goods and high unemployment levels.  President Roosevelt pointed to the passage 
and implementation of the NIRA and the AAA as a means to address these problems.  The 
forces that hampered the industrial and agricultural recovery were being addressed.  With 
the enactment of the NIRA, child labor had been curtailed, and unemployment levels had 
been reduced, because the jobs that children maintained in the labor market could be given 
to adult men and women.108    By 1934, policymakers, such as Dr. Ruth W. Ayres of the 
Consumer Advisory Board of the NRA and corporate executives from the petroleum 
industry, argued that oil prices at refineries had increased by 114 percent and were about 
127 percent above the session lows in the national economy.109  The NIRA and the codes of 
fair competition that NRA officials negotiated had altered the national and even the global 
economy, as many other nations were following the lead of the United States.   
Roosevelt in his radio address gave credit to the Presidential Reemployment 
Agreement.  The PRA was a blanket code that many industrial leaders and corporate 
executives had signed before the establishment of specific industry codes.  The PRA was 
important, because “it got the ball rolling” for many corporations in the various industries 
that used it as a starting point for their industrial reforms.110  The PRA served to establish 
rudimentary codes so that American corporations could begin to reform their business 
practices.  Corporations, such as General Motors Corporation, supported the NIRA and they 
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were more than happy to sign the PRA so that the industrial emergency could be 
resolved.111            
The automobile industry was among the most significant targets to the NRA.  The 
Great Depression had proven to be a devastating blow for the automobile industry.  In 
1929, the automobile industry produced five million vehicles; by 1933, the number had 
dropped to 1.3 million cars manufactured annually.112  Detroit, which was the center of the 
automobile industry, was a city without a prominent relief program for its citizens.  It 
suffered from one of the highest unemployment rates in the United States.  Thus, it came as 
no surprise that, with the oil code in place, the NRA began to focus its attention on the 
automobile code.  One problem that the NRA faced was that the Big Three, especially Ford 
Motor Company, was disinterested in the code process.  Henry Ford believed in “self-help 
and self-reliance,” and he was against the regulation of the automobile industry.113  Henry 
Ford did not want new government regulations to change his company’s practices.  In 
1933, Ford Motor Company was approximately thirty years old.  Ford did not want to lose 
control over his business operations, if he signed onto a proposed automobile code.114  
During the early years of the Great Depression, however, Ford Motor Company experienced 
a “total net loss of over $ 107 million between 1931 and 1932 alone.115  Overall, the 
automobile industry had performed fairly well in the national economy in comparison with 
other industrial sectors up to 1929.  Its only concession to joint regulation was under the 
                                                           
111 Arthur B. Adams, Our Economic Revolution:  Solving Our Depression Problems Through Public Control of Industry 
(Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), 115-116. 
112 Doris B. Laughlin, Michigan Labor, 101. 
113 Sidney A. Fine, The Automobile under the Blue Eagle:  Labor, Management and the Automobile Manufacturing 
Code (Ann Arbor:  The University of Michigan Press, 1963), 75.  Sidney Fine, “Ford Motor Company and the N.R.A.,” 
357. 
114 Sidney Fine, “Ford Motor Company and the N.R.A.,” Business History Review 32, no. 4 (Winter 1958):  355; Ted 
Morgan, FDR, 401-402. 
115 Sidney Fine, “Ford Motor Company and the N.R.A.,” 356. 
264 
 
 
 
policies of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, to which Henry Ford did not 
belong.116   
With the creation of the NRA, most automobile industry leaders worried about the 
NRA code process.  What if individual companies refused to accept the auto code and the 
entire industry was not on the same page?  Members of the Automobile industry wondered 
what Henry Ford would do if they approved an industry code to which he did not 
consent.117  The automobile industry was accustomed to the open shop and company 
unions.118   
In May 1933, the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC) President 
Alvan Macauley considered the National Industrial Recovery Act and how it would affect 
the automobile industry.  He then started the negotiation process.119  The organization 
decided to propose codes for the automobile industry and report their findings to President 
Roosevelt and General Johnson.  Alvan Macauley announced that Edsel Ford, who served as 
President of the Lincoln division, would join the committee in May 1933.  Alfred P. Sloan, 
Jr., of GM, became the committee’s chairman.120  However, on June 21, 1933, after some 
consideration, Edsel Ford appointed Herman L. Moekle, who served in Ford’s auditing 
department, to join the NACC and represent Ford Motor Company in the negotiation 
process.121    
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There were eight versions of the automobile code that the National Automobile 
Chamber of Commerce worked on.  Section 7(a), which was included in the code, was 
reworked so that there would be the continuation of the open shop.122  Auto leaders were 
concerned with Ford Motor Company.  They believed that assurances were necessary, in 
case, Henry Ford decided to disapprove of the automobile codes.  On the whole, however, 
the auto companies resisted collective bargaining guarantees. 
Consequently, on June 22, Johnson had a telephone conversation with Henry 
Ford;123 and on June 24, 1933, Johnson flew to Detroit to have a conference with Henry and 
Edsel Ford.  Johnson believed that diplomacy was the answer to the potential crisis in the 
automobile sector during the code process.  Ford Motor Company had pioneered a high 
living wage and reduced work hours.  Johnson believed that Ford could find some common 
ground in the proposed automobile code.  Henry and Edsel Ford, however, opposed any 
provision in the industry code based on section 7(a).   
At the meeting, Johnson was given the impression that Ford would accept the 
automobile code; or, as John Kennedy Ohl pointed out, he would “play ball with the NRA.”  
This turned out to be wrong.  Henry Ford did not participate in the final discussions.  He 
had “second thoughts” about the NRA and specifically opposed section 7(a) of the NIRA, 
because of what it meant to the open shop.  Henry and Edsel Ford sought to implement a 
                                                           
122 W.B. Francis, “Open Shop Fight Due,” Los Angeles Times, September 9, 1933.  In the automobile code, there 
contained a merit clause and in the end, this industry was the only sector to maintain this type of provision.  In 
later discussions with other industries, Johnson would not compromise on this controversial proposal.  He did not 
agree to include this clause in future negotiations with other industrial sectors; Special, “Open Shop Plea Made,” 
Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1933.  Long after the automobile code had been approved, some industry leaders 
viewed the Labor Advisory Board with contempt, because they felt that the agency did not compromise enough on 
the merit clause.  The merit clause stipulated that a person could be hired, promoted or fired based upon their 
work record; Special, “Reorganization of NRA Scheduled by Johnson,” Los Angeles Times, September 1, 1933.  Even 
after the adoption of the merit clause in the automobile code, the Labor Advisory Board continued to scrutinize it 
and viewed it as a detriment to the American worker. 
123 Sidney A. Fine, The Automobile under the Blue Eagle, 76. 
266 
 
 
 
merit clause that was to replace the closed shop.  The merit clause would have rewarded 
workers for their exemplary on-the-job service and performance.  Ford did not want to sign 
on to anything that eliminated the open shop conditions in his plants.124  Section 7(a), in 
Henry Ford’s opinion, meant that organized labor would begin to represent factory 
workers and establish a relationship with management that was detrimental to the 
interests of Ford Motor Company.  Ford further worried about price and production 
controls, and felt that they were bad for business.   
On July 25, 1933, Henry and Edsel Ford discontinued their participation in the 
automobile code-making negotiations.  They did not travel to Washington, D.C., to present 
the final code to General Hugh Samuel Johnson.   At this time, industry leaders and trade 
unions had organized a meeting to confirm the details of final code before it was sent to 
Washington, D.C., to receive the approval of Johnson and President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.125  One of the major companies, however, stood opposed to any code.      
To finalize the automobile code, Johnson flew back to Detroit and held conferences 
with the National Auto Chamber of Commerce on July 27 and 28.126  Johnson directly 
addressed industry leaders at the General Motors Headquarters on July 28.  He was 
determined to not undergo the same problems that he had faced with them in 1917.  In 
1917, for the War Industries Board, General Johnson had to fight with industry leaders 
from the automobile industry regarding military production.  He hoped to avoid a similar 
confrontation with them in 1933 during the approval process for the automobile code.  
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Johnson tried to overcome Ford Motor Company’s objections to section 7(a), which might 
have laid the groundwork for collective bargaining in the automobile industry.  Edsel Ford 
tried to convince Johnson to maintain the open shop and to eliminate the section 7(a) 
provision from the automobile code.127  Ford felt that Section 7(a) was not needed in the 
code.  Organized labor was not necessary to the automobile industry and especially not at 
Ford Motor Company.128  Sidney Fine, in his important work, quoted Henry Ford: 
He (Henry Ford) made better bargains for his men than any labor organizer could.  
We have bargained for our men; we have never been compelled to bargain against 
them, nor they against us.129   
In his meetings with leaders from the automobile industry, General Johnson tried to 
assuage their fears and persuade them that he was not attempting to promote the interests 
of organized labor, instead of the open shop.  He argued that collective bargaining meant 
that representatives negotiated with industry leaders for workers’ rights and benefits that 
became the norm with the acceptance of the code.  The Big Three could still talk to workers 
on a separate and individual basis.  Employee representatives did not always have to be 
present for the negotiations or discussions on the code and industry conditions.  With these 
new interpretations of section 7(a), the auto leaders accepted the code; and General Hugh 
Samuel Johnson returned to Washington, D.C., to examine the preliminary document.130  
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Henry Ford refused to accept any codes that were provided to him, but Johnson felt that 
one day he would change his mind.131   
On August 1, 1933, Robert W. Lea was assigned as the deputy administrator for 
discussions regarding the automobile code.  It was his job, in the conferences and other 
NRA hearings, to negotiate with the automobile associations, industry leaders and 
governmental personnel.132  Lea was knowledgeable.  He had served as a president of an 
automobile company and had been an employee of the Moline Plow Company.  He was a 
business leader that became a public servant during the New Deal era.  The practice of 
business leaders working for the federal government had been a traditional form of public 
service and a way for corporate executives to give back to the community.  It also meant 
that business had a strong hand in shaping NRA codes and practices.   
On August 24, 1933, General Johnson met again with the National Automobile 
Chamber of Commerce.  As a result of his meetings, Section 7(a) was reinterpreted to mean 
that there would not be the dis-continuation of the open shop but a merit provision was 
added to the code.133  On August 26, General Johnson submitted the Automobile code for 
the president’s approval.134  On August 27, Roosevelt signed and approved the code.   
With the emergence of the automobile code, Henry Ford knew that he had to adhere 
to the code regulations even if they did not contain his signature.135  The prospect of 
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government oversight worried Ford immensely, because he did not agree with the 
provisions about price and production controls or collective bargaining.136  Moreover, 
because Ford did not sign the code, his business did not earn the Blue Eagle designation.  
Without the Blue Eagle, the Federal government was no longer obligated to purchase Ford 
vehicles for public business.137  Ford’s refusal to sign on could have hurt the business 
operations of the Ford Motor Company.  
Another reason that prevented Henry Ford from signing the automobile code was 
that the proposal was devised to regulate employment levels in the automotive industry.  
Ford made the crucial decisions for the company, and he believed that the code would force 
him to adhere to public sector standards that may not have been entirely in favor of Ford 
Motor Company.  Thus, Ford Motor Company did not obtain the Blue Eagle Seal that would 
have legitimated its business practices.  At the same time, Henry Ford complied with the 
code even though this aspect would have regularized or probably altered employment 
levels at his firm.138  The provision implied that there would be a stoppage of work for the 
autumn introduction of new models, but Ford, GM and the other automobile workers 
would have to establish employment practices in which employees worked all year.  Henry 
Ford, Alfred Sloan, Jr., and others acknowledged that there was some down time 
throughout the year of automobile production.  Corporate executives wanted to ensure 
their workers that, with limited weekly work hours, more individual employees could be 
hired and work alongside their colleagues.   
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By January 31, 1935, amendment 5 of the automobile code did more to eliminate 
production breaks in the previous months; and the automobile sector was more prepared 
for new vehicle production the following year.139  Further, the automobile code regularized 
employment levels in the automotive industry and auto workers could spread out the 
hours in which they worked throughout the year.      
The automobile code was not as expansive as the petroleum codes as signed by 
Roosevelt.140  The auto code established minimum wage standards for auto employees 
depending upon region.141  Those employees who lived in heavily populated areas received 
higher weekly wages.  If employees lived in a city that contained more than 500,000 
inhabitants, for example, then they could earn fifteen dollars per week.142  White collar 
automobile employees were to have a weekly schedule of no more than 40 hours with the 
exception of a period of two weeks during every six months for inventory purposes.  Auto 
workers were to labor no more than six days per week, or 48 hours in one week.  The NRA 
and the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce understood that production was 
subjected to peaks and slowdowns, because of the issue of supply and demand for vehicles 
throughout the year.  Both parties were determined to establish level work hours and 
eliminate child labor for those below sixteen years of age.   
  Once the automobile code had been approved, Henry Ford drew criticism for his 
failure to support the NRA.  Many citizens wrote to the NRA members that Ford was a 
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traitor and that his company was against the spirit and breadth of the NRA.  He was even 
called a “snake in the grass.”  Henry Ford’s refusal to sign the automobile code may have 
tarnished his reputation as a great industrialist and automotive icon for the American 
people but, Ford did have some public supporters.  Some argued that the NRA was 
behaving poorly to the “Nation’s Greatest Benefactor.”   
Some business leaders supported Ford, because he was standing up against 
extensive government regulation that they felt destroyed the national economy.  Among 
public opinion, some thought that the Federal government should sanction the actions of 
Henry Ford; but others felt that he would be affected by the fact that none of his newly 
developed cars had the Blue Eagle seal.  This alone would be bad for his business, because 
it would cost him money if sales declined exponentially.  If companies adhered to the NRA, 
then they received the Blue Eagle, which legitimated their business transactions.  General 
Johnson tried to illustrate to Henry and Edsel Ford, that if they did not have the Blue Eagle, 
then they could not conduct or transact business in the United States.143   
As a result, General Johnson was adamant that if Ford would not comply with 
governmental regulations, then the Federal government would cease to purchase his cars 
and trucks.  Johnson found precedent for his actions in the Executive Order 6246 of August 
10, 1933, which stated the following: 
The recipients of government contracts were to comply with the applicable 
provisions of the code of their industry or trade or if their trade was un-codified, 
with the terms of the President’s Reemployment Agreement.144  
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One problem that Henry Ford did face was that he had signed the Presidential Re-
employment Act (PRA).  The Presidential Re-employment Act was a blanket, or universal, 
code of fair competition that corporations signed before the NRA industry codes were 
established.145  The PRA sought to handle the financial crisis by the improving the 
purchasing powers of Americans, lower unemployment levels, and “restore” the business 
and industrial sectors.146  The Ford Motor Company was in partial compliance with the 
laws, because it did not approve of the automobile codes.  But the automobile company was 
a party to the PRA.  While these events transpired, Henry Ford continued to improve upon 
his company’s work environment and employees’ benefits.  On September 5, 1933, in part 
as a response to the NRA, “Ford announced that his employees would receive wage 
increases ranging from $.40 to $1.00 a day.  Ten days later the company made it known that 
employment would be given to 5,000 Wayne County veterans.”147  Would the federal 
sanctions stand, especially after these Ford improvements?148   
Ford Dealer R.P. Sabine of the Northwest Motor Company of Bethesda, Maryland, 
decided to test the waters.149  The Commerce Department and NRA were troubled, because 
Sabine was the lowest bidder on many government contracts.  Initially, President Roosevelt 
and General Johnson, as well as members of the Labor and Commerce departments, did not 
give in to Sabine, who was an independent Ford Dealer.  Although Ford Motor Company did 
not sign the automobile code, Sabine’s dealership supported the dealer code.  Sabine also 
                                                           
145 Colin Gordon, New Deals:  Business, Labor, and Politics in America (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 174. 
146 Franklin D. Roosevelt:  “The President’s Reemployment Agreement,” July 27, 1933.  Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/we/?pid=14492.  
(accessed March 13, 2015). 
147 Sidney Fine, “The Ford Motor Company and the N.R.A.,” 363. 
148 “Ford Compliance on Code Claimed,” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1933. 
149 Detroit Bureau, “Ford Motor Co.,” Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1933. 
273 
 
 
 
argued that his business was different from that of Ford Motor Company.  Their business 
operations had been independent and separate.  Sabine was a corporate entity that sold 
Ford vehicles.  
While the debate and struggle between the Ford dealers-principal and the federal 
government ensued, Lewis Lorwin of the Brookings Institution argued that there was 
significant strike activity in the fall of 1933 at Ford plants, such as in Edgewater, New 
Jersey.150  The Automobile industry was deeply troubled by this occurrence, because it 
suffered from decreased automotive production and sales.  The automobile code did not 
curtail workers from fighting for their rights, as the automobile executives struggled with 
indecision and concern that the NIRA might not be the proper course of action.  Further, 
according to Historian Irving Bernstein, in many industrial sectors, several million work 
hours were lost to strike activity.151  Were workers disappointed with the actions of their 
colleagues and management or did they seek economic change and social justice?  Most 
employees felt that collective bargaining was a must for the promotion of social, industrial 
and economic change. 
On October 28, 1933, Sabine contacted the Comptroller General J.R. McCarl, because 
his firm did not receive a contract for supplying several hundreds of trucks to the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, although he had been the lowest bidder.152  Sabine commented that his 
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bid had nothing to do with the operations at Ford Motor Company, and he had sought 
approval for the contract for his dealership alone.  Two thousand three hundred vehicles 
were involved in this deal, and the Ford dealership bid was $200,000.153   
On November 10, 1933, the Comptroller General asserted that Ford’s signature on 
the code was not as important as his adherence to the code.  The Ford Motor Company was, 
in fact, in compliance with the code in terms of paying wages to its employees; and Henry 
Ford had already reduced work hours.  He did his best to adhere to code provisions.154  
Compliance enabled Ford Motor Company and its independent vendors to bid for 
government contracts without being sanctioned by the Federal government, even if Henry 
Ford had not signed the code.155 
As a result, as historian Sidney Fine reported, “on December 1, 1933, the Secretary 
of Agriculture Wallace awarded Sabine a contract for over eight hundred trucks for the 
Civilian Conservation Corps.  By March 1, 1934, approximately $1 million in government 
contracts had been granted to Ford dealers.”156  The battle between Ford Motor Company 
and the Federal government was not over.  On March 14, 1934, Roosevelt signed an 
executive order 6646 that stipulated that a certificate of compliance of the industry codes 
was necessary to obtain government contracts.  Sabine was unable to obtain further 
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contracts.  Although he and his dealership complied with the dealers’ code,157  Ford had not 
signed a certificate of compliance.   
The Federal government relented on the executive order some months later, 
because the acquisition of Ford vehicles was more cost-effective.  It is interesting that 
Henry Ford did not agree with the code process, although he was not in violation of the 
industry code.  He followed them to the letter and sought to improve the working 
conditions of his employees.  Throughout this battle between the Roosevelt administration 
and Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor Company witnessed profitability.  Its business 
operations did not suffer from a lack of a Blue Eagle Seal.  Historian Sidney Fine argued 
that: 
Indeed, whereas the Ford Motor Company (including Lincoln) had suffered a net 
loss of $7,888,718 after taxes and accounted for only 21.5 percent of the total new 
passenger cars and truck registrations in the United States in 1933, in 1934 it made 
a profit of $21,362,118 after taxes and increased its percentage of total new car and 
truck registrations to 28.8.158 
Despite Ford’s profitability, there was another battle in May 1934 between 
Northwest Motor Company and the federal government.  The dealer sued the federal 
government, because the latter would not accept the dealership’s contract, even though it 
was the lowest bid for the acquisition of American vehicles.  The Press Digest from May 9, 
1934 stated that the federal judiciary had to decide whether the executive order from April 
1934, that established that bidders for government contracts that operated within the 
codes of fair competition and carried the Blue Eagle Seal, was legally valid and 
constitutional.159  Remember, Northwest Motor Company operated under the code for 
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dealerships, but Ford Motor Company did not sign the automobile code; and the dealership 
sold Ford cars and trucks.  While this case was filed, Henry Ford lost a case against the 
Departments of Interior and Agriculture.  Neither department would consider Ford’s bid 
for vehicles for government personnel.   
Justice Daniel W. O’Donoghue, who served in the District of Columbia, argued that 
Ford was not following the letter of the law, even though he had signed the PRA.160  While 
Henry Ford’s bid was thirty thousand dollars less than Chevrolet, the latter obtained the 
contract.  Ford was dissatisfied with the results of this case, and he appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for a positive settlement.  But in July of 1934, corporate executive at Ford Motor 
Company signed the NRA auto code and this ended the war between Henry and Edsel Ford 
versus General Johnson at the National Recovery Administration.161  Now Ford Motor 
Company was in complete compliance of the auto code. 
Examining General Motors Corporation during this period, industrial conditions 
were somewhat different from the norm.  During the negotiation process for the 
automobile code, President Sloan and General Motors Corporation expressed their 
gratitude and approval for this process.  Moreover, Sloan was supportive of General 
Johnson, because Sloan thought that Johnson would be competent and astute.162  Sloan was 
in favor of the industry codes.163  He believed that higher wages for his employees at 
General Motors Corporation and at other businesses prevented the exploitation from 
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management in the job market.  Sloan decided to work with trade unions, rather than 
against them, even though unionization at his firm had not occurred at this time.164  
Employees benefited from improved wages and this was one reason why he supported the 
codes.   
From 1932 to 1935, General Motors was not faring very well financially.  Sales 
figures for the period were not inspiring.  In 1932, annual sales reached 510,060 vehicles 
while, in 1933, General Motors experienced some improvements in the sense that it sold 
755,778 to consumers.165  In November of 1932, General Motors did not sell more than 
12,780 cars; and the situation did not improve until November of 1933, when General 
Motors sold 35,417 cars.  The shift in car sales may have caused Sloan to favor the NIRA 
and the industry codes that were established in August 1933.  He believed that the industry 
would perform better with the codes in place, even though he refused to negotiate with 
unions.   
By examining the sales figures, Sloan and other corporate leaders knew that the 
national economy was in a financial crisis.  Sloan may have thought that the industry codes 
were a step in the right direction for improved economic growth and expansion.  He 
differed from Henry Ford who was not a member of the National Automobile Chamber of 
Commerce; and initially, Ford did not support the automobile code.  Not surprised with the 
passage of the NIRA, Sloan knew that Roosevelt would enact this law.  He was convinced 
that it was the right thing to do for the American people.  The law was important, because 
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by 1933, there were only fifteen automotive leaders in this industry sector and General 
Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation were in the top three 
spots.166   The automotive industry was becoming more competitive with fewer companies 
in operation.  Industry leaders attempted to rely on the Roosevelt administration to devise 
resolutions to this crisis and to improve economic conditions for American workers and 
corporate executives.  
With the passage of the NIRA, Sloan was certain that the industrial crisis would be 
resolved.  He continued to communicate with the leading automakers in the industry and 
coordinate corporate policies to complement the NIRA.  He even became a member of the 
Industrial Advisory Board within the National Recovery Administration.167  Sloan 
attempted to link his corporate practices at General Motors Corporation to the principles 
and policies inherent to the NIRA.  He sought to follow the letter of the law, because he 
believed that Roosevelt was correct in his assertion that the United States was in an 
economic downturn. 
Sloan believed that the NIRA benefited workers, because of the increased wages, 
limited working hours, and corporate incentives that were put in place with the code.168  
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Moreover, he sought the corporate advice of the Business Advisory and Planning Council, 
which was an industrial organization.  This think tank had as members, Gerard Swope of 
General Electric, Walter Teagle of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and Louis Kirstein 
of Federated Department Stores.169  Sloan joined this group, because he was satisfied its 
qualified and important members gave the organization public legitimacy.   Sloan also 
joined the Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA.  With business leaders joining the NRA, 
many grassroots activists may have felt that the agency promoted big business interests.  
Remember, corporate executives had worked for the WIB during World War I, and it only 
made sense that they would continue in the employ of the NRA.   
Sloan did have some initial reservations when he joined the IAB, because he did not 
approve of the closed shop or in extensive government regulation of industry.  Organized 
labor unions continued to be a problem for his industrial psychology.170  He agreed with 
improving the conditions for workers, but he was concerned with the policies of trade 
unions.  He was not sure if trade unionism worked or whether it benefited American 
workers.   With the NRA, Sloan became pro-active and decided to become a dynamic 
participant in the negotiation process.  He was certain that this law worked.  He differed 
from his colleagues and the National Association of Manufacturers, who believed that this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
economic turnaround.  Lastly, he contended that Americans, in this period, would have to choose between 
government regulations of the national economy or a system of laissez-faire. 
169 David Farber, Sloan Rules, 171-172. 
170 Alfred P. Sloan Jr’s speech entitled “Industry’s Problems” given at the Boston Chamber of Commerce, April 26, 
1934, Alfred P. Sloan Jr,., and Harold Smith Papers and Speeches, Richard P. Scharchburg Archives, Kettering 
University, Flint, Michigan.  This speech highlights Sloan’s opposition to trade unionism as promoted by the NRA.  
He believed that it would be difficult to interpret how workers would respond to their new industrial rights, such 
as section 7(a), which provided for the emergence of collective bargaining in the United States.  Moreover, he 
wondered how Roosevelt would implement this new policy and what the actions of his workers would be in 
response to collective bargaining.  Sloan argued for the continuation of company unions or employment 
representation plans, while he stated that Roosevelt did not provide corporate executives with clear procedures to 
implicate section 7(a).  
280 
 
 
 
new law was harmful to American workers.  He was not suspicious of the law, but he had to 
overcome the disapproval of his colleagues.171   
Over time, Sloan did have some reservations about the NRA.  He became 
disappointed with the agency.  He also felt somewhat disappointed, because of the 
unsuccessful efforts to devise sound industry strategies and policies.  Sloan tried to 
promote competitive industrial policies, but he became convinced that the New Dealers 
would not create legislation or codes that would augment free enterprise and free trade 
globally.  Sloan did not believe in inflationary policies or low wages; but he sought to 
establish an industrial code that served the interests of corporate executives and 
employees.   
During the Great Depression, General Motors Corporation was the only automobile 
company to earn significant levels of profit.  If General Motors was performing well, then 
why did Sloan become so dissatisfied with New Deal politics?172  Initially, he supported the 
NIRA wholeheartedly, but over time, he became disillusioned with the NRA and the tactics 
of government agencies.173  Did he believe that the NRA was attempting to tell automakers 
and other industry leaders how to run their businesses?  This may have been the case.  As 
the months progressed and the NRA regulations did not change the nature of the national 
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economy, Sloan sought to change his industrial outlook and his support shifted to the right.  
He became a supporter of NAM and began to give speeches on behalf of this 
organization.174 
The National Association of Manufacturers was supported by businessmen who 
were conservative and wholly Republican.  Sloan was under the group impression that the 
NRA suppressed industrial competition and penalized corporations, such as GM, that were 
financially independent, stable, and efficient.   Sloan was not pro-labor; but he believed in 
giving workers the benefit of the doubt.  Moreover, he was concerned that politicians were 
not listening to their constituents when they crafted the NIRA and other industrial laws and 
codes. 
In summary, by 1934, Sloan began to part company with the NRA and the IAB.  This 
was important, because initially, he had been supportive of this agency.  Sloan may have 
realized through his efforts with the IAB and other entities that the Roosevelt 
administration could not devise industry codes that regulated successfully the 
manufacturing sectors of the United States.  He may have believed that the NRA was 
attempting to tell corporate executives how to run their businesses, and it may have been 
disconcerting to him.  Sloan differed from Henry Ford and other industry leaders, who 
viewed the NRA with contempt and disdain.  In 1933, Sloan held out hope that Henry Ford 
was wrong in his assertions and that the NRA was a step in the right direction for industry 
leaders.  By 1934, Sloan was overcome with dismay at the policies of the NRA.  It may have 
been the industrial advice that he received from the NRA; and trade unions, which caused 
him to rethink his position.  All in all, Sloan changed his mind and began to support more 
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conservative viewpoints and ideas for General Motors Corporation.  He may have felt that 
this was the only way that he could realize industrial improvements to the national 
economy.  He may have speculated that he could not depend on the Roosevelt 
administration and its efforts to drive the national economy in a positive direction.  
By examining the sources for General Motors Corporation, it is difficult to determine 
why Sloan modified his political views.  Initially, Sloan was supportive of the NRA, but he 
changed his tune in 1934.175  Sloan even became a member of NAM, which opposed any 
federal intervention or regulation of the market.  Moreover, it is impossible to pinpoint 
exactly when Sloan changed his mind or what act of the federal, state, or local authorities 
influenced him to become more conservative. 
All in all, both the petroleum and automobile sectors experienced many industrial 
highs and lows in the 1920s and 1930s.  The oil and automobile industries’ code 
negotiation processes also reveal the difficulty of talks between the NRA and industry 
leaders.  The normal process that industry leaders and the NRA had to take in order to 
receive approval for the codes was not the same for different industries nor did they 
always follow protocol.  General Johnson had to take extraordinary steps during the 
negotiation process for both oil and auto industries.  He realized that the process would not 
be easy.  The oil industry was concerned with the pricing of their commodities as well as 
the production process and levels.  Small refiners did not have the same profitability as the 
larger multinational corporations.  Both entities were afraid that the NRA and its codes 
would be bad for business.  However, change was necessary in order to mitigate the effects 
of the national economic emergency.  Oil prices were too low, and many petroleum 
                                                           
175 Hal Foust, “Sloan Visions Threat in NRA Labor Rules,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 2, 1934. 
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companies were concerned with maintaining their profitability.  Thus, policymakers, 
scholars and corporate executives asked themselves whether the industry codes prevented 
economic growth or expansion.  The industry codes led to the emergence of highly 
regulated industries, but corporate executives had to determine for themselves if the codes 
were effective in bringing about economic change and sustained growth. 
The automobile industry underwent the same process.  Industry leaders worried 
about the effects that the closed shop had on prices and the sales of their products.  Henry 
Ford also protested vehemently against the automobile code, because he did not want to 
lose control over the business operations of Ford Motor Company.  Would overregulation 
and collective bargaining destroy his business?  Henry Ford believed in the open shop and 
disagreed with policymakers and organizational think-tanks, such as the Brookings 
Institution, that sought to include Section 7(a) in the automobile code.   
The automobile code would have altered the relationships that management had 
with its workers.  Workers for the Big Three would have been represented during the 
negotiation process for wages and workers’ benefits.  If they were represented by an 
outside party, such as a trade union, then workers would gain access to information about 
labor policies from their union representative.  This would have enabled them to 
understand their rights.  The industry leaders may have felt that the information that 
workers received would have been harmful to their corporate practices and policies.  
General Johnson, however, worried about radicalism among trade unions.  He did not 
believe in the strike, but he approved of collective bargaining; because he fostered a 
professional environment between workers and management.  In many ways, Henry Ford 
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and General Johnson had these principles in common.  The NRA reflected Johnson’s 
positions. 
It is also important to note that during and after the negotiations for the automobile 
code, both General Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company encountered some labor 
difficulties.  General Motors had to contend with the Flint, Michigan sit-down strikes 
conducted by over three hundred hourly workers at Fisher Body and Chevrolet plants.176  
Ford Motor Company was subjected to the Edgewater crisis in New Jersey where over one 
thousand men participated in demonstrations.177  In terms of the 1933 automobile strikes 
at Ford Motor Company plants, Henry Ford placed the blame on bankers and other 
financial managers.178  Both events occurred in the 1930s when there were efforts to 
cement trade unionism in terms of the recognition of the United Auto Workers in the 
automobile sector.  General Motors also faced strike activity at seventeen plants in the 
United States in 1937.  General Motors plants in Indiana, and Missouri are mentioned in 
contemporary newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal.179  The situation throughout the 
country was tense and severe.   
                                                           
176 “CIO Union Assumes Heavy Responsibility in its New Pace with General Motors Corp.,” Wall Street Journal, 
March 15, 1937; “G.M. Strike Settlement Seen As Possible Soon,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1937; C.E. 
Robbins, “G.M. Strike Near End Twice in Past Week,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 1937; “Strike Tension 
Grows,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 1937; “Decision on G.M. Sit-Down Injunction Expected Early Today,” Wall 
Street Journal, February 2, 1937; “New Auto Strikes Lend Dark Aspect to Labor Picture,” Wall Street Journal, April 
2, 1937. 
177 Special Report, “Ford Strike in California,” New York Times, September 29, 1933; “Strike Parley Set for Ford 
Factory,” New York Times, October 19, 1933; Special Report, “3,000 Ford Men Suddenly Strike,” New York Times, 
September 27, 1933. 
178 “Ford Says Bankers Caused Strike,” New York Times, January 28, 1933; Eugene M. Lokey, “Ford Motor Company 
and its Head—Future of Cabinet Secretaries, New York Times, February 5, 1933.  Again, in this article, Henry Ford 
accused bankers for attempting to destroy the business operations at Ford Motor Company by causing strikes and 
other forms of civil disobedience. 
179 “No Action to Revive Motor Strike Parleys Likely for Day or Two,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1937. 
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Most workers had been receptive to Ford Motor Company before the 1930s, because 
Henry and Edsel Ford were noted for improving wages, benefits and limiting weekly work 
hours while Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., negotiated with workers to prevent sanctions and the over-
regulation of the auto industry.  After much political and labor pressures, both Ford Motor 
Company and General Motors Corporation signed the auto codes, but in 1935, when the 
NIRA was declared unconstitutional, both firms experienced some labor and civil 
disobedience as workers began to fight for their rights as employees of multinational 
companies that they felt had the financial resources to improve work conditions and 
benefits.     
The emergence of the NIRA was a watershed in American economic history.  The Big 
Three companies argued that the negotiation process for the codes was without 
precedence.  Industry leaders and NRA officials did not have any laws or statutes that they 
could apply to the propagation of industry codes.  This new intervention probably 
threatened the automobile industry that, unlike the rest of the industries of the national 
economy, was starting to recover in the early 1930s in terms of corporate sales and the 
investment of retained earnings.  Would their business practices be hindered or hampered 
if the codes were approved and came to the forefront?  This was a question that the 
automobile industry did not want to address.  The NIRA was established to target reforms 
to a national emergency in the United States.  Businesses suffered from a lack of economic 
growth and confidence in public officials in the United States, but what about the oil and 
Big Three companies?  Would the Big Three and their vendors become a casualty if they 
adopted the code?  Would it hurt business?  It was a chance that industry leaders did not 
want to take. 
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CHAPTER 8:  OPPOSITION TO THE NRA AND CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURTS 
 
 When Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president, in 1933, many senators, such as 
Key Pittman of Nevada assumed that he would encounter difficulties pushing his public 
agenda.1  Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican senator from Michigan, argued that the 
federal government required a tyrant or dictator who had the capacity, intellect, and 
astuteness to get his initiatives through Congress; but overall, the administration’s One 
Hundred Days required no extraordinary measures.  Historian James T. Patterson, in 
Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, asserted that President Roosevelt and the 
Congressional Democrats were able to pass eleven pieces of legislation, in the early 
months, with only forty hours of debate.  In 1933, the Democratic Party had an 
overwhelming majority, with 311 Democrats to 116 Republicans in the House of 
Representatives while the Senate had 60 Democrats to 35 Republicans.2   
 One problem that Roosevelt faced was that as he signed new legislation into law, he 
encountered more opposition from Southern Democrats.  Southern Anti-New Dealers 
became his enemies and staunch opponents.  Segregationists opposed the broad sweep of 
his programs.  Small government proponents saw the New Deal as overreaching.  Many 
Congressmen were angered by Roosevelt and his success, especially as the Democrats 
pushed his agenda through Congress.  But Congress could not push the New Deal aside, 
because Roosevelt had a political mandate in 1933.  Many Democratic Senators, such as 
Carter Glass of Virginia, Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma, Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, 
                                                           
1 James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal:  The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in 
Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington:  University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 1. 
2 James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 5-6. 
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Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina, and Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia were against the New 
Deal and voted against many of Roosevelt’s legislation.3  As Roosevelt became more 
successful, he experienced backlash from Congress.  After the passage of the Agricultural 
Adjustment and the National Industrial Recovery Acts, he sought to justify their enactment 
and rally support.  Once enacted, the AAA, NIRA and the NRA lost their backers.4  This lack 
of enthusiasm for the NRA caused government officials, such as Donald Richberg and 
General Hugh Samuel Johnson, to travel the country to draw up support from the American 
people.5 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 and the National Recovery 
Administration it created provoked serious controversy in the political and economic 
spheres.6  Although the NIRA had only a two year life-span, it faced much opposition among 
business leaders, especially in the petroleum and automobile sectors; this opposition 
would lead to political and legal challenges.  Passed in response to a national economic 
emergency,7 the NIRA was not easy to enforce:  it restricted some trade and this limited the 
                                                           
3 James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 15-18, 20-29.  For a crucial analysis of the 
impact of the New Deal on African Americans, see Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks:  The Emergence of Civil 
Rights as a National Issue (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1978). 
4 “Dill Urges An End to Recovery Law,” New York Times, September 2, 1934.  Democratic Senator Clarence C. Dill of 
Washington urged that Congress should attempt to nullify the NRA, so that the interference of the federal 
government in the private sector would cease; Special Report, “NIRA Lapse Perils Key Federal Agencies in Event of 
Congress Deadlock Past June 16,” New York Times, May 17, 1935.  Before the NIRA was declared unconstitutional 
in 1935, Congress was deadlocked over whether the law should be renewed.  This indecision would have caused 
the entire law to lapse. 
5 “Johnson Sees Red, Fascist Plans Urged,” Washington Post, May 21, 1934; “Manufacturers Warned,” New York 
Times, July 11, 1933. 
6 Robert R. McCormick, “Assaults Upon the Constitution:  II,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 29, 1953.  
McCormick argued that there was also some controversy surrounding the NIRA and industrial codes for the 
newspaper industry as well.  Any extra regulations or forms of taxation that the federal government imposed upon 
the industry were viewed as a form of a dictatorship or tyranny affecting newspaper reporters and staff. 
7 John Boettiger, “Code for Nation Is Issued,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 21, 1933.  Along with the enactment of 
the NIRA, Roosevelt created the President Reemployment Agreement to serve as the basis or foundation for the 
tentative industrial codes.  Employees and corporate management had to adhere to the PRA before the industry 
codes were signed into law. 
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operations of some businesses.  Conservative Republicans argued that there was an 
absence of precedent that justified the enactment of this law.  Although there was much 
opposition to how the law was enforced, many corporate executives still signed the 
Presidential Re-Employment Agreement and the industrial codes in 1933.   
As the opposition to the NRA grew, chief NRA administrator General Johnson, and 
Donald Richberg, as legal counsel to this organization, struggled to defend the NIRA and the 
role that the NRA played in the recovery.  They were not successful.  Pushback against the 
NRA also prompted Roosevelt to speak to Congress and the American people in support of 
the agency.  Most importantly, legal challenges to the constitutionality of the NIRA 
eventually succeeded.  By mid-1935, the Supreme Court declared the NIRA invalid, on the 
basis of its infringement of the Commerce clause to the Constitution and the due process 
provisions of the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  This chapter will provide 
readers with some of the arguments behind the opposition against the NIRA.  It will look at 
some of the legal arguments for and against this law.  It will discuss whether the NIRA held 
a prominent place in addressing the industrial and economic emergencies present in the 
United States during the Depression decade. 
Shortly after the passage of the NIRA, Alfred E. Smith, four-time New York State 
Governor and Presidential hopeful, criticized the law in a New York Times column.8  He 
argued that the United States had entered a new era in which collectivism and 
governmental regulation had become a mainstay.  The way of life based on American 
                                                           
8 Editorial, “Smith Deprecates the Recovery Act,” New York Times, June 30, 1933; “Smith Questions Legality of 
NRA,” New York Times, November 1, 1933; “Smith Scores Policy,” New York Times, November 25, 1933.  As the 
New Deal progressed, Smith was in opposition to the Roosevelt Administration and he argued that the nation 
suffered from a credit bubble and inflationary pressures; “Al Smith Sees Failure of U.S. Recovery Plan,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, June 30, 1933. 
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Individualism and self-help had passed.  In his commentary, Smith argued that the passage 
of the NIRA marked a new stage in United States’ history.  He questioned whether progress 
was made in the American legal system with the passage of the NIRA, because the law was 
unprecedented.  He argued that if “the terms of the Recovery Act are carried out literally 
the tendency will be to cripple initiative, legalize and even officially encourage monopoly, 
raise prices and require higher tariffs to maintain the new structure.”9  Smith wondered 
whether the limited nationalization of the American economy represented by the NRA was 
a step in the right direction.10  Further, he asked how much nationalization was necessary 
to promote positive change.  Was the establishment of state enterprises the next step?  
Raising the specter of a state-controlled economy, Smith voiced political opposition to the 
core programs of the New Deal.  His stance differed from FDR, who asserted that 
centralized planning and federal regulations were necessary in the private sector to 
address the economic crisis. 
Smith wondered about average citizens and how they were affected by this law.  He 
questioned whether they would be “lost in the shuffle.”  This last point was important, 
because Smith wondered whether ordinary citizens would become active participants in 
the national economy and benefit from the changes in industry laws.  If Americans were 
                                                           
9 Editorial, “Smith Deprecates the Recovery Act,” New York Times, June 30, 1933; Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt 
Glossary, Al Smith, The George Washington University, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/smith-al.cfm. (accessed September 16, 2013).  Smith became 
a leading opponent of the New Deal and was a principal actor in the American Liberty League.  He also began to 
support the Republican party and its members; The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Alfred Smith (1873-1944), George 
Washington University, http://www.gwu/edu/~erpapers/mep/displaydoc.cfm?docid=erpn-alfsmi. (accessed 
September 16, 2013).  Smith did not believe that the New Deal was a valid or constitutional approach to resolving 
the Great Depression. 
10 Obituary, On this Day:  Alfred E. Smith Dies here at 70; 4 Times Governor, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1230.html. (accessed September 16, 2013).  Smith 
was concerned, because of what he viewed as the inflationary policies of the Roosevelt administration, and he 
believed that the nationalization of the economy was unconstitutional. 
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“lost in the shuffle,” then they would lose their political voice and become unresponsive to 
changes in the national economy.  Smith did not believe that the Roosevelt administration 
was on the right path, and he did not think that the recovery would occur with the 
enactment of the New Deal laws.11  Although Smith no longer served as a public official 
after 1935, he still maintained a powerful and determined base of support in the United 
States.  His ideas even carried some political weight in the Roosevelt administration, 
because he was a Democrat and Roosevelt’s predecessor as the New York State governor.12 
Alfred Smith was the prominent voice of the small business owners who held some 
reservations about the New Deal, especially the Agricultural Adjustment and National 
Industrial Recovery Acts.  The national economy was becoming more industrialized and 
small business owners and small farmers no longer held a prominent voice in the White 
House.  With the New Deal, the small business communities began to realize that their 
power in the national economy was waning and their interests were no longer as essential 
to the government.13  This led to some opposition among small businesses for the New 
Deal, because their presence in the manufacturing sectors was no longer influential.  They 
perceived that they were losing federal support for their industrial practices and business 
concepts.  
Alfred Smith asserted that economic and political developments had altered 
corporate perceptions about appropriate industrial and business standards that prevailed.  
                                                           
11 Norman Thomas, “Is the New Deal Socialism:  An Answer to Al Smith and the American Liberty League,” Chicago 
Democratic Socialists of America, http://www.chicagodsa.orgthomasnewdeal.html. (accessed September 16, 
2013);  “Program of NRA Upheld by Smith,” New York Times, August 23, 1933.  In a speech to supporters, Smith 
reduced his opposition to the NRA and believed that as long as the American people benefited from the law, then 
he was in favor of its enactment.  What led to this change of heart? 
12 Obituary, “On this Day:  Alfred E. Smith Dies here at 70: 4 Times Governor,” New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1230.html. (accessed September 16, 2013). 
13 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform:  New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York:  First Vintage Books 
Edition, 1996), 4. 
291 
 
 
 
Small farmers, businessmen and other industrial leaders may have felt out of place as 
participants in this newly-developed national economy no longer responded to their 
needs.14  The national economy was run by large multinational corporations who had 
hundreds to thousands of employees and produced substantial amounts of consumer 
goods each year.  This new economy changed the ways in which the federal, state and local 
governments viewed the small business community in relation to dominant international 
corporations.  But as a consequence of this newly developed national economy, historian 
Alan Brinkley argued, most Americans believed that the federal government had to step in 
to rectify the absence of equalitarian economic, financial, and industrial environments 
during the crisis.15  The federal government had to become proactive and assertive to deal 
with new issues of inequality. 
In Invisible Hands, historian Kim Phillips-Fein, affirmed Alan Brinkley’s and Alfred 
Smith’s assertions.  She argued that, by the early 20th century, big business began to 
dominate the national economy.16  They had triumphed over American regionalism as the 
United States became a powerful and industrial nation-state.  The interests of small farmers 
and small businessmen became outmoded and obsolete, as large corporations, such as Ford 
Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, hired thousands of employees and 
produced massive amounts of consumer goods at a rapid pace.  These modifications to the 
national economy troubled those who felt that the world had gone astray.  They believed 
that American workers would not benefit from this newly-formed centrally planned 
national economy.  According to Kim Phillips-Fein, it was large multinational corporations, 
                                                           
14 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform, 4-5. 
15 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform, 6-7. 
16 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands:  The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan 
(New York:  W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 5-7.  
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and not just small businesses that led the industrial and economic counterrevolution 
against Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda.17       
In September 1933, Henry Harriman, the president of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, attempted to convince corporate executives and working Americans to stand 
against the closed shop and to promote the open shop in the workplace.18  As a 
conservative, Harriman sought to prevent liberal interpretations of section 7 (a) of the 
NIRA from coming to the forefront.  He opposed the closed shop or unions and attacked it 
as an accepted practice in the industrial sectors.19  Harriman also praised automobile 
executives who established the merit clause in compensation schemes.  The merit clause 
provided management with the opportunity and the industrial structure to advance and 
reward its employees on the basis of their work ethic and performance on the job.20  In 
November 1933, the Republican party, citing an American Federation of Labor survey, 
intensified the debate.  The GOP argued that, since the emergence of the NIRA, wages 
earned had not increased; and the agricultural and manufacturing sectors that had adopted 
processing taxes or industrial codes had gone into decline.21  Similarly, the Chamber of 
                                                           
17 “Politics and Short Memories,” Chattanooga Times Free Press, June 16, 2009; Mickey Edwards, “Back to 
Capitalism,” Boston Globe, January 11, 2009.  Both reviews of Phillips-Fein’s book describe how some business 
conservatives attempted to rally to defeat the Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. 
18 Special, “Labor Policies of NRA Drawing New Opposition,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 4, 1933. 
19 “Harriman Warns of NRA Autocracy,” New York Times, May 23, 1934.  Harriman was concerned that extreme 
centralization of the federal government would occur with the NIRA even though he was a staunch conservative; 
Special, “Harriman’s Views Assailed By Green,” New York Times, September 22, 1933.  This article details the 
American Federation of Labor’s criticisms of Harriman and the emphasis he placed upon the open shop and merit 
clause. 
20 Special Report, “Open-Shop Clause Urged by Harriman,” New York Times, September 4, 1933; “Harriman Recites 
Gains Under NRA,” New York Times, September 3, 1933.  Harriman supported the NIRA with the exception of 
Section 7(a).  He believed in the open shop and merit clause. 
21 Special, “GOP Attacks Democrats on Recovery Plan,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 12, 1933; Arthur Sears 
Henning, “GOP Tells Recovery  Aims,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 19, 1940.  Dr. Glenn Frank, Republican 
committee chair argued in a report that the New Deal was a failure, and he believed that the country was in a crisis 
of ideology.  Planned economies versus liberalism or laissez-faire economies faced the American people and the 
Republicans, in his opinion, had the solution to ending the Great Depression. 
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Commerce insisted that farmers had not generated more proceeds from the sale of their 
commodities then before.   Prices for farm goods in stores increased, but ordinary 
Americans lost valuable purchasing power.22  
In January 1934, the Republican party launched a new attack on the Roosevelt 
administration.  The Republican National Committee complained that the federal deficit 
had increased at an exponential rate, due to the enactment of New Deal laws.23  Its 
members argued that maintaining a balanced budget should have been the goal of the 
Roosevelt administration.  Moreover, they contended that there was a lack of confidence in 
the Executive Branch, because of its excessive spending programs.  The federal 
government, they proclaimed, was in peril, because of Roosevelt’s policies.  Henry P. 
Fletcher, the Republican National Chairman, argued, in August 1934, that the Roosevelt 
administration was on the path toward socialism or collectivism.24  He stressed that the 
Roosevelt administration was promoting policies that were akin to a command economy in 
the Soviet Union.25 
 Members of the National Recovery Administration, such as Donald Richberg, 
defended the practices of the NRA.26  In the New York Times in November 1933, Richberg 
                                                           
22 Ibid. 
23 Arthur Sears Henning, “GOP Fighting Pending Budget as U.S. Danger,” Chicago Daily Tribune, January 9, 1934; 
Special, “Republican National Chairman Attacks New Deal,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 10, 1934. 
24 Special, “Republican National Chairman Attacks New Deal,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 10, 1934; Arthur Sears 
Henning, “GOP Renews its Attack on Administration,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 15, 1934; Special, “NRA:  
The American Way,” New York Times, March 6, 1934. 
25 Special, “Hours Cut Put Up To NRA Code Chiefs,” New York Times, March 8, 1934.  In speeches, Johnson 
countered corporate leaders that believed that the NIRA and the emergence of the NRA were on a path toward 
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stated that there was a misunderstanding between NRA members and industry leaders in 
terms of how to enforce the provisions of the industry codes.  Roosevelt, in response to 
general criticism, established the National Recovery Review Board in order to handle 
complaints from business leaders, especially small companies.27  The NRA and its sub-
agencies had over thirty labor lawyers that handled litigation cases and worked in 
conjunction with the Department of Justice to ensure that there were no violations of the 
law.  Labor attorney and Donald Richberg’s legal colleague Charles S. Darrow was selected 
in May of 1934 to head National Recovery Review Board.  Darrow’s obligation was two-
fold.  He had to determine whether the suspension of anti-trust laws led to monopolistic 
behavior in the private sector and to discover whether small businesses were affected by 
the adoption of industry codes.28  Some small business owners had voiced concern, because 
they felt that multinational corporations could use the industry codes to drive them out of 
the marketplace causing bankruptcy. 
More to the point, Richberg asserted firmly that the NRA was not a public 
dictatorship over the private sector.29  It had not been established to coerce corporate 
executives or to tell them how to run their business operations.  The intentions of the NRA 
were to regulate industries in the national economy, not to take them over.  Richberg had 
to address the question as to whether Congress provided the Executive Branch with too 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1934 to June 1935;National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland.  Garrett in this memo stated that the 
NRA and its ability to establish industry codes had been successfully defended in litigation cases.  The agency had 
over thirty lawyers that worked on litigation cases and assisted the Department of Justice; “Richberg Lauds NRA as 
Best Way to Lead Industry,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 11, 1933. 
27 Charles Frederick Roos, NRA Economic Planning (Bloomington:  The Principia Press, Inc., 1937), 376-377. 
28 Michael Hannon, “Clarence Darrow and the National Recovery Review Board, University of Minnesota Law 
Library, http://www.darrow.law.umn.edu/trialpdfs/national_recovery_review_board.pdf. (accessed June 13, 
2014). 
29 Editorial, “Richberg Says NRA Seeks Middle Path in Industrial Plan,” New York Times, November 9, 1933. 
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much legislative power and control.30  Corporate executives continually had consistently 
challenged the roles of government in the private sector.  Their argument against 
government regulations surfaced against the NRA, because corporate elites feared 
government interference in their businesses.  Government regulations were, by contrast, 
difficult to enforce; and it was not clear how to promote corporate compliance of the 
industry codes.31 
Richberg affirmed that policymakers, along with private citizens, understood that 
the national economy was capitalist, not communist or socialist.  He made clear distinctions 
between the communist dictatorship in Russia and the democratic values present in the 
American government and economy.  Without a combined approach between the private 
and public sectors to regulate the national economy, Richberg argued, he feared that more 
direct government intervention might have become necessary.  His New York Times 
articles, further, contended that the NRA was the middle path between “the 18th century 
individualism and the 19th century socialism.”32 Roosevelt had taken a new path toward the 
economic recovery and this meant that neither old world Individualism nor socialism were 
suitable as solutions for the industrial crisis.  Did he imply that the NRA as a government 
agency could fit within classical economic theories, or was extensive state intervention into 
the economy a necessity for policing the entire system?  From Richberg’s perspective, the 
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Review 33, no. 4 (February 1935):  599. 
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NRA was designed as a gradual approach toward regulating the national economy, one 
justified by the continuing economic crisis. 
 In December 1933, the New York Times published an editorial article that challenged 
perceptions that the NRA was an institution approved by industry leaders.  The staff 
reporter stated that 98 percent of manufacturers did not support the licensing provisions 
of the NRA nor the stipulations behind the Blue Eagle.  These corporate executives did not 
support collective bargaining, such as section 7(a) of the industry codes.33  At the Waldorf-
Astoria, that year, members of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) met for a 
two day conference to discuss industry and economic policies.  NAM initially supported 
Roosevelt:  but by 1934, it became disenchanted with the New Deal, especially the NIRA, 
and sought legal change.34  James A. Emery, as NAM general counsel, stated that section 
7(a) and the licensing provisions of the NIRA should be separated.  He argued that industry 
self-regulation should remain a mainstay of the manufacturing sector and that the licensing 
provisions of the NIRA and section 7(a) were wholly detrimental to the American 
economy.35  If the licensing provisions were separated from section 7(a), and a company 
violated the collective bargaining stipulations, then management would not lose its Blue 
Eagle designation.  Additionally, businesses would not have to maintain the closed shop or 
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lose their industrial mandate, if they changed their approaches toward trade unionism.36  
This suggestion implied that if corporations violated section 7(a) of the NIRA, then they 
would not automatically lose their Blue Eagle license.   
What was neglected in the New York Times report on the conference was some 
perspective on how ordinary Americans viewed the law.  How did most American voters—
as distinct from business—view the NIRA, and did they believe that the law was a 
detriment to their social conditions?  Did the average American live decently, because of 
the enactment of this law or did they earn less in wages and lose their ability to subsist 
during this economic emergency?37  Donald Richberg, in a Rotary Club speech in Chicago, 
attempted to respond to this problem of inequality by stating that he believed in high 
wages as long as it did not destroy the production process.38  He also sought to increase 
prices but did not want American workers to lose their valuable purchasing power.  He 
took to heart the interests of ordinary Americans and sought to use the NRA as a 
springboard for change.  
 Although the National Association of Manufacturers criticized publically the NRA, 
Donald Richberg responded in the New York Times article that appeared on the same 
month.  In it, he defended the actions of the NRA in its efforts to devise guidelines and 
quotas for the national economy.  Specifically, he stated that: 
Not long ago I said that the Recovery Administration was seeking to establish a half-
way house of democratic cooperation for the common good, midway between the 
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anarchy of unplanned, unregulated industrialism and the tyranny of state control of 
industry.39 
Richberg stressed that it was necessary to develop coordinated strategies for businesses so 
that they functioned properly in a hostile economic environment.  Only then could the 
American public receive the consumer goods that it needed.  Thus, he argued that it was 
necessary to coordinate their industrial strategies and work together in a collective way to 
stimulate growth and change.  Traditional and classical economic tactics no longer worked, 
and Richberg believed that it was now necessary to establish a centralized approach to 
regulate the marketplace.40   
Richberg’s last statement touched on how the NRA was designed to assist ordinary 
Americans live better and improve upon the struggling economy.  The same workers who 
produced consumer goods could not afford to purchase them in the marketplace.41  
Working people were faced with economic crisis, but they wanted to accomplish more than 
just survival.42  They wanted to thrive, and the NIRA was established to help them along 
this path.  Many Americans remained unconvinced that the NIRA was the answer to their 
financial prayers.  
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Throughout the short life of the NRA, General Johnson and Donald Richberg 
defended its policies; but criticisms and opposition to the NRA did not abate.43  
Policymakers and industry leaders believed that the country faced a severe economic 
emergency, but solutions to the crisis were a source of conflict.44  There were no 
agreements about the steps that Roosevelt could take to resolve the economic collapse.  
When the NIRA was devised and approved, industry leaders, such as Henry Ford and 
members of the NAM were cautious.  They did not know if this was the right step or what it 
meant for their industry in particular.  Members of the oil industry, for example, did not 
want an industry czar to have control over the creation of their business practices, price 
structure, and decision-making processes.  Many businessmen worried, because the NIRA 
was the first law of its kind to have provisions that required business compliance with 
government-negotiated federal standards. 
 Some scholars, lawyers and political activists were concerned with the passage of 
the NIRA.  They looked for legal precedents to prove or challenge its constitutionality.45  
They understood the interconnections between the state and federal judiciaries, and they 
sought to use both entities to affirm the NRA and the NIRA.  Initially, NRA supporters 
argued that prior cases could be discovered and used to promote the validity of the NIRA.  
These supporters had to reach back into court decisions from the late 19th century to affirm 
their legal positions and stances. 
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During the late 19th century, the United States was no longer viewed as just a 
regional power by global actors.  The country had become an industrial and economic 
powerhouse; and this had an effect upon the business community.  The Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act was enacted in 1890 to protect the interests of small business owners from the larger 
corporations that monopolized the private sector.46  Amendments to the law established 
more penalties for violations of its provisions.  The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 
continued this tradition by protecting small business owners from large monopolistic firms 
or combinations who controlled the manufacturing sectors.  The law also was one of the 
first steps toward the legitimation of trade unionism, because it provided workers with the 
legal tools that they could use to pursue their rights to external representation.47  But what 
impact would these laws have on Americans workers and voters?  Would these laws have a 
detrimental effect upon the open shop and lead more businesses to adopt trade unionism?   
All in all, section 7 (a) of the NIRA was the legal culmination of efforts by trade 
unionists to protect American workers that had begun with the passage of the Sherman and 
Clayton Anti-Trust Acts.  The provision provided workers with new rights to bargain 
collectively in the workplace, curtailed the legitimacy of company unions, and promoted 
the close shop, which the business community believed was detrimental to their 
interests.48  The conservatism of the business community and some policymakers, such as 
the Anti-New Deal Southern members of the United States Senate, may have been the 
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reasons for the conservative Supreme Court decisions in the early 20th century that 
established the right or freedom to contract, which recognized contractual workers as 
corporate property.      
From the late 19th century until the early 1920s, state courts as well as the Supreme 
Court applied the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to address the rise of 
contract labor.49  Historian James Gray Pope, in The Promises of Liberty, argued that, when 
American workers were inhibited from striking, organizing, collective bargaining or merely 
fighting for their labor rights, they cited the Thirteenth Amendment, which had eliminated 
slavery and the perception of workers as a commodity or chattel property.50  Yellow dog 
contracts, labor injunctions, and other worker hindrances were viewed as unconstitutional 
to labor leaders, because they invalidated the provisions of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
In 1897, the United States’ Supreme Court decided in Allgeyer v. Louisiana that a 
state law that required any insurance business to operate under state licensing provisions 
was unconstitutional.  In citing Butchers’ Union Company v. Crescent City Company, Powell v. 
Pennsylvania, and Milliken v. Pratt, the court affirmed that a citizen should have the right to 
enjoy the benefits of selling his labor and the freedoms associated with maintaining an 
occupation.51  Citizens could enter into contacts that allowed them to sell their labor and to 
benefit from any industrial position for which they decided to work.  But the “right of 
contract” was used to undermine trade unionism and Federal and state attempts to 
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regulate labor.  It was argued that workers could not earn a decent living with restrictions 
on their rights to work.   
Moreover, as Christopher Tomlins has argued, business leaders before the Great 
Depression hampered any efforts at promoting trade unionism through extensive use of 
labor injunctions and other laws.  Management believed that it was necessary to maintain 
high production levels and provide families with low prices for consumer goods.  This 
undermined any steps at sustaining external industrial representation in the workplace as 
long as there were substantial employment numbers in each manufacturing plant.52  
Strikes were viewed as a necessarily evil, because they hindered the production process 
and threatened the supply of consumer goods in the marketplace.53  Efforts at developing 
trade unionism were suppressed by legal authorities, when workers were conscious of 
their difficult working conditions and limited employment status.54  This problem had to be 
overcome if workers were to fight successfully for their industrial rights.  
In 1905, the United States’ Supreme Court heard the case Lochner v. New York, in 
which Justice Peckham wrote the 5-4 majority decision.55  In citing among others, Allgeyer 
v. Louisiana, Holden v. Hardy, Atkin v. Kansas, and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, he argued that 
a New York law that inhibited workers in bakeries from working overtime and that had 
maximum work hours was unconstitutional, because it hindered employees from 
supporting their families financially.56  The court argued that citizens had a right to work in 
the private sector and often in order to take care of their households.  They believed that 
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the New York law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  Americans had to right to due 
process and the loss or deprivation of their life, liberty and property was 
unconstitutional.57  Employers argued that the New York law that prohibited overtime 
obstructed a worker’s ability to earn a decent living.  Limiting work hours was a detriment 
to small companies that had to increase their labor costs and were, thus, forced out of 
business.  The right of contract repeatedly was used to justify the invalidation of labor laws. 
In Vegelahn v. Guntner, a Massachusetts court case in 1896, the majority decision 
stated that striking or picketing was illegal and illegitimate.58  Changes in these practices 
began around World War I.  President Woodrow Wilson established the National War 
Labor Board during the First World War.  Further, the 1930 Supreme Court case Texas & 
New Orleans Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks allowed for collective bargaining 
by workers in the Railway industry.59  In it, the Supreme Court held that the Texas & New 
Orleans Railway Co. attempted to establish a company union called the Association of 
Clerical Employees, and prevent the introduction of external representation.60   
The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks sought to represent railway workers; and Justice 
Hughes decided that labor organizations should not be hampered from promoting trade 
unionism.  He argued that employers could not use injunctions to establish company 
unions and inhibit the spread of trade associations.  This decision upheld section 2 of the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926, because it allowed for collective bargaining without the 
interference of corporate management.  The judgment also substantiated prior court cases, 
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such as Stuart v. Hayden, Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Railroad Commission, 
Washington Securities Company v. United States and Bodkin v. Edwards.61  Permitting 
injunctions to curtail the spread of trade unionism was viewed as unconstitutional and 
violated section 20 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.  Lastly, federal injunctions to inhibit trade 
unionism took away the rights of workers present in the First and Fifth Amendments to the 
Constitution, because it obstructed employees and their pursuit of external 
representation.62   
The Fifth Amendment became an important provision, because business leaders 
believed in maintaining their due process and rights to control their private property or in 
this case, their employees once they had signed individual labor contracts.63  The First 
amendment dealt with the rights to assemble and many scholars wondered if strikes or 
even collective bargaining were in violation to this constitutional stipulation.  Corporate 
leaders also received more state and federal rights because of the issue of federalism.64  
The business community was viewed as benevolent patriarchs that had the peoples’ 
interests in mind.  But one problem that corporations encountered was that state 
governments had the ultimate policing powers of business leaders.  If employees could 
appeal to state governments to recognize trade unionism and collective bargaining, then 
workers’ rights could be promoted.   
The Federal government changed its political outlook with the passage of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, especially section 1, 
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prevented the use of temporary or permanent injunctions to end strikes if a company had 
national business operations.65  The strike or boycott was considered legitimate, and 
injunctions to limit strike activity were not justified, if it restrained the Commerce clause of 
the Constitution.66  The Clayton Act of 1914, however, was one of the first Congressional 
attempts to provide relief to workers affected by the strict enforcement of anti-trust laws.67  
If the Clayton Act had not been declared unconstitutional in 1923, then the Norris-
LaGuardia Act would have been unnecessary.  Section 6 of the Clayton Act stated that the 
labor powers of any worker were not forms of chattel or property.  Section 20 of the 
Clayton Act stated that when the acts of trade unions interfered or caused injury to the 
employers’ property rights, then this activity was unconstitutional.68  Thus, the Clayton and 
Norris-LaGuardia Acts gave workers more substantive powers in conducting labor 
remedies, such as the right to boycott or strike.69  Injunctions to end boycotts or strikes 
were viewed as constitutionally invalid.70 
During the Great Depression, policymakers such as President Roosevelt and General 
Johnson were increasingly disenchanted with the judiciary, because of the conservativism 
of the United States’ Supreme Court and state entities.  They, along with other critics, 
argued that “judges’ values are the law and they make decisions for the federal institutions 
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in which they represent.”71  If a judge established a decision that was contrary to the beliefs 
or operations of a business or even a state entity, then it might take years before a new 
decision could be rendered that affected pre-existing laws in a constructive way.  Thus, the 
conservativism of a court could be maintained for many years until there were new 
members of judiciary that might hear a related case and overturn the prior ruling.  The 
slow pace of judicial change meant that the court was conservative, even in times when 
liberal legislation challenged and attempted to rework the system of laissez-faire 
government.72  Judges, for the most part, were reluctant to invalidate the government 
approaches to the American market.  Roosevelt’s New Deal programs confronted classical 
judicial perceptions that limited and dismantled its provisions until after 1935.   Neither 
judges nor policymakers change their value systems overnight.  They lingered for a long 
period of time, unless new members join and infuse their ranks. 73 
 By the mid-1930s, employees and firms in opposition to the NRA and AAA filed 
court cases that challenged the NIRA, but few cases were supported by workers.  The NIRA, 
moreover, did not spell out the mechanisms that American workers could take to redress 
violations of the industrial codes of fair competition.74  This implied that contacting a local 
union was not an effective step for workers that suffered in the manufacturing, retail, 
insurance and finance sectors.  Before Norris-LaGuardia, workers were subjected to labor 
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restrictions as it pertained to trade unionism.  Section 7(a) of the NIRA was the first step in 
promoting the use of independent labor organizations to address work-related violations.75     
  In January of 1934, Franklin Delano Roosevelt asserted that it was necessary to 
speak to the American people in an address to Congress, because of worker-related fears 
about the implementation of the NIRA in industry.76  He hoped to restore the confidence of 
Americans in the NIRA, even though there was much discontent in this industrial system 
and about the industry codes.  He argued that the American people should not move back 
to the runaway market competition and instability that had caused the crisis.  Americans 
had to move in the direction of industrial and centralized planning, because it was the only 
way to create stability in the marketplace and economic security.  The NIRA and AAA had 
enabled Americans to move forward, but confidence in the laws was uneven.  Corporate 
executives who had initially supported the NIRA viewed the new agencies with skepticism 
and with the critical eyes of organizations such as NAM.77  
 On March 5, 1934, the president gave another address to the General Conference of 
Code Authorities and Trade Association Code Committees in Washington, D.C.78  Before the 
NIRA was passed, Roosevelt had argued, competition in the national economy was cut-
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throat.79  Corporate leaders tried to expand their business operations and improve their 
financial positions at the expense of their colleagues and other economic counterparts.  
Competition was often unfair, and many Americans were victims of corruption and 
ruthlessness.  Roosevelt emphasized that the NRA ameliorated competition.  Its adoption of 
centralized planning to the national economy in order to starve off the crisis was an 
attempt to stabilize the democratic market, not take over market capitalization.   Roosevelt 
did not believe that he had overstepped his bounds, as he sought to use new domestic 
approaches to get Americans back to work. 
 The purpose of the NIRA was to stabilize the national economy, to enable it to 
become structured so that the buying or purchasing power of all Americans improved.  
Industry, labor, and the public were to work together for the economic success of the entire 
nation.  With the NIRA, there was to be a balance between the interests of industry, 
government, and workers’ advocates.  All Americans could benefit from the NRA’s 
economic modifications of the public and private sectors.  Addressing his critics’ concerns, 
Roosevelt argued that the NIRA had employed constitutional means to reform the national 
economy.  Further, Roosevelt argued that “the government could not forever absorb the 
whole burden of unemployment.”80 
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 By 1934, however, many journalists, newspapers and businessmen were no longer 
supportive of the NIRA.  Many of them believed that the national economy was not stable, 
or improving.  Conservative reporter Frank Kent, for example, argued that only 1.5 million 
jobs had been created since 1933, when the NRA was adopted by the Executive and 
Legislative branches of government.  Business owners also were dissatisfied with the NRA.  
Republican Senator William Borah from Idaho persuaded the United States’ Senate to 
conduct hearings on the NIRA so that industry leaders could express their reservations and 
outright opposition.81  Borah argued that his office had received approximately “nine 
thousand complaints,” and he wanted them addressed.82  The NIRA was so unsuccessful as 
a national policy initiative to the business community, Senator Borah insisted that 
corporate leaders should not adhere to the provisions of industry codes.  If any business 
executives were sanctioned by the federal government, then Borah told them to let him 
know.  Borah would clear the names of the business leaders affected by government 
officials who sought to enforce the codes.   
From 1934 onward, Senators Borah and Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota continued to 
pressure the Roosevelt Administration because they believed that the NRA and AAA 
promoted controversial price and production standards.83  They believed that this was a 
step in the wrong direction for the American people.    Further, throughout the Great 
Depression, Senator Borah campaigned in Idaho for many of his Anti-New Deal Republican 
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colleagues, such as Frank Stephan, 1934 candidate for governor.84  Borah supported 
Republican candidates that were against the policies of the Roosevelt Administration.  He 
was a staunch conservative and a strong opponent of the New Deal.  However, after 1935, 
Borah somewhat changed his political outlook because he asserted that the Herbert Hoover 
and the Old Republican Guard failed to prevent the Great Depression and hampered the 
economic viability of the American people.85  He was against the exploitation of the 
American people by the Republican party, but continued to argue that Roosevelt sought to 
establish a governmental dictatorship by political mandate to resolve the economic crisis.  
 The problems that business leaders and conservative policymakers faced were in 
section 7(a) and the emergence of collective bargaining as an important provision of the 
NIRA.  Conservative businesses had long relied on Liberty of Contract arguments in labor 
law.  Commonwealth v. Perry in 1891 illustrated this point vividly, because workers were 
given the rights to sell their labor rights in American marketplaces.    At no point did this 
legal precedent acknowledge workers’ limitations in individual bargaining.  In the early 
1920s, the United States’ Supreme Court increasingly relied on the 13th and 14th 
amendments in an effort to protect American firms.86  The employer had the right to dictate 
the conditions of employment.  In two cases decided in 1921—American Steel Foundries v. 
Tri-City Central Trades Council and Truax v. Corrigan, collective bargaining and other labor 
rights were viewed as unconstitutional.  It hindered the rights of employers to utilize the 
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labor rights of their employees.87  American Steel Foundries held that trade unionism, and 
collective bargaining, had become legitimate industrial and labor practices, because of the 
passage of the Clayton Act of 1914.88  Employers argued that strikes and industrial 
syndicalism interfered with the rights of management to use its corporation’s property in 
the appropriate fashion.89  Thus, the labor laws that governed the American private sector 
benefited the firm and protected the property rights, not employees.   
These two court cases were important, because they addressed workers’ rights in 
the labor market.90  Workers had the right to sell and own their labor:  but once they 
became employed, then the labor powers of workers became the property of that firm.  
Further, employers could not own the labor rights of their workers while employees had 
the right to sell their own labor assets to the firms of their choice.  This implied that 
employers could control the business operations, and production and labor costs of their 
firms.  This principle served to disfranchise employees in the workplace.  American 
workers did not completely control their labor and could not use trade unions to fight for 
their labor rights.91  
 More importantly, court cases that challenged the constitutionality of the NIRA 
increased dramatically after 1934.  Criticisms of the law were manifold.  First of all, 
scholars and policymakers questioned whether Congress had the power to expand its 
legislative power under the Commerce clause of the United States Constitution.92  Further, 
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they asked whether the NIRA extended or enlarged the legislative powers of the Executive 
branch and its myriad agencies.  The key questions were how much regulation was 
necessary to affect interstate commerce, and whether the commerce clause and interstate 
commerce were interwoven.  Many scholars have contended that Congress had the 
constitutional power to develop regulatory policies for the federal level, but there were 
some repeated challenges to this framework.  Yet, regulations were imperative to police the 
system, which became essential if the government was to intervene in the economic crisis.  
The meaning of interstate commerce and the commerce clause, however, was expanded 
under the NIRA, which aimed to “revive” the national economy and promote an expanded 
role for the federal government to regulate interstate commerce.   
David B. McCalmont, Jr., from the Yale Law Review, argued that Congress and the 
Executive Branch received extensive legislative powers under the NIRA to curtail the 
economic emergency that had occurred after 1929.93  If this was the case, then Congress 
and the Presidency maintained this expanded responsibility until the economic emergency 
had ceded.  But were these powers limited to the economic emergency?  Still when it 
ended, would federal authorization be curtailed?94      
Second, legal scholars asked whether due process was inhibited under the NIRA.  
Traditionally, price controls had been shown to lower prices for consumer goods and, one 
might add, for labor services and raw materials.  The NIRA and the AAA were different in 
the sense that they aimed to raise prices for commodities in the United States and globally.  
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Raising prices as a government policy was largely uncommon before the Great Depression:  
but traditional economic approaches had failed to resolve the crisis.  The New Deal, which 
was engaged in persistent experimentation, sought to use industrial codes and price 
guidelines as a way to fix the economy.95  In most court decisions before 1934, however, 
justices contended that the regulations for lowering prices for commodities and consumer 
goods were unconstitutional.    
Third, challenges to the NIRA asked whether Congress expanded its role as a 
mechanism for promoting interstate commerce under this law.  Could Congress have the 
legislative capacity to regulate interstate commerce by inhibiting the shipment of goods 
from American corporations without a license or the Blue Eagle Seal?  Could Congress 
devise a law that promoted collective bargaining and thus eliminate yellow-dog contracts 
from the economic and industrial discourse?  Legal experts at the time affirmed that 
Congress had the power to expand its legislative capacity and embody its legislative 
qualities in other federal entities, but legal challenges also asked whether the NIRA 
interfered with the separation of powers between the three federal branches of 
government.96  Further, they asked whether the NIRA violated due process.  If an employer 
was entitled to enter into contracts with his employees and to use their labor for the 
benefit of his corporation, was it unconstitutional?  These questions were important 
because strikes, collective bargaining, and restricted contracts were affected by the NIRA.  
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The new law expanded Congressional and Executive powers into uncharted territory in the 
judicial system.97   
The courts had to decide whether due process was affected negatively by the NIRA.  
If employees were recognized by an outside party that bargained for their benefit, then this 
might interfere with the relationship that employees had with their employers?  
Supporters of the NIRA argued that the provisions of the industry codes of the NIRA did not 
interfere with due process and they had been accepted by policymakers as the letter of the 
law. Stipulations that limited weekly work hours or fixed minimum wages were widely 
seen as solutions to the unemployment crisis.   In many ways, it appeared that due process 
was promoted with the NIRA, because Congress was expanding the ability of American 
corporations to resolve this national emergency though government channels. The NRA 
created industry codes that reformed the national economy and made it easier for 
businesses to conduct economic and financial transactions.  The provisions of the codes of 
fair competition were put in place to enlarge the business operations of American 
businesses and due process as well.98      
Another problem that the courts had to address was whether it was within the 
scope of the legislative powers of Congress to regulate intrastate commerce.  Did the NIRA 
expand the powers of Congress to govern companies in the national economy that 
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conducted local business or intrastate commerce?99 What if a corporation employed 
thousands of workers in the manufacturing sector but decided to lay-off a number of its 
employees.  This act affected interstate commerce in a negative way, because the 
corporation was reducing its manufacturing capacity nationally.  Each state where the 
corporation that had employees was affected by the reduction in employment levels, 
especially if the company curtailed its national or international business.   
Small, regional or local businesses were considered wholly different, and Congress 
arguably had less capacity to regulate them, if their business was intrastate and outside of 
the NRA’s jurisdiction.  Legislators and other policymakers had to decide whether the 
corporation that reduced its workforce could be regulated by the federal government, due 
to the impact of its business practices; they also needed to decide the limits of regulation.  
Did the federal government need to treat the operations of small businesses differently 
than multinational corporations?  If unemployment levels increased in the United States, 
could Congress regulate interstate commerce in an effort to reduce the lay-offs and allow 
for the hiring of more American workers?  These were important questions, because they 
dealt with the role of the federal government in the national economy.  Congress, the 
Judiciary, and Presidency all shaped the roles that businesses played to enhance economic 
growth and job creation.100  By 1934, these questions came to the surface and corporations 
brought court cases to challenge the government powers.101      
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 As a result of the criticisms of the NRA, opponents brought several dilemmas to 
federal court cases to challenge the provisions of the law.  Initially, these cases appeared in 
the district courts, courts of appeals, and state supreme courts.  Over time, the United 
States Supreme Court became involved.  It reviewed the NRA case, Schechter v. the United 
States in 1935, which declared the NIRA unconstitutional.102  These cases addressed the 
constitutionality of the industry codes, the public works provisions, and collective 
bargaining provisions in section 7(a). 
 In 1934, there was one intriguing case that dealt with violations of section 7(a) of 
the NIRA.  The case was Bayonne Textile Corporation v. the American Federation of Silk 
Workers, Raphael Brown, Olga Sacaroff and Nathan Burn.  Bayonne Textile was submitted to 
the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey in February 1934, and it was decided on May 
4, 1934.  Bayonne factory was a producer of silks and rayon fabric.  Corporate executives 
felt that the strike that took place on their grounds interfered with their property rights, 
violating the due process clause of the Constitution.103  With the emergence of the NIRA, a 
code was established for this industry; and the Bayonne factory was in compliance with all 
of its provisions.  Management argued that the strike that followed crippled the Bayonne 
factory’s operations, and the behavior of the strikers was not conductive to a positive work 
environment.  In the decision of the court, Chief Justice J. Heher argued that: 
Insults, indecent and annoying language and abusive epithets were hurled at 
complainant’s employees, by pickets acting for defendants, as they passed to and 
from the complainant’s plant; that they were threatened with physical violence if 
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they did not withdraw from complainant’s service; that windows of complainant’s 
plant, about thirty in number were broken by defendants, or those acting on their 
behalf and etc.104 
The Chief Justice asserted that there was some violence between the members of the trade 
association and management at Bayonne Textile Corporation.  But was this violence alleged 
or did the plaintiffs have some evidence to prove that these incidents occurred?  Would it 
make a difference in the case or favor the plaintiff and their beliefs that strikes were wholly 
detrimental to their business operations?105  
In the Bayonne Textile Corporation case, Joel Gross served as the attorney for the 
plaintiff while Edward Bennett of Cole & Morrill was the lawyer for the defendants.106  In 
this case, Bayonne Textile Corporation argued that their property rights had been violated 
because of trade unionism.  According to the plaintiff, the American Federation of Silk 
Workers interfered with the corporation’s business operations, because its members had 
told employees to stop working during normal business hours.107  There was a work 
stoppage, or strike, that caused the corporation to lose money.  Arguably, it destroyed the 
relationship that workers had developed with management.108  
The Bayonne Textile Corporation argued that it was stipulated in the Constitution 
that businesses had control over the labor powers of its workers.  In particular, this case 
dealt with the court’s interpretation of the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth amendments 
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to the constitution.109  Workers had to capacity to sell their labor powers in businesses to 
which they were employed.  Once workers became members of any American firm, they 
lost control over their labor process.  Workers did not maintain control over their 
individual rights, conditions, and wages:  and businesses claimed that workers’ labor rights 
were placed within any firms’ jurisdiction.  In this case, the judges listened to the 
arguments.  In their decision, they remanded the case to the lower court and altered the 
order of the trial court with further instructions.110 
 This was a significant case, however, because it dealt with the collective bargaining 
provisions of the NIRA.  Did workers have the right to join unions, organize and bargain 
collectively with management or other corporate officials?111  Did workers lost their 
individual rights if they became members of trade unions and went on strike?  If the court 
answered the first question in the affirmative, then workers maintained the right to control 
their labor and to hire an outside party to represent their workplace interests.  The 
defendants argued that under the NIRA, the codes of fair competition allowed employees to 
place limits on work hours and to have minimum wages and other employee benefits.  But 
the codes were not absolute.  Workers had the capacity to bargain if they felt that their 
employee rights were infringed upon or if management offered benefits that were not on 
par with industry standards.112   
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On the other hand, the corporate plaintiff cited the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States’ Constitution, which gave citizens the right to “make contracts for the sale of the 
labor of others or for their own labor.”  The Fifth Amendment stipulates that corporations 
could not lose their property rights without the due process of the law.113  Justice Heher 
cited Adair v. United States, Coppage v. Kansas and Hitchman Coal and Coke v. Mitchell to 
validate the right of workers to sell their labor in the workplace, the right of trade 
associations to unite workers, and use collective bargaining to fight for improvements in 
the workplace.114   
Further, this decision was important.  Workers could bargain collectively during the 
negotiation process.  There was the right of all citizens to labor in the marketplace, and 
their labor powers were owned by American corporations, who could dispose of their labor 
as they saw fit.  Workers could sign contracts in which they provided employers with 
access to their labor powers.  Does the right to sign employment contracts to provide 
corporations with their labor power imply that workers could join trade unions or were 
they forbidden?  Employers were given the right to use the labor of their employees to 
produce for the national economy, but always within limits.  State labor laws had, for more 
than a century, defined certain conditions as hazardous and unsafe, and regulated women’s 
and children’s labor.  Employers had the basic right of using their property to promote 
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successful business operations and policies.  The question was whether firms also could co-
opt the labor rights of employees as the property of management.115   
In Bayonne Textile case, the work stoppage had been authorized by the strike 
committee of the trade union under defendants Brown, Sacaroff, and Burn.  They were 
responsible for bringing about the strike.  The plaintiffs, however, were under the 
impression that the NIRA eliminated strikes, although workers could bargain collectively 
for their rights, but Chief Justice Heher argued that the plaintiffs were wrong in their 
assertions.  The NRA law was a temporary measure designed to rectify the economic 
emergency brought on by the Great Depression.   In addition, the NIRA established 
industry codes:  but they could be re-negotiated if management did not agree with them or 
workers felt that they did not produce a positive work environment.  Further, as Heher 
cited Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Company, trade unionism was legal under the NIRA, 
and company unions could be supplanted by independent labor unions that sought to 
organize workers.116 
 As a result, the decision in Bayonne Textile case was a victory for the defendants 
and trade unionism.  Workers could strike, and the NIRA did not limit them in this capacity.  
The Fifth Amendment, which dealt with due process and property rights, was not 
applicable to this particular strike and on the court cases that followed.  Workers had the 
ability to bargain collectively, but the strike was a part of this function.  It was a crucial part 
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of the negotiation process.  This case established important worker’s rights that were not 
supplanted easily and management no longer had direct control of the labor skills and 
rights of workers.     
 In late 1934 and 1935, there were four cases that dealt with violations against the 
petroleum industry code.  The fifth case revolved around the live poultry code.  It was to be 
the final case that decided whether the NRA could establish industry codes or codes of fair 
competition.  The four other cases were Panama Refining Co et al v. Ryan et al; Amazon 
Petroleum Corp. et al v. Ryan et al; Locke v. the United States; and State Ex Rel. Lee, Atty. 
General v. Continental Oil Company.  Lastly, the case to decide the future of the industry 
codes was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. et al v. the United States.  These decisions were 
important, especially the Panama Refining and Schechter cases argued in the United States 
Supreme Court, because the Hughes Court, with the exception of Justice Benjamin N. 
Cardozo, did not believe in an expanded role for the national or federal government.117  
Generally, legal historians, such as David Atkinson, have argued that the Hughes Court 
maintained the belief in limited government, which frustrated the efforts of the Roosevelt 
administration to handle the economic emergency confronting the United States.118   
 The Panama Refining Case was argued in the United States’ Supreme Court on 
December 10 and 11, 1934.  A decision was rendered on January 7, 1935.119  Chief Justice 
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Hughes wrote the final decision.  He began his statement with a discussion of the NIRA and 
how it pertained to the petroleum industry.  He stated that the executive order from July 
11, 1933 (no. 6199) regarding the transportation of oil shipments statewide prohibited 
excess shipments of oil to other states in an effort to stimulate petroleum prices.120  The 
executive order applied to state laws regarding quotas, and there was a universal standard 
for oil shipments that was established by the other executive orders or state laws.   Another 
executive order dated July 14, 1933, (no. 6204) listed the federal penalties for violations of 
transportation and state shipment standards to be imprisonment of no more than six 
months and a fine of no more than 1,000 dollars.  Under the NIRA, general penalties for 
federal offenses were fines of no more than 500 dollars, and imprisonment was the 
same.121   
On July 15, 1933, the Interior Secretary Harold Ickes was given the authorization to 
handle the executive orders of July 11 (no. 6199) and July 14, 1933 (no. 6204).  Moreover, 
the amendment to these executive orders dated July 25, 1933, and the petroleum code 
dated August 21, 1933, were put under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior.  
The NRA was not given the responsibility to administer the executive orders or the 
petroleum code.  Under the Petroleum code, the Interior Department received reports on 
production and shipment data from industry leaders of the petroleum sector.122  From this 
data, the Interior department regulated the petroleum industry and ensured that there 
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were regular shipments made across the country.  The shipment amendment was 
important, because it was determined in Congressional proceedings and the executive 
orders that shipments to other states were in excess of demand causing the prices for 
petroleum products to decline substantially.   
Two cases, Panama Refining Company and Amazon Petroleum Corporation 
challenged the shipment clauses in state and federal laws and statutes.123  In Panama 
Refining Company, the oil company had a refining plant in Texas as well as oil and gasoline 
leases in that same state.124  The Panama Refining company sued the federal government to 
prevent the enforcement of shipment requirements and regulations from section 9(C) of 
the NIRA.125  Violations of section 9 (C) occurred when oil shipments were made to states 
in excess of their petroleum quotas.126  In this case, the plaintiffs contended that the NIRA 
gave the president powers that were beyond its legislative scope. Their business 
operations were intrastate, not interstate.127  Congress could regulate only corporate 
business relations if their practices were national, not local.128  Moreover, the plaintiff 
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argued that the law violated the commerce clause of the United States’ Constitution.  The 
NIRA had infringed upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution that dealt 
with private property and due process.129  Lastly, the decision stated that Legislative and 
Executive branches of the federal government must maintain distinct political powers.130  
This prevented the blurring of political power of the three federal branches of government. 
The Amazon Petroleum Corporation case was brought to the federal court system in 
an effort to prevent the state of Texas, especially the Railroad Commission, from imposing 
restrictions on the production and distribution of oil statewide.131  Supposedly, the state of 
Texas, if it enforced the NRA provisions, would be in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.  The plaintiff challenged the petroleum code and declared 
that it was not constitutional, but reasons were not given for how the petroleum code 
infringed upon the Fourteenth Amendment.  In both cases, heard by a district judge, the 
plaintiffs were granted an injunction so that they would not have to adhere to shipment 
requirements because of the unusual delegation of legislative power that had illegally been 
granted to the Interior Department and NRA.  In the case, the court prevented the 
enforcement of section 4 article III of the Petroleum code.  On appeal, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled in favor of the defendants; and the case was dismissed.  Both cases made it to 
the United States Supreme Court on the basis of a writ of certiorari that had been given on 
October 8, 1934.132   
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In the decision in Amazon Petroleum, Justice Hughes examined the shipment 
provisions of the petroleum code.  He argued that shipment quotas that had existed under 
the petroleum code (section 4, article III) had been eliminated with the executive order of 
September 13, 1933.133  Thus, the shipment quotas ceased to exist when these cases had 
been submitted to the federal judiciary for scrutinization.  Consequently, the Court could 
not deal with provisions for shipment quotas that were no longer in force.  Interior 
Secretary Ickes had issued regulations IV, V, and VII of the petroleum code, but they had 
been altered with subsequent amendments, and their meaning had changed wholly in 
character.134  This part of the decision was significant because it illustrated the lack of 
consensus on how to enforce the petroleum code and its myriad stipulations. 
Next, the Supreme Court decided to examine section 9(C) of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act to determine if Congress provided the Executive branch with legislative 
powers that were beyond its scope.135  The petroleum code dealt with the transportation 
quotas in excess of state or federal requirements.  The question became whether Congress 
or the Executive branch had overstepped its regulatory bounds.136  The Court argued that 
section 9(C) of the NIRA was specific and not vague.  It provided states with regulatory 
powers regarding interstate and foreign commerce in terms of oil shipments.  It did not 
attempt to control the production of petroleum commodities, as Hughes contended, 
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however, it provided the Executive branch with enormous regulatory powers over the 
petroleum industry in terms of its policy and enforcement provisions.  Congress had 
provided sweeping powers to the Executive branch of government when it passed the NIRA 
in the first place to allow for the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce.  But with the 
NIRA, Congress had not established itself as the principal regulator of the petroleum 
industry because the Interior Department controlled fundamental aspects of enforcing the 
industry code for this sector.   
In regards to shipments that exceeded state guidelines, Congress had not developed 
a regulatory strategy nor had it created a particular policy to target the issue.  Section 9(C) 
of the NIRA went beyond the delegation of power from the Congress or the states, and 
Hughes and the majority of the Court viewed it as unconstitutional.137  Moreover, the 
majority argued, legislative power was hampered by the creation of an Executive branch 
agency such as the NRA.  The court cited Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities 
Comm’n, Union Bridge Co. v. United States, Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, and 
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson to affirm his decision.138  Hughes reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals, and the case was remanded to the district court with instructions. 
Locke v. the United States was another case that addressed violations of the NRA 
petroleum code.  This case was argued in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.  The 
initial case had been brought before the District Court of the United States from the Eastern 
District of Texas in which Justice Randolph Bryant wrote the decision.139  On January 25, 
1935, the Circuit Court of Appeals’ Justice Sibley rendered his decision.  This decision was 
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important because instead of just revoking a company’s Blue Eagle designation, a plaintiff 
actually faced jail time and fines.  This may have been one of the first instances in which an 
industry code was enforced through the use of tangible penalties.   
Justice Sibley, who provided the court’s final decision, discussed the specifics of the 
case.  Originally, the case was brought to the District Court, because N.S. Locke and his 
colleagues sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the excess production and 
shipment restrictions of oil or petroleum products from wells, as determined by the 
Railroad Commission of Texas.  The plaintiff (federal government) had argued that 
overproduction of oil products had contributed to lowered prices and destroyed interstate 
commerce.  With the emergence of the NIRA and the petroleum code, the Texas Railroad 
Commission had accepted a quota of five percent of its producing capacity.  However, the 
Commission and some refiners were producing at levels above the quota, while others 
were in compliance.140  This may have been an instance in which equal treatment was not 
given to all companies in the oil sector.  Equal protection and justice may have been lacking 
in the enforcement of the petroleum code.   
In the District Court case, the defendants were found to be in non-compliance of the 
NIRA and petroleum code.  Locke tried to argue that the NIRA was invalid, because only 
Congress, not the Executive branch, had the capacity to legislate rules pertaining to 
interstate commerce.  Further, all powers that were not enumerated in the United States 
Constitution were given to the state entities and the people.  Locke’s argument was not 
considered valid in the critical eyes of the court, and he was sentenced to 90 days in jail.  
Even with jail time, Locke remained non-compliant.  In his decision at the Court of Appeals 
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case, Justice Sibley argued that, if the District court had failed to make the proper decision, 
continuing to violate the law was not the answer.  Any constitutional issue could only be 
corrected in court, not through civil disobedience.  Locke had been in contempt of court by 
violating the injunction.  Sibley believed that the decision from the District court was 
correct, and affirmed their finding.  Locke violated the petroleum code and the NIRA by 
infringing upon others and not adhering to the federal injunction.  If Locke had not violated 
the prior court decision, then the Court of Appeals could have reversed the decision and 
ruled in his favor.  But Locke was non-compliant and uncooperative, because he was 
dissatisfied with the previous court decision.  Sibley cited Brougham v. Ocean Stream 
Navigation Co., Schwartz v. United States, and O’Hearne v. United States to validate his 
position.141 
State Ex Rel. Lee, Atty. Gen. v. Continental Oil Company was federal case decided 
regarding the failure to comply with the petroleum code and the NIRA.142 The initial case 
had been argued in the District court from Laramie County, Wyoming, presided over by C.O. 
Brown.  The most recent case had been decided on April 16, 1935 by Justice Riner.  
Continental Oil Company was the “largest producer, manufacturer, seller, and distributor of 
gasoline in Wyoming.”143  The company was based in Delaware, but it had a virtual 
monopoly over the sale and distribution of gasoline in Wyoming.  Since 1931, the company 
had been supplying gasoline to the state of Wyoming’s service stations:  but it had been 
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charging greater sums for its gasoline in Wyoming than in Delaware.  The issue in this case 
dealt with the national price for gasoline charged by Continental Oil Company.  The plaintiff 
was attempting to determine whether Continental Oil violated article 2 of chapter 117 of 
the Wyoming Revised Statutes, the NIRA, and the petroleum code.  Citing Budge v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Lincoln County, State v. Smart and State v. Kelley, Brown decided 
that constitutional questions had to be examined and resolved first in a trial court before 
they can be decided in a state supreme court.144   
The court asserted that the plaintiff had to follow the necessary procedures and 
allow lower courts to explicate the issue and determine if violations were present.145  This 
case was significant because the court justices argued that there were legal or judicial 
procedures that had to be followed in any case that was brought to the local, state or 
federal levels.  These legal procedures enabled the judiciary to function in the appropriate 
fashion and failing to comply by the laws caused unnecessary hardship on both plaintiffs 
and defendants.  It was necessary for court justices to ensure that the rules were followed 
in any case brought in the United States. 
The first four important cases challenging the NRA dealt with the petroleum code 
and violations against some of its provisions targeted the codes of fair competition that 
contained stipulations for price regulation, and production and shipment controls.  The 
Supreme Court case that decided the fate of the NRA codes was, however, the Schechter v. 
United States, which did not deal with petroleum but the live poultry code.  Allegedly, the 
Schechter firm was disappointed by the federal charges against it and believed that the 
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federal government, through the use of the poultry code, was too involved in the financial, 
agricultural and industrial operations of its business.146 
Justice Hughes stated that New York City maintained the largest poultry 
marketplace in the United States.  The Schechter brothers were butchers that operated in 
Brooklyn and New York City.147  Most of the time, the Schechter brothers purchased their 
poultry within New York State in the West Washington Market and the Manhattan railroad 
stations.  But on some occasions, poultry was obtained from vendors in Pennsylvania.  The 
dispute was over whether the Schechter brothers were engaging in interstate commerce.  
The Schechter brothers were affected by the live poultry code that was approved on April 
13, 1934.  Section 7(a), or stipulations regarding collective bargaining, was included within 
its provisions, but minimum wages and maximum work hours were itemized in the code as 
well.  According to the live poultry code, employees were not authorized to work more than 
40 hours per week and minimum wages consisted of .50 cents per hour.148  Child labor 
provisions were comprised of limiting employment to individuals sixteen years of age and 
older.  Children were excluded from participating in the labor market. 
In terms of violations to the live poultry code, the Schechter brothers were alleged 
of committing eighteen offenses.149  There was one count for conspiracy, two counts for 
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violating minimum wages and maximum hours’ provisions of the live poultry code, and ten 
counts for straight killing.  There were further six counts for selling “unfit chickens,” and 
violating inspections for their products, two counts for making inaccurate reports and 
keeping inaccurate data, and a count for selling to dealers that lacked a proper license as 
approved by New York City.  
Joseph and Jacob E. Heller were the lawyers for the Schechter brothers, while 
Attorneys General Cummings and Donald Richberg attempted to prosecute the 
offenders.150  Initially, the prior case had been argued in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit (Eastern New York) and was brought to the Supreme Court by a writ of 
certiorari.151  The Schechter brothers in the Court of Appeals case had been found guilty of 
16 out of 18 violations of the live poultry code and conspiracy.152  The plaintiffs, however, 
argued that the federal government, especially the Executive branch, had overstepped its 
bounds and had been vested with extensive legislative powers to regulate interstate 
commerce.153  The Hughes court cited Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, because it addressed 
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the issue of Congressional delegations of power to other government agencies or 
branches.154  Moreover, the court argued that the federal government had violated the due 
process clause and the Schechter brothers had been deprived of their property and due 
process, as enumerated in the Fifth Amendment.155   
The Schechter case was argued on May 2 and 3, 1935, and a decision was rendered 
by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes on May 27, 1935.156  There was a six to three 
decision to declare NIRA and the codes of fair competition unconstitutional.  The Supreme 
Court focused on Schechter’s issues.  In the Schechter decision, Hughes argued that the 
NIRA and industry codes were devised throughout the United States, because of a national 
economic emergency.  An emergency, however, did not serve as justification to create laws 
that violated the Constitution.  All laws, regardless of why they were created in the first 
place, had to be viewed within the range and scope of the Constitution.  Just because there 
was an economic crisis did not suggest that a law contained more constitutional authority 
or weight.  Laws have been developed during times of stability and crisis but their 
constitutionality, no matter why and when they were created, could be questioned in the 
court system.157   
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Second, Hughes decided to weigh in on the question of the delegation of legislative 
powers to an Executive branch agency such as the NRA.158  He looked to the Panama 
Refining case for answers.  He discovered that the Panama Refining case dealt with the 
transportation or shipment of oil or petroleum products statewide and to other countries.  
The question became whether the president could prevent excess shipments of those 
products if they lowered the prices for those goods within the states that received their 
shipments.  In that case and its application to the Schechter case, Hughes attempted to 
determine the meaning of what constitutes a fair code.  The NIRA did not itemize the 
qualities of fairness, or a fair code, but only unfair competition was addressed.  In this case, 
Hughes tried to determine how the concept of fairness applied to the poultry code and the 
NIRA in general.  
With the emergence of the Federal Trade Commission Act (sections 5 and 11), the 
term “unfairness,” was viewed as an action that was unlawful.159  This established new 
legal precedent.  The NIRA dealt with establishing fair codes, while the Federal Trade 
Commission handled unfair economic and industrial acts.  Both laws were wholly different 
and provided the federal government with broad powers to enforce the law and regulate 
the national economy.  As the government argued, violations of the NIRA were similar to 
infringements against the FTC and should have been handled accordingly.  With 
disapproval, Hughes argued that Section 3 of the NIRA, which established the codes of fair 
competition, was unconstitutional.  Hughes argued that the NIRA and its code-making 
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abilities was an unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the Executive 
Branch.160  For this specific part of the Hughes court decision, he cited Federal Trade 
Comm’n v. Raladam Co., Federal Trade Comm’n v. Keppel, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech Nut 
Packing Co., and Federal Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co.161   
 Third, Hughes decided to address the intrastate transportation actions of the 
Schechter business.162  He affirmed that the Schechter brothers conducted their business 
transactions, a majority of the time in New York State.  The codes that dealt with wages and 
hours pertained to interstate exchanges, not intrastate ones.  Citing Brown v. Houston, 
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Landon, Industrial Association v. United States and Atlantic Coast 
Line v. Standard Oil Co., the Hughes court argued that the activities of the Schechter 
brothers were maintained in New York, especially their dealings with the general public.163  
In terms of the Schechter’s transactions in Pennsylvania, Hughes stated that just because 
primary goods flowed into New York State from other parts of the United States did not 
imply that those transactions after the fact flowed elsewhere.164  The wage and hours 
provisions of the live poultry code did not apply, because the Schechter Company’s actions 
were intrastate and did not affect the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.   
 Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone concurred but for different reasons.165  They 
argued that, in terms of the Commerce clause of the United States’ Constitution, the 
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dissenting justices could not find any directness in terms of the relationship between 
intrastate versus interstate commerce.  The dissenting justices wondered when an 
economic transaction was viewed as affecting interstate commerce.166  When was a 
transaction considered solely local or conducted within the state?  What was local 
commerce versus national or international commerce?  Moreover, Justice Cardozo argued 
that local or interstate commerce should not be studied or viewed in a vacuum.  It had to be 
examined in conjunction with other legal parameters.  The wages and hours provisions that 
made up the live poultry code lost their meaning, once it had been determined that the 
actions of the plaintiffs had been within the state of New York and not state or 
nationwide.167  The actions were local and the code collapsed under its weight after the 
actions of the Schechter corporations had been enumerated and illustrated vividly in the 
case.   
 With all of the challenges to the NIRA in the federal judiciary, do legal scholars 
currently believe that the NRA law was constitutional?  By employing dialectical skills, 
lawyers from this period argued in favor of and against this important law in American 
political history.  The NIRA was targeted to resolve a growing economic emergency, but 
temporary lawmakers and legal authorities, from the period, did not agree on the best 
approach to handle this industrial dilemma.  Clearly, there was and is evidence on both 
sides of the matter.  Further, the enforcement of the NIRA was problematic, which implied 
that the codes of fair competition were not the sole causes of court challenges.   
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 There is an underlying principle here that must be pointed out.  Roosevelt had 
differed from the previous administrations on the scope of federal control over the national 
economy.  The court cases that determined the constitutionality of the NIRA did not answer 
the question about how much regulation of the national economy was necessary to 
promote economic growth, only whether the Constitution provided for such regulations.  It 
would take the enactment of the Wagner Act of 1935, when judges affirmed the federal 
government’s expanded role in the national economy to alter federal court opinion of 
executive power, but the NIRA set the stage for these political discussions.  Further, the 
federal judiciary did not become on board with Roosevelt until after the nullification of the 
NIRA and AAA.  Once federal judges began to realize that New Deal legislation had become 
a necessity, and that it had public support, they ceased supporting challenges to those laws.  
In terms of the NIRA, hindsight allowed policymakers to take elements of the NIRA and 
apply them to future legislation.  After the Schechter case, those Americans who were 
determined to improve upon their daily work conditions and their elected officials, and 
even Supreme Court judges, came to agree that the Federal government had to play a role 
in the process.  
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CHAPTER 9:  EPILOGUE:  THE LEGACY OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT 
OF 1933 
 
 In many of his 1932 campaign speeches, President Herbert Hoover argued that the 
election was “more than a contest between two parties.”1  Rather, it was a battle between 
two different political ideologies.2  Two ways of life were at stake.3    In his campaign 
speeches, Roosevelt countered that “bold and persistent experimentation” was needed to 
establish economic growth, reform industrial and business practices, and stimulate 
corporate profitability.4  If one experiment did not work, he argued, these scholars, 
industrialists, business leaders and policymakers should try alternative strategies.  Both 
candidates asked what role should the federal government take.5  Should policymakers 
establish a strong, centralized federal government with responsibility for individual 
welfare and regulating the national economy, or should the federal government maintain a 
limited role?   
Throughout the economic crisis, Americans witnessed a change in how political 
officials viewed government and in their ideas about making government work.  Public 
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opinion came to the surface during this time period, and ordinary Americans began to play 
an active role in the government process by writing letters to their Congressional 
representatives and to the president and in listening to speeches on the radio.  Political 
officials were beginning address the concerns of ordinary citizens with more respect, 
because they made themselves more visibly a part of the political process.  Their votes 
mattered.  Some policymakers, such as former Democratic Governor of Colorado, William E. 
Sweet, argued that the problems that Americans faced during the Great Depression were 
similar to those experienced by Britons over one hundred years before.6  Industrial and 
self-discipline had been lost, and the codes of fair competition served to bring them back.  
Implicitly, elected officials had to maintain a balance between supply and demand and that 
only the codes of fair competition could strike a healthy equilibrium.         
After 1929, the United States faced trying economic conditions.  There had been 
some minor depressions throughout the 1920s, but 1929 became a devastating year for the 
United States.  The Great Crash was detrimental to national economy in the United States; 
and for some, it signaled the beginning of the end to Old World Individualism.  Both Hoover 
and Roosevelt were prominent public officials who attempted to devise resolutions to 
address these dismal economic conditions.  But were they both successful in solving the 
Great Depression?  Was the American way of life changing for the better?  Did the struggle 
over governmental powers under the New Deal yield results?   
 Throughout this dissertation, I have discussed the reasons for the coming of the 
Great Depression and sought to add to this economic debate by discussing how the New 
Deal programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and National Industrial Recovery 
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Act (NIRA) were designed to mitigate this economic emergency.  The AAA handled the poor 
economic conditions of the farming community.  It established a processing tax for farmers 
to produce smaller amounts of crops through production controls and used quotas to 
improve liquidity and strengthen commodity prices.  With farmers producing limited crops, 
the prices for agricultural goods were supposed to increase in value.  But did this work?  
Some policymakers, farmers, and scholars believed that the AAA reemphasized the farm 
economy, while other contended that the economic situation became worse.  In both cases, 
the question might be asked “better for whom”? 
The NIRA was designed to regulate the industrial sectors; but in the petroleum and 
automobile industries, the NIRA may have caused more problems than it was able to 
resolve.  Many corporate executives from the petroleum industry sought to avoid price and 
production controls, because they did not want government to regulate their sector.  In the 
automobile sector, Henry Ford sought to bypass industrial codes and maintain his control 
over Ford Motor Company.  General Motors, Chrysler, and the small vendors worried about 
their economic future, because of Henry Ford’s resistance to the NIRA’s guidelines.  Ford 
did not want government regulations of his business operations.  He particularly worried 
about the enactment of section 7(a) of the NIRA.  What would it do to his company and its 
efforts to control its healthy industrial environment?  Although Ford did not sign the 
industry codes for the automobile sector until 1934, he adhered to the letter of the law.  
Henry Ford maintained higher wages, benefits, and limited work hours for his employees, 
but the question is why did Ford comply with the industry codes, if he did not approve of 
them?   
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Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., and General Motors Corporation took a different political 
approach to the NIRA.  Initially, Sloan was supportive of the law.  A member of the 
Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA, he backed Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential 
election.  Satisfied when Roosevelt gave his inauguration speech on March 4, 1933, Sloan 
had high hopes for the administration, but he saw them dimmed by 1934.  Sloan believed in 
good wages for his employees and benefits, but he did not approve of the closed shop or 
trade unionism.  With the introduction of the industrial codes, Sloan became concerned 
that the NRA was attempting to tell corporate executives how to run their businesses.  He 
soon took a more conservative stance and switched to back the National Association of 
Manufacturers, who opposed the NIRA in the mid-1930s.  In Sloan’s view, the public and 
private sectors had merged too much.  He worried that he would have to surrender his 
control over General Motors to an outside party or the public sector similar to the debacle 
of 1920, when Durant was ousted, because of his stock market dealings on Wall Street.  
Collective bargaining was Sloan’s chief concern.  Although he believed in some workers’ 
rights and benefits, he was not inclined to have workers assert themselves over the 
company’s profitability and economic livelihood.   
With the decline of the NIRA and the NRA, the codes of fair competition that held the 
automobile industry together came asunder.  After 1935, there were many strikes in 
Detroit and throughout the Midwest.7  Auto workers had supported Roosevelt and believed 
in the principles behind the NIRA.  They were sorely disappointed when the law was 
declared unconstitutional.  The United Automobile Workers understood that, in order to 
improve upon the workers’ rights through collective bargaining, the negotiators had to 
                                                           
7 Lewis L. Lorwin, “Industrial Truce or Strife:  The Labor Problem Analyzed,” The New York Times, November 4, 
1934. 
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agitate for social and economic justice among the Big Three, because it had the greatest 
market share.  By August 1935, the United Auto Workers was established and began to act 
aggressively to unionize the auto industry.8 
Overall, the UAW’s approach worked.  It was not, however, until the coming of the 
Second World War that workers at Ford Motor Company, received the right to bargain 
collectively, which had been initially a guarantee under the NIRA’s Section 7(a).  Finally, the 
UAW decided not to strike against Ford Motor Company due to the particular conditions at 
the company.  Ford had not signed the automobile code until 1934, but the firm catered to 
its workers to ensure that working conditions and benefits were strengthened. 
Before the NRA or even the War Industries Board (WIB) during World War I, the 
federal government was decentralized and lacked a common hierarchical system to 
organize its agencies.  Moreover, political parties and interest groups played dynamic roles 
in the enactment of laws and their implementation.  On the whole, there was little federal 
and state development except for periods of war prior to the 1930s.  Even though federal 
agencies were separate from the private sector, business and industry leaders influenced 
government policies, laws and statutes.  In the political environment of the early New Deal 
period, the passage of the NIRA and the emergence of the NRA were watershed 
developments, as they were without precedence.  The NRA had to “start from scratch,” 
because it did not have many models on which to base to the new agency.9   Moreover, 
scholars argue, that the NRA was staffed with industry leaders, business executives, and 
corporate heads.  Business interests were often promoted, and trade unionism and 
                                                           
8 John Barnard, American Vanguard:  The United Auto Workers During the Reuther Years, 1935-1970 (Detroit:  
Wayne State University Press, 2004), 3-4, 30, 41, 48. 
9 Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, “State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” 264. 
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collective bargaining took a backseat.  These individuals did not believe in “cut-throat 
competition,” but they sought to steer the NRA and its economic organizations in a more 
conservative direction.   
 Despite constitutional limitations, there is some counter evidence to the above-
mentioned ideas.  The NIRA might have worked, if it had been given more time.  It needs to 
be examined more closely to discover the tenets that did work so that they could be 
improved upon.  Former New Deal president of the American Economic Association, John 
Maurice Clark, contended that over four million jobs had been created, because of the 
passage of the NIRA in 1933 in both the private and public sectors.10  He showed that 
500,000 jobs were created each month until 1934, when his article was written.  Moreover, 
work hours had been reduced from 43 to 37 ½ per week while hourly wages improved 
from 43 ½ cents to 52 ½ cents.  With these positive developments, the Roosevelt 
administration was on the right track in terms of creating sound economic public policies.  
But scholars may never know completely if the NIRA was a success or failure, because the 
law was declared unconstitutional in May 1935. 
   In the spring months of 1935 and winter of 1936, the United States’ Supreme Court 
declared the AAA (Butler v. the United States)11 and NIRA (A.L.A. Schechter v. the United 
                                                           
10 J.M. Clark, “Economics and the National Recovery Administration,” 18-19; John Maurice Clark was an economist 
who graduated with a P.H.D. from Columbia University, and he was a gifted Keynesian theorist.  He was also the 
president of the American Economic Association in 1935.   
11 John W. Graff, “Agricultural Adjustment Administration,” 182-183; Paul L. Murphy, “The New Deal Agricultural 
Program and the Constitution,” 161; W.J.W., “Constitutional Law,” 369-370; Alpheus Thomas Mason, “Politics and 
the Supreme Court:  President Roosevelt’s Proposal,” 661,665-666,669-670; Donald R. Richberg, “Should the 
Power of the Federal Government Be Increased,” Michigan Law Review 39, no. 6 (April 1941):  846; Edward L. 
Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, “Henry A. Wallace,” 134; Donald R. Richberg, “The Constitution and 
the New Deal,” 63; David Atkinson, “Mr. Justice Cardozo and the New Deal:  An Appraisal,” Villanova Law Review 
15, no. 1 (Fall 1969):  79.  Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty:  A Constitutional History of the United States (New 
York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 674.  There was a 6 to 3 decision in supporting the nullification of the AAA; Richard 
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States)12 unconstitutional.  The court further invalided the processing tax under the AAA 
and the codes of fair competition of the NIRA in two separate cases.13  The NIRA had been 
up for Congressional renewal for two additional years, but it did not pass.  Roosevelt, 
however, was able to renew some segments of the National Recovery Administration until 
April 1, 1936.14  Many members of the NRA lost their jobs, and only a limited amount of 
personnel was allowed to stay on and work regulating the industrial sectors.  Their duties 
were to enforce the emergency stipulations of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, and they were limited to assuming this role.  In addition, Roosevelt was angered by 
these judicial developments, and he sought to regulate the Supreme Court with his court 
packing bill or the Judicial Reform Act of 1937.15 
 The Judicial Reform Act of 1937 was to infuse new blood into the federal judiciary 
and turn around the conservative bias of the court.  It allowed for the retirement of federal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Polenberg, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933-1935:  A Brief History with Documents (Boston:  Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2000), 10-11. 
12 Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945),” http://gwu.edu/ (accessed 
November 2, 2012); Gene Smiley, “The Great Depression,” Library of Economics and Liberty, 
http://www.econlib.org/ (accessed November 2, 2012); Timothy Sandefur, “Comes a Horseman,” National Review, 
September 2010, 38. http://www.nationalreview.com. (accessed March 14, 2015); William E. Leuchtenburg, 
“When Franklin Delano Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme Court and Lost,” Smithsonian Magazine, 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/showdown.html. (accessed September 15, 2013); William 
E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn:  The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1995), 89.  May 27, 1935 was called Black Monday because of three decisions including 
Schechter, one of which nullified NIRA and declared that they were unconstitutional; Stephen K. Shaw, William D. 
Pederson and Frank J. Williams, eds., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court Volume 3 
(Armonk, New York:  M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 23. 
13 William E. Leuchtenburg, “Showdown on the Court,” Smithsonian, May 2005. http://www.smithsonian.com. 
(accessed March 14, 2015); David M. Kennedy, “The Supreme Court Reborn:  The Constitutional Revolution in the 
Age of Roosevelt,” The Atlantic, July 1995. 
14 Franklin Delano Roosevelt:  “Statement on Conference with Congressional Leaders after Supreme Court Decision 
on N.R.A.,” June 4, 1935.  Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15067.  (accessed March 24, 2013); Franklin Delano Roosevelt:  
“Executive Order 7076 Extending the Activities of the N.R.A.,” June 15, 1935.  Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/us/?pid=15082). (accessed March 
29, 2015) . 
15 “Court Packing and Unpacking,” Buffalo News, November 5, 2013; Carter Hodding III, “Viewpoint:  Court Packing:  
Tradition of Both Left and Right,” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 1986. 
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judges who had been 70 years of age or older and had held judicial tenure for 10 years or 
longer.16  When a federal judge reached a certain age, moreover, new judges could be 
appointed in an effort to “pack the court” with new members.  This bill, if passed, would 
have created the judicial and political foundation on which Roosevelt could obtain more 
favorable decisions:  but the bill was dependent upon Senate approval for the new 
appointees.  Thus, Roosevelt would have increased his executive powers, but he would 
have had to still rely upon the Congress for appointment purposes.  For the general public, 
Roosevelt’s plan was an executive overreach.  It contributed to the fraught relationship 
among the Federal Judicial, Executive, and Legislative branches of government in the 
United States during this period and also cost Roosevelt and his New Deal political capital.   
Did the Judicial Reform Act of 1937 have public support?17  Overall, the nation was 
equally divided over the issue.  Support for the proposal averaged about 31 to 46 percent 
while disapproval for the bill was about at 41 to 49 percent.18  The New Deal programs 
were popular, but others believed that the court bill went too far in seeking to regulate the 
behavior of the Federal Judiciary.  During most of the New Deal, the Supreme Court 
maintained its conservative stance.  The justices as a whole opposed the design and context 
of President Roosevelt’s proposals.  The NIRA and the AAA were declared unconstitutional, 
                                                           
16 Kermit L. Hall, ed, Major Problems in American Constitutional History Volume II:  From 1870 to the Present 
(Lexington:  D.C. Heath and Company, 1992), 197; Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers, 292; William E. 
Leuchtenburg, “Showdown on the Court,” Smithsonian, May 2005. http://www.smithsonian.com. (accessed March 
14, 2015), 106; David M. Kennedy, “The Supreme Court Reborn:  The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of 
Roosevelt, The Atlantic, July 1995, 87. http://www.theatlantic.com. (accessed March 14, 2015).  Kennedy 
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(Summer 1998):  16. 
18 Gregory A. Caldeira, “Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court:  FDR’s Court-Packing Plan,” The American 
Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987):  1146. 
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because the Supreme Court did not agree with the centralized planning of Roosevelt’s New 
Deal proposals and laws.  The national economy was moving in new directions as it had a 
more international face; but that did not mean all understood the trend.  The Supreme 
Court may not have realized how globalism affected the federal, state, and local authorities.  
The Supreme Court was further divided about whether the expanded role of government in 
regulating the American national economy should be allowed.  The Judicial Reform Act was, 
in this sense, a short term failure in its reform of the court, but it had other consequences. 
Although the Judicial Reform Act of 1937 did not pass Congress, the Supreme Court 
became more liberal in its decision-making.19  The Court became more supportive of 
federal government acts and policies.  It began to understand that government agencies 
had to play a dynamic role in providing benefits and services to the American citizens, 
especially in times of great need.  More to the point, the Federal judiciary revised its 
interpretation of Executive powers and the Commerce clause.  In 1935, it found the 
National Labor Relations Act, among other legislation, constitutional.   
 The NIRA was the first peacetime measure to apply centralized planning 
mechanisms to the national economy.20  The law was written to reduce competition and 
alter the system of laissez-faire government, which many felt no longer worked.  Roosevelt 
was convinced that the NIRA mitigated the negative efforts of overproduction, which had 
                                                           
19 Stamford Parker, The Words that Reshaped America, 114-115; Howard F. Bremer, ed., Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
139-145; Thomas E. Vadney, The Wayward Liberal:  The Political Biography of Donald Richberg (Lexington:  The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 186; William H. Chafe, ed., The Achievements of American Liberalism:  The 
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reduced wages as employers sought to lower labor costs, and thus to prevent corporate 
bankruptcies from weakening the American private sector.21  In 1933, many Congressional 
members felt that the bill was a necessity, because it would have strengthened the 
industrial sector.  Throughout the NIRA, policymakers, such as General Hugh Samuel 
Johnson and Donald Richberg, defended the practices of the NRA; but the NRA remained a 
controversial government agency.  Under the NIRA, wages seem to have increased and 
work hours decreased.  Child labor was curtailed throughout American corporations.  The 
measure had been put in place to reduce cut-throat pricing in the crisis economy, but 
doubts remained.22   
This dissertation argues that both Hoover and Roosevelt were responsible for the 
economic turnaround of the national economy during the 1930s.  Hoover took on a macro 
approach in his decision-making processes, because of his wartime experiences in Belgium 
during the First World War.  He examined the international system and attempted to 
produce intergovernmental reforms.  He also created one of the most important agencies—
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)—in bringing about some recovery.23  
Roosevelt looked at domestic conditions and sought to create national laws that applied to 
the American crisis.  In the end, the policies of both presidents helped to moderate the 
effects of the Great Depression.   
There were many lessons that can be drawn from the NIRA.  First of all, the 
purchasing power of the American people was an important factor to address in the crisis.  
In the consumer-based economy, goods were developed and produced for the American 
                                                           
21 Ibid, 169-170. 
22 Leonard Silk, “The United States and the World Economy,” 476. 
23 R.G. Tugwell, “The Protagonists:  Roosevelt and Hoover,” The Antioch Review 13, no. 4 (Winter 1953):  419-420. 
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public.  A predominantly agricultural economy had been replaced by a powerful 
manufacturing nation-state.  Now, with new government mechanisms, the consumer 
economy was put back on trade.  
Second, most nations, by the 1930s, witnessed the coming of powerful global 
conditions that contributed to policies that affected all nations collectively.  Collective 
security within such institutions as the League of Nations and later the United Nations 
began to promote united efforts at regulating global conditions.  Both Hoover and 
Roosevelt were important political figures to the changing global role of the United States, 
because they realized that the world was becoming a smaller place with global citizens that 
interacted globally.  The domestic character of the early New Deal should not obscure that 
Roosevelt also saw the importance of the domestic recovery for the global economy.  
Roosevelt sought to devise strategies that enabled Americans to move forward, but 
he could not govern this country without taking into consideration the policies of other 
nations, especially its allies.  The NIRA was a step in the right direction toward recovery.  
Many of the provisions of the NRA were thought-provoking and remain in use in 
contemporary American society, such as child labor laws, collective bargaining between 
businesses and trade unions, and higher wages and benefits, and work hour limitations.  
The questions that scholars had to ask is whether they were a better off, because of the 
NIRA or whether, because the private sector reasserted itself after it was declared 
unconstitutional?   
The NIRA had its pros and cons, but overall, the law had the interests of the 
American people at heart.  The NIRA continues to be seen as a controversial law, but it was 
developed during a time in which Americans had been “grasping for air.”  One question that 
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scholars will have to ask is, if the NIRA was detrimental to the American economy, what 
could have replaced it?  Were there any pieces of legislation that could have supplanted the 
NIRA and promoted economic change?  But if economic revitalization, in terms of Gross 
Domestic Product growth, occurred with the emergence of the Second World War, does 
this mean that both Hoover and Roosevelt were wrong in their political assertions?24  We 
may never know.  But to ask these sorts of questions opens the political debate in this 
country and throughout the world.  Hopefully, this dissertation will start a new discussion.
                                                           
24 Leonard Silk, “The United States and the World Economy,” 463; Eric Rauchway, “New Deal Denialism,” Dissent 
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 This dissertation seeks to place the National Recovery Administration (NRA), a central agency of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, in historical context.  It explores the NRA’s origins in the political 
agendas and ideological arguments of presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as they 
reshaped the federal government’s role in bringing about an end to the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
The dissertation most closely focuses on Roosevelt’s enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1933, the response of the Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation in the automobile 
sector, and the petroleum industry to the NRA’s passage.  The approval and implementation of 
industrial codes established minimum price levels and production controls for petroleum commodities 
that reformed the oil sector; but they also generated opposition to the New Deal.     
Following recent studies, this dissertation argues that, through the New Deal, President 
Roosevelt sought to expand the roles that federal government played vis-à-vis everyday citizens.  
Roosevelt realized that Americans required financial assistance of the federal government when there 
was an economic downturn or collapse that was beyond their control.  Similarly, this dissertation argues 
that, with the emergence of the NIRA and section 7(a), collective bargaining and trade unionism came to 
the forefront and provided American workers with more tangible rights and benefits.  If President 
406 
 
 
 
Roosevelt had not restructured the economy by providing relief to ordinary Americans and promoting 
industrial reforms, then the United States might not have recovered or recovered as robustly from the 
Great Depression.  Certainly, the nation’s economic and political structures were altered by the “bold 
experiment” of the NRA and the New Deal as a whole.  Finally, the NRA did, in fact, have an impact on 
ordinary citizens through the slow decline of unemployment and an increase in hourly wage rates.  From 
the corporate perspective, the power of the regulatory state, as embodied in the National Recovery 
Administration, had to be resisted; still, the NRA was but one example of the further intervention of 
government power in the private market. 
In step with other studies, the dissertation contextualizes the New Deal by contrasting 
Roosevelt’s approach from that of his predecessor, Herbert Hoover’s steadfast belief in American 
Individualism and self-help as the foundation of his approach to the economic crisis.  He believed that 
everyday Americans could pull themselves up by the bootstraps and become economically viable 
without federal intervention.  Hoover promoted private charities and local relief, not public sector 
involvement to address the problems of deprivation and destitution among ordinary Americans.  In the 
end, even as he created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which was a first step toward the 
New Deal, Hoover became a severe critic of Roosevelt’s policies.  In contrast, Roosevelt’s NRA 
experiment, despite opposition and its dismantling in the wake of Supreme Court decisions, became a 
milestone in the growth of presidential power in the twentieth century and furthered the integration of 
federal government agencies into the private sector.    
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